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Žhen ů heard ĭe learn’d Ćtronomer;
Žhen ĭe proofs, ĭe Ėgures, were ranged in columns before me;
Žhen ů wĆ shownĭe charts andĭe diagrams, to add, divide, andmeĆure
ĭem;
Žhen ů, sitting, heardĭeĆtronomer, where he leĊuredwiĭmuch applaĮe
in ĭe leĊure-room,
Ůow soon, unaccounĬble, ů became tired and sick;
źiğ rĝing and gliding out, ů wander’d oﬀ by myself,
ůn ĭe myﬆical moĝt night-air, and Ěom time to time,
Ųook’d up in perfeĊ silence ćĭe ﬆars.
—WaltWhitman
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AbﬆraĆ
ăis thesis is centred around the analysis of how the diﬀerent groups of specialist ex-
perts that make up theoretical physics at large communicate and transmit knowledge
between themselves. ăe analysis is carried out using two sociological frameworks: the
Studies in Expertise and Experience (SEE) approach by Collins & Evans (2007), and
mechanisms of sociological and institutional trust in the general sociology of science
literature. I argue that the communication process is carried out in two ways: through
interactional expertise that is based on deep comprehension when the interaction is
between micro-cultures that are sociologically closely connected, and through lower
forms of knowledge relying on trust for the micro-cultures that are sociologically far
apart.
Because Collins&Evans’ framework is strongly based on processes of transmission
of tacit knowledge, an analysis of the importance of tacit knowledge in physics is carried
out to support the thesis. Speciđc types of tacit knowledge are closely examined to
understand how they shape theoretical physics practice. I argue that ‘physical intuition’,
oneof the guidingprinciples of all theoretical activity, is in fact a typeof tacit knowledge
— somatic tacit knowledge — that is familiar to both philosophers and sociologists
within the academic literature. ăe end result is a description of physics that highlights
the importance of sociological mechanisms to hold the discipline together, and that
permitknowledge to Ĕow from the empirical to the theoretical poles of physics practice,
and vice versa. ăe thesis is supported by unstructured interview material and by the
author’s prolonged interaction within theoretical physics professional circles.
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IntroduĆion
Ųike my moĭer Įed to say, ‘if my grandmoĭer had wheels, she’d be a troğey
car.’ųymoĭer didn’t have wheels, she had varicose veins. Źtiğ, ĭe woman
gave birĭ to a briğiantmind. ůwĆ considered forĭeŴobelŶrize in physics.
ů didn’t gċ it, but you know, it’s ağ politics jĮt like every oĭer phony honor.
—Ũorĝ,ĭeorċical physicĝt; openingmonologueĚomŽoodyŧğen’s ‘Žhć-
everŽorks’
A new picture of theoretical physics
ăis thesis will examine the way in which diﬀerent types of theoretical physics groups
establish communication amongst themselves, andwith other theoreticians from đelds
of knowledge closely related to physical theory (viz. experimental physics and math-
ematics). A preliminary diﬃculty in carrying out this project is that while physics
is usually categorised as either experimental or theoretical — and this classiđcation
is observed within the majority of philosophical and sociological studies of science
— this classiđcation does little justice to the many types of physics involved in non-
experimental work. ăus before facing the problem of communication in full, I will
start out by oﬀering a richer vision of physics practice than is usually given in the sci-
ence studies literature. Although I will examine the culture of ‘traditional’ pure theo-
reticians working in front of blackboards, trying to write down the laws that describe
the fundamental interactions of the physical universe, Iwill also draw attention to other
areas of theory that lie between this high-theory and purely experimental physics (that
is, laboratory physics). ăe areas that mediate between theory and experiment con-
stitute sociologically autonomous đelds of knowledge and practice, even though their
xv
śIntroduĆion xvi
Experiment
Experimental
analysis
Simulation
Logic
Pure 
mathematics Applied
mathematics
Mathematical
physics
Modelling
Mathematics
High theory
Phenomenology
Pure theory
Figure 1: ăe horseshoe diagram.
social networks overlap with the networks of physicists in the other more theoretical
or more empirical domains. ăese phenomenological physics domains include sets of
skills that are distinct from those found either in pure theory or experiment. ăe struc-
ture of these overlaps and the exchanges of knowledge which they permit are the main
topics of this thesis.
Byprobing the role of phenomenological physics Iwill oﬀer anewpicture of physics
that portrays the discipline as a diverse mix of epistemic elements bonded together by
social interactions and special languages. In parallel I will also describe mathemati-
cal physics as the connection between physics and theory’s other epistemic pole, pure
mathematics. Like phenomenology, mathematical physics has developed into an au-
tonomous area of expertise that is independent from both pure theory and pure math-
ematics. ăis model of physics is represented in Figure 1, which I will refer to as the
‘horseshoe diagram’.
ăe horseshoe diagram represents a ‘chain of practices’ that I will illustrate in the
following chapters, by elucidatinghowtheoretical knowledge is sociologically connected
to the production of empirical and mathematical knowledge. ăe horseshoe shape de-
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picts how physics is a science that is ‘grounded’ on two poles, like a magnet. While
these poles are ‘opposites’ if viewed from a classical epistemological point of view, they
are in fact tied together by scientists’ practical work and discourse. In fact, there are
further similarities to the physical properties of a magnet. When one breaks a magnet
into smaller pieces, these still maintain their bi-polar properties. Likewise, every one
of the lozenges in the diagram, seen as a piece of practical physics, is subject to the si-
multaneous pull of the empirical and the mathematical. ăis is the heart of all physics.
All physics confronts this tension, but each epistemic pole aﬀects the diﬀerent ‘micro-
cultures’ of theoretical physics in diﬀerent ways. In order to explain how this occurs, I
will focus on two themes: theway that each lozenge canbe conceptualised as a sociolog-
ically and epistemically autonomous space, and the way in which knowledge is trans-
mitted across and between these. ăe horseshoe diagram also distinguishes between
three broad ‘families’ of practices (mathematics, high-theory, phenomenology), groups
ofmicro-disciplines whose practitioners tend to interact closely orwhere there is ample
possibility for individuals to move across the boundaries of the individual lozenges.
ăeunity and disunity of physics
A topic central to science studies is the discussion concerning whether science as a cul-
tural phenomenon is uniđed by any sort of generalised property, method, object, etc.,
or what in the literature is loosely referred to as the question of ‘the unity of science’. Ʋ
As Galison & Stump (1996) point out, the debate in modern terms can be traced back
to theViennaCircle’s desire to đnd a languagewhereby all scientiđc endeavour could be
given đrm universal roots, as glimpsed through the title of the logical positivist’s most
celebrated collective publication, the Encyclopaedia of UniĖed Science.
In Chapter 1 I explore how the positivist uniđcation project has inĔuenced sci-
ence studies’ descriptions of theoretical physics, and how the implicit positivist lead
has given rise to minimal epistemic diversity in descriptions of physical theory. ăe
chapter is dedicated to tracing how social studies of science developed alternative ac-
counts of scientiđc knowledge by positing sociological demarcation criteria that do not
đt traditional subject-centred epistemologies, and the eﬀect of this transition to a col-
ƲSee for example Oppenheim& Putnam (1958).
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lective epistemology on the uniđcation project. Although the present consensus in so-
cial studies of science is that science is a diverse and multi-faceted collection of prac-
tices and languages that deđes uniđcation (whatmay be termed the disunity thesis), this
generalisation is nevertheless not reĔected in the way theoretical physics is currently
understood or described by social studies of science. ăis is argued to be due in part
to the limited number of sociological reĔections on theoretical physics. Appealing to a
popular science studies metaphor, although sociologists, anthropologists and ethnog-
raphers extensivelymappedout the practice of experimental physics, theoretical physics
still remains very much a ‘black-boxed’ discipline in sociological terms. ăe horseshoe
diagram is an illustration of how theoretical physics can be re-conceptualised as a set of
smaller and disjoint micro-cultures. Hence, this work resonates with and embraces the
disunity thesis.
Chapter 2 describes the general properties of each lozenge and illustrates the mul-
tiplicity of practices in theoretical physics, that is, it shows that the disunity thesis
holds true in theoretical practice. However, adhering to the disunity thesis is prob-
lematic because it comes coupled to another question: how is it that despite the mul-
tiplicity and fragmentation of practices, cultures, and languages in science it neverthe-
less remains possible for scientists to collaborate, cooperate and exchange knowledge?
ăe answer given here is twofold, based on the work of Collins & Evans (2007) and
their Studies in Expertise and Experience (SEE) framework. Within Collins & Evans’
framework knowledge-transfer is carried out in twoways: through ‘direct’ transmission
from esoteric-experts to other esoteric-experts who speak the same expert language, or
through secondary accounts that are reconstructed for the ‘layman’. ăeoretical physics
is argued to operate through these knowledge-exchange mechanism also. Lozenges in
the horseshoe diagram that are near to each other develop interactional expertise, or the
ability for individual experts in one lozenge to acquire prođciency in the language of
another lozenge without becoming full-blown experts in a ‘foreign’ domain’s practice.
Interactional experts acquire the ability to become fully prođcient in a foreign lozenge’s
language and culture, while stillmaintaining their own cultural identities. On the other
hand, for the case of lozenges that are ‘far’ from each other in the horseshoe diagram,
the low-level knowledge exchanged is based on setting up chains of trust in autonomous
expert domains.
I end the chapter discussing the interactional expertise/trust model in relation to
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the highly inĔuential trading zones model of Galison (1997), which has been broadly
posited as a solution to the problem of cross-cultural communication in science. Ac-
cording to this model when two autonomous cultures meet, in order to communicate
eﬀectively they start developing hybrid languages inside mutually sanctioned linguis-
tic spaces that are created for this purpose. A critical feature of trading zones is that
while some of these may be ephemeral and parasitic on the interaction between the
disjoint cultures, if the interaction is sustained for a long enough period a new and au-
tonomous language may emerge from the hybrid trading zone language. I argue that
this leads to conceptual complications which render trading zones as incomplete mod-
els of generalised scientiđc knowledge-exchange; in fact if taken at face value the lin-
guisticmetaphor used byGalison onlymakes cross-cultural communicationmore com-
plicated. While both models are not incompatible and can be seen to work in parallel
in some cases of theoretical collaboration, the trading zone model does not solve the
problem of communication posed by the disunity thesis, while the IE+trust model is
tailored made to permit communication across fragmented domains.
Chapter 3 analyses the problemof communication focusing on the high-theoretical
sectionof thehorseshoediagram, bydescribinghowhigh-theoreticians understand and
use empirical data in their work. In order for it to be considered physics and not math-
ematics the object of a theoretician’s study has to be somehow grounded on empirical
work. But experimental work lies well outside of high-theoretician’s realm of epistemic
authority, and in this sense high-theory and experiment are completely autonomous
domains, and the communication problem is most visible. I illustrate how trust is es-
tablished to apprehend established experimental results, even when in practice high-
theoreticians have no access to understanding themeans of experimental work. In fact,
no mutual understanding is necessary, and to further appreciate the structures behind
this ‘blind trust’, I illustrate the existence of what I have termed virtual empiricism: the
idea that although the epistemic mechanisms of experimental physics lie well outside
theoreticians’ direct access, other experts are always potentially if not actually available
to explain empirical knowledge production (or that given enough time, the theoreti-
cians themselves could potentially come to comprehend experiment in full). Lastly, I
also show that when these epistemic gaps are bridged by a sheer practical necessity to
collaborate, it is mainly through immersion in the other collaborator’s language and
culture— that is, through the development of interactional expertise.
śIntroduĆion xx
Chapter 4 explores the relationship between high-theory and mathematics, expli-
cating an epistemic division between them that parallels the one between high-theory
and experiment, and that also also uses mechanisms of trust to bridge large epistemic
gaps. I deepen the analysis of the concept of tacit knowledge further, examining the role
of tacit knowledge in mathematical and theoretical practice directly. Using the tripar-
tite typology of tacit knowledge found inCollins (2010), I analyse a famous discussion
between two mathematical schools in order to emphasise the importance of a partic-
ular kind of tacit knowledge that is of importance in both mathematics and physics:
somatic tacit knowledge. ăis type of tacit knowledge is traced to the concept of in-
tuition, which both mathematicians and physicists uphold as one of the key guiding
elements of their practice. ăe role of a second type of tacit knowledge, relational tacit
knowledge (knowledge that is potentially explicit, but remains tacit), is also explored
in connection with mathematical proofs and theoretical derivations. Tacit knowledge
is used as a primary sociologicalmarker to delimit the constitution of autonomous epis-
temic đelds and expertises. Finally I argue that it is the diﬃculty of transmitting tacit
knowledge that is the source of the theoretical physics’ fragmentation into diﬀerent
micro-cultures, and that gives rise to the need for mechanisms such as virtual empiri-
cism to face the diﬃculties in transmitting knowledge betweenmicro-cultures that are
distant from each other.
Chapter 5 elaborates on the last type of tacit knowledge, the most sociologically
signiđcant type: collective tacit knowledge. I present cases of people who practice the-
oretical physics outside of the culture of mainstream professional physics, and the rea-
sons that lead them to be labelled ‘cranks’ by physicists. ăese cases show that although
it is possible for cranks to do technically competent work in physics, the work is ille-
gitimate from the collective point of view because cranks are not immersed in the so-
cial world of professional physics. While scientists tend to emphasise the individual’s
universal accessibility to scientiđc knowledge when speaking to a non-scientiđc pub-
lic, when theoreticians confront cranks they tend to stress the collective dimensions of
scientiđc knowledge. In the latter case, theoreticians argue that the strength of their
discipline lies not in the individual but in the collective eﬀorts of consensus opinion.
Additionally, the strategies for ‘isolating’ the pool of communal knowledge fromcranks
is carried out at the collective, and not at the individual level. Finally, I also discuss the
means andprocesses throughwhichnovicephysicists acquire collective tacit knowledge
xxi śIntroduĆion
and are thus set up on the path of becoming expert theoreticians by their mentors, that
is, how novice theoreticians learn to practice ‘legitimate’ physics and become experts in
their đeld.
śIntroduĆion xxii
CHAPTER 0
Onmethodology
Ƈoughts and intentions, even one’s own— perhaps one’s own moﬆ of ağ—
remain shiĜing and elĮive. Ƈere ĝnot one singleĭought or intention of any
sort ĭć can ever be precĝely eﬆablĝhed. Žhć ĭe uncerĬinty of ĭoughts
does have in common wiĭ ĭe uncerĬinty of particles ĝ ĭć ĭe diﬃculty
ĝ not jĮt a praĊical one, but a syﬆemćic limiĬtion which cannot even in
ĭeory be circumvented.
—ų.Ŭrayn, ‘ũopenhagen’ (poﬆscript)
Onmethodology: Fleck, ‘thought styles’ and ‘thought col-
lectives’
In his analysis ofmedical biology, Fleck (1935, p.39) introduced the concept of thought
collective, which he deđned as “a community of persons mutually exchanging ideas or
maintaining intellectual interaction.” A though collective, he claimed “provides the
special carrier for the historical development of any đeld of thought, as well as for the
given stock of knowledge and level of culture.”ăis stock he named a thought style.
Fleck illustrated thought styles by developing a careful study of the emergence of
‘syphilis’ as a scientiđc concept, from antiquity to modern medical science. ăought
styles were the antecedents of T. S. Kuhn’s paradigms, and in Fleck’s opening chapter
1
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he condenses the ideas concerning paradigms that would later be set out and ampliđed
inKuhn (1962). Fleck (1935, p.29) also antedatedKuhn’s diﬀerentiation between nor-
mal periods of science and revolutionary periods brought about by ‘anomalies’ stating
that “many theories pass through two periods: a classical one in which everything is in
striking agreement, followed by a second period during which the exceptions begin to
come to the fore”. Ʋ In Fleck’s account thought styles are the collective matrices from
which concepts spring, just as paradigms are the social matrices on which Kuhn’s sci-
entiđc practice is carried out. As Fleck stresses — and as Kuhn would later posit as a
central tenet of his theory — it is not enough to investigate the relationship between
subject and object to understand how cognition and new knowledge come about, and
one must also include thought styles as “a third partner in this relation; it is a basic
factor of all new knowledge”.
For Fleck the principal object of study in the analysis of scientiđc knowledge is
not the individual but the thought collective and its associated thought style. It is
in the phenomena that transcend the individual that one is to đnd the characteristics
of thought collectives and thought styles. Fleck (1935, p.45) in fact argues that the
thought collective ismore stable than the individual as an object of study and as a repos-
itory of scientiđc knowledge, since as the epigraph for this chapter suggests, individuals
“consist of contradictory drives”.
Taking all this into account, one could posit that to apprehend the thought style of
a thought collective, one ought to probe the majority of individuals that are known
to be immersed in a thought collective, and then đnd the common strand in their
thought patterns. Following this pathway, if the aim of a researcher were to enunci-
ate the thought style underlying a particular scientiđc group, then the proper way to
carry on would be to probe as many individual minds of that community as possible
and to highlight the commonalities.
Fleck himself oﬀers an alternate pathway. Aĕer discussing thought styles and col-
lectives, Fleck presents himself as an example of a member of a scientiđc thought col-
ƲAlthough Kuhn acknowledged Fleck’s inĔuence on his own work, there are some diﬀerences in
both their theoretical and conceptual frameworks. Mößner (2011) for example suggests that though
collectives diﬀer signiđcantly from paradigms by the scope of conceptual phenomena that each author
aimed to encompass. Perhaps more importantly, Moશßner argues that while the process of abrupt change
and incommensurability is central to Kuhn’s conception of scientiđc change and the role of paradigms,
Fleck stresses that within a thought style changes occur gradually. Nevertheless, even in this critique the
similarities between the two concept are signiđcantly greater than the diﬀerences.
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lective, and then provides an extended reĔection upon the thought style that he has—
by deđnition— adopted in becoming a proven expert in a scientiđc đeld. Fleck (1935,
p.52) does this by attempting an explanation of a technique known as the Wasserman
reaction. “For a long time I have wondered how I could describe the Wasserman reac-
tion to a layman. No description can take the place of the idea that one acquires aĕer
many years of practical experience with the reaction”, he conđdes. Fleck’s strategy is to
identify those elements that allow him, a medical scientist, to enunciate to the layman
the ‘facts’ concerning the Wasserman reaction. Fleck is then able to reĔect on what
allows him to make sense of the scientiđc world in which the Wasserman reaction is
meaningful, as opposed to a layman, who by not having these concepts would see the
very same world devoid of any signiđcance.
To be then not to be
Just like Fleck’swritings on theWasserman reaction, the presentwork is also borne from
personal experience, speciđcally on nearly a decade of professional work as a physicist
during which I actively participated as a junior research assistant in one of Latin Amer-
ica’s most important physics institutes. Although I never formally attended higher de-
gree courses, I sat through countless seminars, colloquia, and conferences on physics
throughout these years. I co-authored a handful of peer-reviewed articles and spoke at
international conferences on a few occasions. Although I do not possess an upper-level
physics degree, I nevertheless have the experience of having been an actively partici-
pating young physics researcher, immersed in the daily life and the social world of the
physics professional.
But it is not onmy credentials ormy track record that this thesis on the sociological
aspects of theory is basedon. Itwas not in a classroom, but in theprolonged interaction,
in the being part of everyday physics research for an extended period where I learned
‘what being a physicist is like’. Even if I had not published anything (as happens with
most undergraduates and many graduate students), direct exposure to activities and
dialogues with and between other physicists would have put me in the same position
of immersion within the social world of physics.
ăis brings me back to Fleck’s reĔexive exercise. I grew interested in both philos-
ophy and sociology of science in my academic career at about the same time as I was
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exposed to the world of professional physics research. I was also deeply interested in
how sociological descriptions of science seemed to stray away from the image of science
proposed by the more ‘romantic’ physicist talk I knew, or the physics of popular sci-
ence. ăis was probably the beginning of the end of my career as a physicist. Aĕer a
physics degree, while still actively involved in physics research and publication, I began
aMaster’s degree in philosophy and sociology of science, which initiated a gradual mi-
gration out of physics research. ăis, perhaps, reached a conclusion around the middle
of the writing of this thesis. Nowadays, although I still keep contact with my scientiđc
ex-collaborators, and try to attend conferences as much as possible and to keep up with
arXiv publications in my đeld, I cannot say that I would be able to publish in the đeld
again— at least, not without months of intensive work exclusively on physics.
ăis interactional dimension is, I believe, fundamentally important for the plausi-
bility of the kind of social science research which is carried out here. ăe thesis can be
said to draw on a generalised method known in the literature as ‘participant observa-
tion’, which contrasts with another fundamental sociological methodological position
which can be referred to as ‘unobtrusive observation.’ I will not argue over the superi-
ority of either method over the other, but will discuss and outlining the positive and
negative aspects of participant observation.
ăe đrst thing to note is that participant observation is not a methodology in the
sense of a determined and algorithmic procedure or set of actions, but a generalised ap-
proach which involves the production of knowledge through the interaction of the re-
searcher with the subject, and not despite it. ăus Schwartz& Schwartz (1955, p. 344)
deđne it as “a process inwhich the observer’s presence in a social situation ismaintained
for the purpose of scientiđc observation. ăe observer is in a face-to-face relationship
with the observed, and, by participating with them in their natural life setting, he gath-
ers data.”ăe generalised approach thus having been set out, the way that interaction is
carried out can vary enormously.Ƴ
ăe subjective/objective dichotomy
Gold (1958) distinguishes four types of participant observation: complete-participant,
ƳSee Jackson (1983).
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participant-as-observer, observer-as-participant, and complete-observer, outlining the
virtues and diﬃculties associated with each type. Gold states complete observer as the
most desirable position for those that aim to become unobtrusive observers, for in fact
all observation is in some ways participant as in real research contexts there is no such
thing as a perfectly-unobtrusive observer. In the study carried out here, most of my ex-
perience in theoretical physics is divided according to Gold’s categorisation between
participant-as-observer (as in the earlier stages of my physics undergraduate degree,
where I still acted as a novice physics apprentice) and complete-participant (as in the
latter stages of my physics research where I was actively publishing and participating in
the activities of a professional physicist). ăe interview material comes from a transi-
tion period from a sporadic complete-participant to a current observer-as-participant.
Nevertheless,Gold (1958, p. 219) considers it crucial that the complete-participant
not fall into the trap of ‘going native’, that is, of losing sight that the observer is not
in fact part of the community under observation. According to Gold, the complete-
participant observer “knows that he is pretending to be a colleague”. ăis would seem
to introduce a fundamental problem for a complete-participant (like Fleck, or me) to
produce a sociological account of one’s own discipline.
Collins (1984) however has presented a diﬀerentway to address the problem, draw-
ing heavily from a philosophical perspective of the social sciences deeply inĔuenced by
the ‘late’ Wittgenstein, a position notably advocated by Winch (1958). According to
this philosophical view, the role of the social scientists is not to provide ‘objective’ infor-
mation that aims to describe cultures or societies as ‘outsiders’ with varying degrees of
detachedness, but rather to provide accounts that rest upon an understanding of these
cultures or societies. Absolute ‘distance’ between a social scientist and his object of
study is not only undesirable but also fatal to this sociological project. ăus Collins
refers to his ownwork not as ‘participant observation’ but ‘participant comprehension.’
Winch and Collins perceive sociology as a means to understand the ‘forms-of-life’
(Lebensform, sometimes translated as ‘life-form’) thatdeđne social groups, a termcoined
byWittgenstein to refer to those elements that permit individuals to make sense of the
linguistic world around them, to move around in that world, and to understand and
to give meaning to it. ăis is possible because according to Wittgenstein, to speak a
language is not only to know the meaning of a group of words and to put them in the
right order, but crucially includes the understanding of the form of life from which it
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sprung:
Here the term “language-game” is meant to bring to prominence that the
speaking is part of an activity, or of a life-form.ƴ
In fact, forms of life and languages are intrinsically tied together:
“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is
false?”— It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree
in the language they use. ăat is not agreement in opinions but in form of
life.⁴
Wittgenstein carefully explored the grammar of language games, that is, the set of
rules thatmake an actionwithin a game eithermeaningful ormeaningless as part of the
game. Wittgenstein showed that grammars are not and cannot be sets of pre-written
and completely unambiguous rules. One ofWittgensteinmost important propositions
is that it is in the application of a rule that one learns what it is to follow a rule correctly.
In fact, Wittgenstein argues, this is the way in which we actually use rules in practice
all the time, by being shown their correct usage. Wittgenstein dismisses the possibility
of there being unambiguous rules by noting that theremust always exist conventions to
enable rule following, for “the word ‘agreement’ and the word ‘rule’ are related to one
another, they are cousins. If I teach anyone the use of the one word, he learns the use of
the other with it”. ⁵
Translating this into a concrete sociological program was a crucial contribution
from Winch. ⁶ It is thus the ‘social grammar’ that one investigates in Wittgenstein/
Winch/ Collins-type sociology. When applied to sociological investigations, the cen-
tral topics to be studied are the elements of the socio-cultural world that enable mem-
bers of a social group to make their actions socially meaningful. To act in a socially
ƴWittgenstein (1953, §23 p. 23e).
⁴Wittgenstein (1953, §241 p. 75e).
⁵Wittgenstein (1953, §224 p. 73e).
⁶Pettit (2000, p. 64) has identiđed three core ‘individual-level’ theses inWinch’s work that are at the
centre of his sociological approach: “1. ăe rules thesis: understanding human action involves seeing
the rules or proprieties in accordance with which it is produced, not just detecting regularities in its
production. 2. ăe practicality thesis: understanding human action does not mean just grasping the
intellectual ideas that permeate it but, more deeply, cottoning on to the practical orientations of the
actors. 3. ăe participation thesis: understanding human action involves participating in the society of
the agents, at least in imagination, not just standing back and surveying that which they are doing.”
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meaningful way is to adopt the form-of-life that enables the enactment of social action,
thus focusing Wittgenstein’s ideas beyond the world of pure language and in action
itself.
From this perspective sociology takes on a new role where there is no longer a prob-
lemwithhow ‘close’ one should approach the object of study in order to produce proper
results. Instead, one must come up with the means to become completely immersed in
the way that the social actor understands the social world. ‘Going native’ is no longer a
problem, but instead an idealised virtue. Collins (1984, p. 60) explains, “In participant
comprehension, the participant does not seek to minimise interaction with the group
under investigation, but to maximise it. Native incompetence is not a technical prob-
lem to be overcome […], but rather the development of native competence may be the
end point of participant comprehension.”
ăeWittgensteinian sociologistwants to see the world through the native’s eyes. It
is those elements that permit this native vision to arise that make up the ‘social gram-
mar.’ ăe sociological sense is given not by an observational but by a reĔexive exercise:
it requires not only that the sociologist understand a form-of-life (as a native), but ad-
ditionally that he understand the process that allowed the acquisition of the ‘thought
style’ in question, as in Fleck’s case.
ăere remains themethodological problemofwhether ‘estrangement’ canbe achieved
by an ex-scientist in order to do sociology, and not just auto-ethnography. We know
that this is at least possible because otherwise sociologists would be incapable ofmaking
any pronouncements of the society they themselves live within, a scenario whichwould
invalidate an enormous (if not the most part) of existing sociological work! ăe estab-
lishment of ‘distance’ between oneself and one’s object of study when one has strong
links to that same object is not a simple matter, and it requires a deep reĔexive exer-
cise, but is not essentially impossible. As in Fleck’s case, this naturally leads to trying
to explain not only how it is that what one is trying to describe happens, but also why
this happens. ăe ‘why’ then becomes the key to introducing a second-level explana-
tion and entering the estrangement process where one needs to momentarily ‘suspend
doubt’ on experience in order to grasp themechanisms that bring this experience about.
One can, for example, choose a sociological explanation, just as well as one can choose
a historical one, an anthropological path, a psychological path, etc. ăe researcher also
has the access to other’s experiences, other’s reĔections and other’s explanations, which
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may or may not đt with one’s own. It is the latter one that tends to be the more intel-
lectually productive, because it forces one to defend or revise one’s own account, which
auto-ethnography has no need for since it is by deđnition only the researcher’s own
experience that is needed.
Many kinds of physics
ăePhysics Institute where I worked had the advantage of being theoretically centred;
during the đrst year I spent there at the Experimental Physics Department I proved
to be completely and absolutely incompetent at any work of that type. During that
time I did however learn a good deal of what experimental work looks like, by playing
a rather insigniđcant role in developing the computer simulation that would be used
to calibrate a neutron detector that would later be used at CERN. Again, more than
my ‘achievements’, it was the exposure to the weekly seminar and colloquia, the possi-
bility of seeing the inside of a rusting but still working van der Graaf accelerator, the
extended conversation with my experimental student colleagues and supervisor, that
enriched my vision of what physics looks like from the inside. Aĕer a year I moved to
the theoretical half of the institute, fortunate enough to land in a group where a di-
verse mixture of people interacted and where work involved exposure to many kinds
of theoretical physics, from computer programming of simulations of nanotechnology
devises, to theoretical scrutiny of very mathematical theory.⁷ ăe Physics Institute also
oﬀered me the same great advantages that being at the National University of Mexico
oﬀers all its students and staﬀ: a constant bombardment of physics-related seminars
and colloquia. Just within the Physics Institute, there were three regular weekly semi-
nars to attend: solid state, theory and experiment. Since all the research institutes are
located within minutes of each other, I also had the opportunity to attend seminars
from other institutes.
I started this thesis with one thing in mind, which brings me again back to Fleck:
attempting to explain to the ‘sociological layman’ what theoretical physics looks like
⁷My main topic of research was the Casimir eﬀect, which has been tackled from the theoretical per-
spective at the Institute by several research groups through the study of Green function methods, and
which was our main mathematical tool. I also grew interested in using Nonstandard Analysis to under-
stand the inđnite quantities that appear in Casimir force calculations.
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‘from the inside’, and to connect it to sociological analyses of scientiđc practice. How-
ever, a problem arises which has been amply discussed in the sociological literature.
How can I be sure that my experience and my conceptions of theoretical physics are
the reĔection of the ‘thought collective’, to use Fleck’s terminology? ăere are ways for
the researcher to keep ‘checks and balances’ and show that an argument is reasonable.
ăeđrst is also based on one of Fleck’s observation that in order to develop ideas, and in
order to communicate them to one’s professional peers, there is a lot of commonknowl-
edge that has to be presupposed. When trying to explain theWasserman reaction, Fleck
explains how he đnds that many of the terms that as a professional he would đnd un-
derstandable almost as second-nature, when explaining to a layman he has to stop and
reĔect on how to put into easier terms. ăe important point here is that as ‘specialists’,
the thought collective’s thought style plays an important role not only for the individ-
ual to ‘tap into’ the thought collective, but for also for the individuals within a thought
collective to dialogue between themselves, to understand each other. During the inter-
view sessions with theoreticians to gather material for this thesis, I acted not only as a
passive recipient of information but sometimes introduced questions that were specif-
ically intended as a check on either my or previous interviewees’ aﬃrmations. ăere
were times where despite my insistence on particular viewpoints, the interviewees were
very resistant to my answers, and I was forced to concede that these were indeed views
that ‘did not đt themould’. I have included this in the text where appropriate by noting
that even if I hold a certain point to be ‘widely held’, there may be signiđcant number
of physicists or theoreticians that do not adhere to my viewpoint.
In fact being a sociologist, or passing as a sociologist, is not always the bestway to get
at the spirit of theoretical physics. A curious phenomenon which I can only recount in
anecdotal terms is the attitudes that my interviewees exhibited depending on whether
they sawme as a sociologist or as a physicist. I noticed very clearly that withmost ofmy
interview subjects, when I established contact đrst as a sociologist the initial interview
answerswere verymuch alignedwith the public, ‘politically-correct’, non-sociologically
informed portrayal that science disseminates to the public. On the other hand, when
I presented myself as an ex-physicist, the answers were more frank and closer to the
traditional đndings of STS.⁸ ăis phenomenon is not unknown in sociology. Jackson
⁸A brief example is given in Chapter 1, when ProfessorM. Berry admits having started out our inter-
views with such an attitude, when by the second interview he had ‘let down his guard.’ In order for this
śChapter 0 10
(1983) for example quotes Whyte (1979), explaining that, “informants generally đnd
it a rewarding experience to be interviewed by a skilled and sympathetic person infor-
mants…oĕen đnd the experience of being interviewed is not only enjoyable but also
useful in helping them to gain perspective on and understanding of their ideas and ex-
perience,” suggesting that “this sounds all too convenient for the social scientist.” I claim
only this subjective observation: I found that when there were signs of resistance, there
was a clear diﬀerence in respondents’ dispositions when they believed or were oﬀered
evidence that I was familiar with the world of theoretical physics.
Ađnalmethodological point related to this discussion is to diﬀerentiate the present
work from an autoethnographical exercise. Certainly, on the surface there were ele-
ments of autoethnography in the beginning stages of my work, such as the inclusion
of autobiographical data, and the reĔexion upon personal experiences to link these to
a wider social context. But unlike the autoethnographical exercise, described by Ellis
(2004) as “research, writing, story, and method that connect the autobiographical and
personal to the cultural, social, and political”, my personal experience is not the central
point of this thesis but only themeans to access to the real object of study: the collective
dimension of a particular scientiđc culture. Science as culture is of course a topic that
has been previously dealt with by sociologists, and this brings about another diﬀerence
with autoethnography. It is not ‘in my own voice’ that the present thesis is written, but
is directly aimed at being comprehensible to a scholarly audience, and đrmly placed
within the tradition of science studies and its conceptual frameworks. It is of course
impossible or at least otiose to draw attempt to draw a đrm boundary between soci-
ology and autoethnography, but the present work certainly is diﬀerent to that of, for
example, J. Ziman in that it is my full intention to directly engage with current debates
in the sociological literature and to ultimately hope that it feeds back into sociology.
to happen I had to actively argue against Berry’s views and challenge them directly not as a sociologist
but drawing on my experience in physics. Eventually Berry conceded, and even recommended me to
read J. Ziman’s works as an example of an important theoretical physicist that through reĔexive eﬀorts
had worked out a description of scientiđc practice that coincided with ‘my’ point of view (in reality, it
was mostly the ‘standard’ sociological view of scientiđc publications). Ziman himself oĕen described in
his work how his entry into sociological aspects of science eventually stopped him from continuing as a
physicist. Although Ziman attributed this to lack of time and the impossibility of keeping up with the
đeld, I think the deeper answer is the immersion into a ‘reĔexive stance’. Nevertheless, Ziman’s work is a
good example of an auto-ethnographical exercise that is not quite sociological, in that it rarely goes be-
yond a statement of Ziman’s experiences as a researcher, and contains only minimal references to canon-
ical sociological work.
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ăe interviews
ăe interviews started at the Physics Institute in Mexico, more because I already knew
it and its structure than any other reason. By the time I began the interviews I already
had a working list of topics I wanted to explore (e.g. the role of ‘physical intuition’
in theoretical work, the methodology for training students to become independent re-
searchers, how and if theoreticians used experimental results in their work, etc.) and a
general scheme of diﬀerent ‘types’ of ‘theoretical styles’ I wanted to describe. I there-
fore chose my interviewees according to the đeld they specialised in, trying to cover all
the ‘types’ I wanted to focus on. Because I had sat at conferences or seminars withmost
of them being speakers or part of the audience, I had a good idea of the kind of theory
they did. In some other cases the recommendation came from physics acquaintances
who thought interviewing particular people would give me greater insight.
Although someof the theoreticians I interviewedhave superlativeprofessional track
records and tremendous experience, I tried to avoid the trap of interviewing only very
senior scientists. Physics is a rapidly changing discipline, and what was true of the
physics practiced forty years ago may not be true of today’s physics. Consider for ex-
ample the role that computers play in physics nowadays; forty years ago computer sim-
ulations, although possible to implement, were certainly not a desktop activity. Today
computers and simulations are crucial elements for much— though not all— theoret-
ical work. ăus I interviewed active theoreticians, from researchers in the earlier stages
of their careers, to a couple of emeritus professors.
I must also mention the question of geographical bias. Certainly if one wanted to
explore experimental physics, there would likely be a tremendous diﬀerence whether
one interviewed scientists from the ăird World or scientists from the First World,
something that is easy to understand in terms of the budgets typically available for ei-
ther case. Fortunately, theoretical physics is more even-handed since đnancing plays
a lesser part in what a theoretician can and can’t do (something that was nonetheless
probed in the interviews in Mexico). In general, those theoreticians in Mexico inter-
ested in the phenomenological dimensions of theory did explain that they faced a rela-
tive drawback in the lack of top rate experimental work near them, but although it may
make their work slightly harder, I did not get the feeling it impacts the general outline
of their work. Moreover, except for one, all theMexican theoreticians interviewed have
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Table 1: Interviewees divided by areas of expertise
Micro-expertise Interviewees
Mathematics/ Mathe-
matical physics
M. Berry, G. Mitchison, D. Tong, M.
Mondragón, L. de la Peña.
Pure theory M. Berry, D. Tong, M. Mondragón,
L. de la Peña, V. Romero, M. Hor-
gan, K. Volke, B. S. Sathyaprakash, S.
Fairhurst.
Phenomenology/ Simula-
tion
R. Esquivel, V. Loke, K. Volke, M.
Mondragón, M. Horgan, V. Romero,
C. Noguez, B. S. Sathyaprakash.
Experiment/ Experimen-
tal analysis
V. Romero, K. Volke, S. Fairhurst
established international connections or form part of international collaborations.
ăe secondmajor round of interviews was performed in theUnited Kingdom, and
I sensed no signiđcant deviations from the answers I received in Mexico. ăis is con-
sistent with my experience in the world of physics, where it is usually seen at confer-
ences that while FirstWorld universities dominate the experimental world, theoretical
physics is much more dispersed throughout the globe. A đnal round of interviews was
arranged inCardiﬀUniversity with theoreticians working as data analysts in large scale
experimental collaborations.
A breakdown of the interviews is given in Table 1 according to the categorisation
of theory in the horseshoe diagram. Some of the names are included in more than one
categorybecause these individuals haveworked inmore thanone area at diﬀerentpoints
in their careers, or their work directly involves expertise from diﬀerent categories.
Other primary sources
Alongwith the interviews and personal experience, I have also tried to usematerial that
I knowtobe important tophysicist’swork. Some resources gathered frommyownwork
have also been used, mainly some of the referee reports from my publications that I’ve
used to highlight some of the hidden dimensions of physics publications. Although I
try to limit the use of technical papers as a sociological source (for an extended discus-
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sion of the reasons behind this, see Chapter 1), sometimes these can serve to illustrate
speciđc points and I have not shied away from using these when I believe it to be the
case. One important source is personal e-mail communications, bothwith the intervie-
wees andwith other physicistswho for practical reasons could not schedule face-to-face
meetings.
ăe Internet also oﬀers a wealth of material if one knows where to look. Many
theoreticians nowadays spend more time in front of their computers than anywhere
else, and many devote ample time to their personal pages and in producing documents
available online that illustrate a lot of physics’ pop culture. Likewise, physics on-line
forums and discussion groups such as www.physicsforum.com can provide insight
into discussion among junior physicists, particularly students in the case of physicsfo-
rums. Nevertheless, as with all internet resources, these should be used with a degree
of scepticism both because of the kind of physicists that populate them and because of
the anonymity behind the posts oĕen found them.
An important issue in any scientiđc work, sociological or not, is the crucial ques-
tion: how does one know when the ‘evidence’ gathered is suﬃcient? ăere is no for-
mula that can tell the researcher how to strike a balance between the time spent inter-
viewing or gathering data and the time spent making sense of the material and building
a coherent narrative. It is, however, possible to get a sense of when new ‘data runs’ are
simply increasing the sample size while providing no additional insights nor new in-
formation. Although, when the interviews are considered in isolation, the sample size
is not large when compared to many social science projects (notably any that have a
quantitative face), the data goes well beyond the interviews. Indeed, the depth of the
interviews was made possible only because of the other sources of understanding on
which the analysis rests. To explain this in a ‘methodology’ chapter I would need to list
every conference, class, seminar and coﬀee talk I was ever part of during the ten years I
was active in the world of physics.
One of the questions that I posed in one form or another to all the interviewees
was whether there is in fact such a thing as a common practical stance or characteristic
that one can đnd in all theoreticians. ăe general answer is that there is not, and some
of the interviewees even stressed the diversity of ‘personal styles’ in ‘doing’ theoretical
physics. It certainly seems the case that in terms of personalities and professional habits
theoreticians are a very diverse lot. Yet onemust remember that it is not, as Fleck noted,
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in an individual’s head that one will đnd ‘thought styles’ but in their relationship to the
thought collectives. And in this, there are deđnite patterns, which I try to highlight
throughout the analysis. ăese are the same patterns that have been amply discussed
in both the sociological and anthropological literature concerning experts and exper-
tise: thenecessity of direct interactionbetween expert andnovice as the typical training
pathway, the role of tacit knowledge in marking out experts, the necessity of socialisa-
tion in becoming a recognised expert, the mechanisms of closure and legitimisation of
expert communities, amongst other topics.⁹
⁹See Summerson Carr (2010) and references therein.
Part I
ăeproblemof communication in physics
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CHAPTER 1
ăeoretical and hiﬆorical background
Ŵow pleĆe give heed to my brief description about ĭe Ėeld, whć it conﬆi-
tutes, its changes, its origins, Ć weğ Ć its knower and its inęuence.
— ‘Ƈe Ũhagavad ŭiĬ’, ũhapter 14, ŹeĊion 4
1.1 Sociology and philosophy as tools of analysis
ăis chapter will introduce the two main approaches for studying science that will be
drawn upon in this work: the philosophical and the sociological study of science, with
particular stress onwhy the sociological approach toknowledge is in this case theprefer-
able one. I am in no way opposed to a philosophical analysis of science, but as I will
argue, I consider the dominant philosophical conception of scientiđc knowledge to be
incompatible with descriptions of scientiđc practice.
I also rely on historical studies of theoretical practice, of which there is a small but
excellent tradition as set out in Galison&Warwick (1998) and references therein. ăe
work of the historians participating therein sheds interesting light into the genesis and
development of theoretical practices, but its sociological relevancemust always be pon-
dered in relation to the present state of theoretical physics, as extrapolating in order to
avoid anachronisms . Despite this caveat, many of the results in works such as those
by Kaiser (2005a,b), Wüthrich (2010) andWarwick (2003) are absolutely compatible
with the present thesis, and where relevant have been referenced in the text as support
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to my sociological project. I see no fundamental break between sociology or this par-
ticular brand of history of science other than the directness and type of material that
each chooses to focus on. Indeed, it is the case that in science studies today’s sociology
is tomorrow’s history. Still, the emphasis in this thesis will be on my own empirical
material, the historical resources being used only to support particular points.
I begin by analysing the origins of modern science studies in positivist philosophy,
which crucially relies on the partition of scientiđc knowledge into two basic kinds: em-
pirical and theoretical. Positivismwas hugely inĔuential on science studies, and for the
better part of the 19th and 20th centuries positivist ideas were the foundation of all
reĔections on science. It was only in the mid 20th century that positivism in science
studies was challenged, in what is oĕen called the ‘social turn’. As a result, many of
the positivist’s idealisations of science were shown to be either incorrect or inaccurate
portrayals of it. Due to the ‘natural’ objects of study of each discipline, sociology of
science concerned itself mostly with experimental work (based on analyses of practice
and action), leaving non-experimental work to the philosophy of science (which was
very comfortable working with highly intellectual theory). While a lot of sociology of
sciencewas aimed at ‘unpacking’ experimental physics from the philosophical and pop-
ular ‘black-box’ it had once been, philosophy treated non-experimental physics quite
diﬀerently, in most cases idealising it or focusing on very narrow products of theoreti-
cians. I postulate that further sociological studies of theoretical physics are necessary to
complement the work carried out for experimental physics by sociologists despite the
numerous works of philosophical nature relating to theory, with this thesis being an
attempt to đll in this gap.
Along with the diﬀerences in their objects of study, social studies of science de-
veloped two important theses that deviate from traditional philosophy in the expla-
nation of what constitutes knowledge: that scientiđc knowledge is a collective phe-
nomenon and therefore socially constituted, and that a socialised epistemology allows
for a greater diversity than the positivist outlook permits. Social studies of experimen-
tal physics have highlighted this numerous times, but again, this has had only minor
impact in the way we understand physical theory. ăus, non-experimental physics is
still referred to as ‘theory’, that is, as one all encompassing category in which a diversity
of practices is not reĔected. ăis is also a dimension of theoretical physics that must be
unpacked, and which I have already touched upon in the discussion of the horseshoe
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diagram.
1.2 ăeinĔuenceofpositivismonscience studies andphysics
Philosophical andhistorical analyses of sciencewere carriedout in the19th century that
deeply inĔuenced scholarly reĔections upon science well into the mid-20th century,
and of these positivism has had a particularly long lasting inĔuence on all branches of
science studies. Both early and late positivists were fascinated by the physical sciences,
which they saw as a pinnacle of positivist ideal knowledge far above the development
of other đelds of knowledge. Although positivism and philosophy were the preferred
perspectives fromwhich to study science for more than a century, positivism— at least
in its original form— is hardly encountered in science studies circles anymore, except
as a historical curiosity.
Nevertheless, in this chapter I will try to show that positivism has leĕ its mark in
one signiđcant way when science studies examines physics, a legacy that has shaped the
way both philosophers and social scientists have approached the discipline. In short,
science studies have inherited from positivism its classiđcation of physical practice. We
‘naturally’ tend to label physics as either experimental or theoretical, and this division
is at the heart of the positivist conception of science, one that does not reĔect themulti-
plicity of practices of modern theoretical physics. Comte’s perspective presents a good
illustration of themost prominent features of positivism and its classiđcation of knowl-
edge. Although he is by nomeans the earliest positivist thinker, his work is arguably the
đrst extendedmeta-theory of scientiđc knowledge that is notmeant purely as a work of
philosophy, but also aims to describe the state of contemporary science. Comte’s depic-
tion of the structure and organisation of scientiđc knowledge has come to inĔuence the
way we still conceptualise physical theory, and the positivist language used to describe
the structure of the physical sciences remains practically intact.
Comte (1830, ch. 1) drew up a framework within which he wished to describe the
historical development of all areas of human knowledge, from the most primitive dis-
ciplines to the highest in form. According to this Law of theăree Stages, knowledge-
making disciplines develop in three đxed types of increasingly growing stature. ăeđrst
and most primitive stage is theăeological or Fictitious; the second stage is the Meta-
physical orAbstract; the third and superior is the Scientiđc or Positive stage. According
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to Comte, all đelds of knowledge must necessarily follow these stages of development
until they reach the positive stage, this being the highest possible form of human intel-
lectual achievement.
While the đrst and second stages are dominated by explanations that rely đrst on
providential entities (ăeological stage) and thenon supra-physical entities (Metaphys-
ical stage), the Positive seeks to establish “the explication of facts, reduced to their real
terms”. ăe Positive stage’s ultimate goal — the ultimate goal of human minds in gen-
eral according to Comte— is to “represent all diverse observable phenomena as par-
ticular cases of a general fact”, for as Comte reminded the reader, “all đne minds aĕer
Bacon have recognised that there is no real knowledge other than that based on facts”.Ʋ
Like Bacon, Comte posited two and only two categories of knowledge in the mature
positivist sciences: empirical (relating to ‘particular observations’) and theoretical (re-
lating to ‘general facts’). Like any good empiricist, Comte argued that real knowledge
could only be achieved if based on the senses, relegating theory (the seeking of general
facts) to an instrumental, classiđcatory role.
1.3 Logicalpositivismandtheearlydevelopments inphi-
losophy of science
Comte’s century was one of tremendous change for science as a professional activity.
At the turn of the 18th century people who would nowadays be regarded as scientists
would not have called themselves by that name, since theword ‘scientist’ did not appear
until 1833 when another major đgure in early science studies, W.Whewell, coined the
word (we owe Whewell the word ‘physicist’ too). However, by the mid 1800s science
was well on its way to establishing itself as a respected professional activity in most Eu-
ropean universities. All along the the 19th century, science, and particularly physics,
was rapidly becoming an institutionalised academic đeld.Ƴ
Ʋ“ăere are and can be only two ways of searching into and discovering truth. ăe one Ĕies from
the senses and particulars to the most general axioms, and from these principles, the truth of which it
takes for settled and immovable, proceeds to judgment and to the discovery of middle axioms. And this
way is now in fashion. ăe other derives axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by a gradual and
unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last of all. ăis is the true way, but as yet
untried [emphasis mine]”, Bacon (1620, Book I, Aphorism XIX).
ƳSee for example Otto Sibum (2003).
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ăe transition into the 20th century carried with it two of the great revolutions of
modern physics, the birth of quantum theory in 1901 and of special relativity in 1905.
In 1910, Russell and Whitehead published their Principia Mathematica on the foun-
dations of logical analysis and mathematics. ăese events deeply inĔuenced academic
positivist philosophy of science, particularly that of the Vienna Circle in the 1920s and
30s. ăough the members of the Vienna Circle held views that were more varied than
is oĕen acknowledged, there was at least one clearly continuous assumption underly-
ing all their work, the unchallenged division between empirical and theoretical knowl-
edge.ƴ ăe unifying purpose of the Vienna Circle’s members can be broadly described
as a project to give philosophical support and surety to the science of their days under
the auspice of empiricism as a foundation for knowledge, while abolishing the role of
metaphysical arguments in scientiđc explanations. Contemporary developments in the
foundations of logic andmathematics suggested to the positivists that theoretical state-
ments could have no epistemological foothold except where they could be tied down
to observation statements. ăe central positivist idea concerning theory is that it is
the tool with which science correlates observation statements, and has little value apart
from that.⁴ Logical positivism was an attempt to give epistemological certainty to sci-
entiđc knowledge by demonstrating how theory based on empirical facts leads to truth.
Although there are signiđcant diﬀerences betweenComte’s positivism and the work of
logical empiricists, the one unifying strand is the division of knowledge between em-
pirical and theoretical domains.
1.4 ăe birth of sociology of science
Ironically, Comte also recognised a phenomenon that would eventually end the domi-
nance of positivism in science studies, identifying “the need— in every stage—of some
theory or another to bind the facts”.⁵ ăat is, although like Bacon he postulated that
ƴA classic anthology taken as representative of the Vienna Circle’s work is Ayer (1959), although it
has been criticised for presenting a picture of positivism that is too homogeneous and ignores the work
of important members of the Circle like Otto Neurath. Hacking (1983, ch. 3) presents a brief analysis
of the development of positivism from Comte to the Vienna Circle, to its rebirth in the work of van
Fraassen.
⁴As positivism matured, the role of theory also changed for some of the Circle’s members. Hempel
(1973) for example eventually recognised that theory could also have ’heuristic’ roles of explanation.
⁵Comte, idem.
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observations are the only grounds for true knowledge, Comte admitted an awkward
problem for the empiricist project: no observation is possible that does not to some de-
gree require a non-empirical background to ‘bind’ it’s meaning for the observer. With-
out attachment of observations to some basic theoretical principles, says Comte, “one
would be completely incapable of retaining [these observations]; and atmost times, the
facts would remain unperceived before our eyes”. While Comte evidently saw the im-
portance of ’theoretical’ assumptions in experimental activity, this was ignored in his
work beyond this brief statement; in Comte’s implicit theory of knowledge there re-
mained the marked and unambiguous separation between the classes of pure empirical
facts (observations) and theoretical facts (general statements) later taken up by the Vi-
enna Circle. For Comte, and for positivism in general, the idea that theory is necessary
for observation does not detract from the hypothesis that they can still be regarded as
separate forms of knowledge and is the central tenet of positivist epistemology.
ăe dominating inĔuence of positivism’s classiđcation of knowledge can be seen
in that even strong critics of positivism like Popper (1934), while engaged in direct
controversy with the group, took the experiment/theory distinction for granted. Pop-
per’s falsiđcationist program challenged the classical induction arguments of positivist
epistemology, but falsiđcationism still relied on a rational reconstruction of scientiđc
knowledge based on the observation vs. theory dichotomy. ⁶
Comte’s aĕerthought regarding the role of theory is now known as the ‘theory-
ladenness’ thesis. It entered science studies mainly through the work ofHanson (1958)
and Kuhn (1962) in the mid-twentieth century, and marked the beginning of the so-
called ‘social turn’ in science studies. ăeory-ladenness aﬃrms that pure, ‘unpolluted’
observation without some sort of theoretical substratum is impossible, and so that the
positivist foundation of knowledge — pure observation — is a chimera. Kuhn went
⁶Curiously, falsiđcationism is to this day the dominant philosophical viewwithin theoretical physics,
as it has been since the 1950s. As one theoretician recalled:
I remember, in the đĕies, I was at school— late đĕies— I read Karl Popper, and the em-
phasis then was…how wonderful refreshing this is because at last here’s somebody who’s
writing about what scientists actually do! He was concerned with the logic — that’s the
title of his book,ąe Logic of ScientiĖc DiscoĂery—pointing out that there were aspects
of this logic which were very diﬀerent from the Baconian way of looking at things. And
this was valuable actually; it was very helpful. But then he didn’t discuss the sociological
aspects. (emphasis added)
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well beyond that, aﬃrming that it is precisely through the gestalt-like changes in the
non-empirical substrata that true scientiđc change comes about, and evenmore, that it
iswithin this paradigm that all science is carriedoutduring its normal, non-revolutionary
phase.⁷ ăis intertwining of ‘theory’ and ‘experiment’ meant a radical departure from
the ViennaCircle’s foundational assumptions, and its lasting inĔuence on science stud-
ies signiđed the end of logical positivism as the dominant view of science. Sismondo
(2009, p. 12) declares Kuhn (1962) to have “challenged the dominant popular and
philosophical pictures of science” as his version of science “violated almost everyone’s
ideas of the rationality and progress of science”.
FollowingKuhn’s socio-historical lead, social scientists then asked themselves if this
could be taken a step further. Perhaps there could be other non-empirical elements that
aﬀected the creation of scientiđc knowledge aside from the ‘theoretical background’. In
particular, they posed the question of whether social and cultural conditions could also
inĔuence scientiđc activity, scientiđc observation, and scientiđc results. ăe shiĕ away
from a purely philosophical perspective is referred to as ‘the sociological turn’. Before
the sociological turn, science studies hadmostly been limited to reĔections about scien-
tiđc knowledge (mostly by philosophers and scientists themselves) or by a history of sci-
ence that concentrated exclusively on the heroes of scientiđc pantheon, or as Butterđeld
(1931) called it the ‘Whig’ interpretation of history, and the sociological work stem-
ming fromMerton’s functionalist school. ăe social turn comprised a rapidly growing
interest and involvement of social scientists and cultural academics into the đeld, which
eventually resulted in a major change of the science studies landscape. ăe Strong Pro-
gram is considered to be the foundational work of the sociology of scientiđc knowledge
through the works of Barnes (1974, 1977) and Bloor (1976).
Barnes andBloor, with the StrongProgrammeof the Sociology of ScientiđcKnowl-
edge, pioneered a sociology of scientiđc knowledge that took up a new ‘socialised’ ver-
sion of epistemology. Barnes’ work was particularly important for introducing the im-
portance of ‘purely’ sociological factors into explanation of how scientiđc knowledge
develops, such as the inĔuence of ideology and interests on scientiđc activity and its out-
⁷In the same tradition, Maxwell (1962) claimed that there was no manner to cleanly demarcate an
empirical ontology from a theoretical one in real life, and thus that what is ‘theoretical’ and what is
‘empirical’ is intrinsically intertwined. Lakatos (1978) and Feyerabend (1958), despite being radically
opposed inmany topics, both held that any diﬀerencemade between theoretical and empirical termswas
actually a psychological construction, and without a real epistemological foundation.
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comes in a tradition that relates to Marx, Lukács and Habermas and which also đnds
much common ground with K. Mannheim’s work.⁸
ăe Strong Programme not only added more possible ‘inĔuences’ than could be
seen in Kuhn’s paradigms and dogmas, but also gave more power to these inĔuences
than had been admitted before. Kuhn argued that the education of a scientist is pur-
posefully guided to incorporate the young scientist into the reigning paradigm. Kuhn’s
paradigmatic education involves a deep commitment to a particular way of viewing the
world and of practicing science in it, but commitment implies a high degree of con-
sciousness, even if that consciousness is not manifest at all times.⁹ On the other hand,
the Strong Programme’s proposed inĔuences seem much subtler and more dramatic:
the scientist might at times seem like a peon of socio-historical contingency to which
he is subject without his knowledge, like the individual immersed in Fleck’s thought
collectives.
ărough its incorporation of sociological causality as a method for explanation of
knowledge, the Strong Programme was treading on new ground in ways which many
philosophers of science, and many scientists, found generally unacceptable. Of partic-
ular concern to opponents of the Strong Programme , and even for Kuhn, was the idea
that purely social factors could not only tinge or tint scientiđc knowledge, but could
actually mould its contents.Ʋ⁰
1.5 ‘ăeory’ in sociological accounts of physics
It is oĕen argued (at least by sociologists) that the sociology of science surpassed the
philosophical image of positivist ‘accounts’ of science through its immersion in the
study of practice.ƲƲ Aĕer the ‘practice turn’, a number of accounts of laboratory life in
many scientiđc đelds provided a richer picture of what empirical science ‘really’ looked
like when it was being carried out by scientists. Social scientists are trained to go into
the ‘đeld’, to observe and attempt an explanation of what social actors do. Most of the
best known works in the đeld are full of writings about ‘scientiđc practice’, ‘science in
⁸See Olivé (1985, Introduction) for an analysis of the Strong Programme within the framework of
these wider sociological theories.
⁹See Kuhn (1963).
Ʋ⁰See Duarte (2007, ch. 4)
ƲƲSee Collins & Evans (2002) and their comments on the SecondWave of Science Studies.
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themaking’ and ‘science in action’; scientistsmanufacturing apparatuses and discussing
things and doing things.ƲƳ But because the most ‘active’ part of physics is certainly not
the theoretician’s oﬃce but the experimenter’s lab, social studies of science concerned
with physics is mostly full of records of the activities of experimental physics, with few
attempts to do the same with theoreticians. Compared to the tremendous number of
sociological and ethnographic research of experimental practice that was carried out,
the extension of the ‘practice turn’ language found little opportunities to be applied to
physical theory.
In a way, this division of labour between philosophers studying theory and soci-
ologists studying experimenters is ‘natural’: argument and concepts as the dominant
elements in theoretical physics ‘practice’ have always been fodder for philosophical ex-
amination, while the human physical action intrinsic in experimental physics serves the
same role in sociology.Ʋƴ Likewise, philosophers have pointed out that the philosophy
of experimental physics is in a rather desolate state, with only a few studies to remedy
the lack of work in the đeld, with emphasis on drawing from social studies of science as
sources on which to reĔect upon. Radder (2003, p. 2) sums up the situation by stating
that “the philosophy of experiment is still underdeveloped, especially as compared to
historical and social scientiđc approaches”. In another important work that was partly a
call for the development of philosophical reĔections on the experimental and material
dimensions of science, Hacking (1983, Introduction) mentions that “rationality and
realism are the two main topics of today’s philosophers of science”, with much of the
rest of the work emphasising the need to introduce the impact of material dimensions
into philosophical accounts of science. Radder (2003, p. 1) considers Hacking’s call to
arms as having started an initially promising tradition, but which “seems to have lost
much of this momentum.”
ăe general situation is then that there is limited sociological insight into the na-
ture of theoretical physics, which given the structuring of physics translates into a rather
poor sociological picture of physics as a whole. While the sociology of experimental
physics is a rich repository of đeldworkmaterial and analysis that has radically changed
the way we understand experiments and even science in general, the sociology of theo-
ƲƳSee for example Latour &Woolgar (1979), Pickering (1992, 1995), Schatzki et al. (2001).
ƲƴCampbell (1998) contains a critical but quite thorough review of the role of ‘action’ in contempo-
rary sociology.
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retical physics does not exist as a strong, autonomous or continuous tradition. In one
of the few papers that aims to “use the laboratory studies approach” to study physical
theory, Merz &Knorr-Cetina (1997, p. 73) adopt the same segregation of the theoret-
ical from the empirical seen in positivist philosophy. Early in their paper the authors
straightforwardly separate the practice of physics into ‘experimental’ and ‘theoretical’,
subsequently dividing theory into two classes: ‘theoretical, or formal, or mathematical
theory’ and ‘phenomenology’. ‘Phenomenological theory’ is simply theory that can be
“considered rather directly related to experiment”, while the ‘theoretical theory’ simply
“is not [directly related to experiment].”Howandwhy this ‘relation’ is carried out is nei-
ther discussed nor explained. Using the concept of ‘epistemic culture’, Knorr–Cetina
(1999, Introduction) has highlighted the “fragmentation of contemporary science “
and “the diﬀerent architectures of empirical approaches”, bringing out the “diversity of
epistemic cultures”,mentioninghow this new vision of a disuniđed science runs counter
to traditional assumptions and forces us to rethink our picture of science. Yet in this
samework, Knorr-Cetina devotes a single paragraph to the theoretical physics—about
its relationship to experiment —and there is no sign that theoretical physics is consid-
ered to be a diverse đeld in the same way that experiment is.
As another example, Pickering (1981) mentions the inĔuence of the phenomenal,
but only as far as it touches on experiment. He posits two categories of inĔuence of
‘theory’ on experiment:
1. ăe instrumental, in which “debate centres on the apparatus, techniques, proce-
dures and so on, from which scientists distil a set of data in a given experiment.”
2. ăe phenomenal, in which “debate centres on the interpretation of those data”.
Pickering thus states that “theoretical conceptions serveboth to constitute and trans-
mit prior agreements and disagreements between individual experimental contexts”,
again delimiting the role of theory as an inĔuence on experimental practice.
Just as Radder has emphasised the need for a philosophy of experiment to comple-
ment the existing reĔections on theoretical aspects of science and particularly physics,
there is a need to develop a sociological account of theoretical physics to balance the ex-
isting sociological work on experimental physics.Ʋ⁴ ăe rest of this chapter is devoted
Ʋ⁴Knorr–Cetina (1999) acknowledges that “no one has looked, to my knowledge, at contemporary
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to establishing a đrm theoretical ground upon which this situation may be resolved, in
order to develop a sociology of theoretical physics in the same vein as has been done
with the experimental side of the discipline. ăere is to my knowledge no strong tra-
dition or wide literature we could đrmly call a ‘sociology of theoretical physics’, since
most of the reference material available is either purely philosophical, or touching on
theoretical physics only as far as it is relevant to experimental physics. Although there
are isolated works of sociologists exploring pieces of theoretical practice, they remain
extraordinary as they are usually departures from the author’s usual orientation towards
experimental topics.Ʋ⁵
1.6 Two diﬀerent epistemologies
Hacking’s assessment of the picture of science contained within philosophical studies
is correct, but incomplete. Philosophy of science centred almost exclusively on the the-
oretical aspects of physics, but also on a very limited sort of theory, ‘đnished’ theory.
Philosophy has taken up a view of physics mainly through the đnalised products of sci-
entiđc activity, that is, mature and accepted mainstream theories. Textbook, journal or
handbook reports are ‘the science’ with which a lot of philosophy of science informs
itself about its object of study. ărough the study of đnished theories and through
its concern with rationality philosophy of science developed extremely close links to a
particular đeld of classic philosophy: epistemology, or the theory of knowledge. Epis-
temology is the discipline that tries to đnd the rational roots, themethodology and the
criteria for calling a set of beliefs ‘knowledge’, or more precisely ‘good knowledge’. For
a long time, philosophers thought that studying scientiđc knowledge was synonymous
with proposing a good theory or a good deđnition of what good scientiđc knowledge
ought to be like, and in the process to be able to distinguish it from ‘other things’ that
physics theorising as practical work or at physics’ theoretical culture either (the […] books listed above
are on the content of theoretical models).” Ziman (1968, 1978) oﬀered a glimpse into ‘the social dimen-
sions of science’ from an accomplished theoretical physicist’s perspective, but lacking a connection to any
sociological tradition, and without a direct relationship to sociological debates. ăe resonance between
his general conclusions andmost sociological accounts of physics can be considered supportive evidence
for sociology’s claims about scientiđc knowledge, but are more akin to an autoethnographic discussion
of physics than a full-Ĕedged sociological work.
Ʋ⁵See for example Pinch (1980), Pickering (1984), Collins (2007),Merz&Knorr-Cetina (1997) and
Kenneđck (2000, 2007).
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are not science. Philosophy of science is oĕen tacitly assumed to be a branch of episte-
mology applied to science. If one conceives of philosophy of science solely as the philo-
sophical study of scientiđc knowledge, then it seems sensible to admit this reduction as
plausible. ăis view, however, clashes severely with the social sciences, which held that
the study of science ought not to be centred on knowledge but rather on practice.
A strong criticism that sociologists have held against philosophy of science is that
philosophers have generally reduced scientiđc knowledge to very limited set of things:
the professional peer-reviewed publications of scientists, the knowledge found in scien-
tiđc textbooks, and occasionally the things that scientists wrote about their own đelds
for outsiders to read. ăe sociological critique is that this oﬀers a distorted image of
what science actually encompasses, and that in most cases these sources do not repre-
sent the ‘real’ nature of scientiđc knowledge.
Kaiser (2005a, p. 7) oﬀers a parallel critique aimed at historical inquiries into the-
ory, declaring that “most studies have followed in the spirit of a joke that the wisecrack-
ing theoristGeorgeGamowwas fondofmaking. Gamowused to explain tohis students
what he liked most about being a theoretical physicist: he could lie down on a couch,
close his eyes, and no one would be able to tell whether or not he was working. For too
long, historians andphilosophers have adoptedGamow’s centralmetaphor: research in
theory, we have been told, concerns abstract thought, wholly separated from anything
like labor, activity, or skill. ăeories, world-views, or paradigms seemed to be the ap-
propriate units of analysis, and the challenge became charting the birth and conceptual
development of particular ideas. In these traditional accounts, the skilledmanipulation
of tools played little role: theorists were assumed to write papers whose content other
theorists could understand, at least in principle, anywhere in the world.”
To illustrate, it is a well known phenomenon for sociologists of science that pub-
lished scientiđc claims in peer-reviewed journals are rational reconstructions of scien-
tiđc practice that seldom reĔect with any sort of accuracy what actually happened dur-
ing the production of the knowledge claims found therein. Both experimental and the-
oretical reconstructions are prone to this sort of rationalisation. ăis is not to be taken
as an indicator that scientists lie, cheat or leave out unnecessary details of their experi-
ments for unethical or dubious reasons. As we will see later on, matters such as limited
publishing space, the fruitlessness of recounting every single negative result, etc. can
justify the practicality of such approaches. Nevertheless the fact is that the image of an
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experimental science based solely on the published scientiđc papers of a scientiđc đeld
is a distorted image of what goes on in the making of a theory or an experiment. ăe
sociological critique is that a study of science that uses this idealised image to describe
scientiđc knowledge only produces distorted narratives, for it is not a description of
science but of scientiđc results, and these are only a small part of the iceberg of science.
Although there are calls formore ‘realistic’ philosophers of science thathave strongly
emphasised the need to take into account “the historical-social context of the experi-
mental natural sciences” this view is far frombeing the dominant one.Ʋ⁶ Franklin (1994,
p. 465) for examplewrote in comparinghis ownphilosophically centredwork to that of
Collins (2004) and its interview-based,micro-sociological accounton the same episode
of gravitational wave physics:
I would like to address an important methodological diﬀerence between
Collins’s account and my own. Collins bases his account of the episode
almost entirely on interviews with some of the scientists involved. ăey
are not named and are identiđed only by letter. My own account is based
on the published literature. A supporter of Collins might argue that the
published record gives a sanitised version of the actual history, and that
what scientists actually believed is contained in the interviews. I suggest
that the interviews do not, in fact, show the scientists’ consideration of
the issues raised by the discordant results, and that these considerations
are contained in the published record. In this particular episode, we have
a publisheddiscussion among the participants, inwhich they explicitly ad-
dressed the issues as well as each other’s arguments. I see no reason to give
priority to oﬀ-the-cuﬀ comments made to an interviewer, and to reject
the accounts that scientists wished to have made as part of the permanent
record. ăere is no reason to assume that because arguments are presented
publicly that they are not valid, or that the scientists did not actually be-
lieve them. ăere are, in fact, good reasons to believe that these are the
arguments believed by the scientists. Aĕer all, a scientist’s reputation for
good work is based primarily on the published record, and it seems rea-
sonable that they would present their strongest arguments there.
Ʋ⁶See for example Radder (1988). Giere (1985) has also called for a similar ‘naturalistic’ approach to
philosophy of science in the same spirit as õuine’s naturalized epistemology.
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Franklin argues that no favourable argument was presented that the interview me-
diated, sociological, practice-centred account gives anything of value to the discussion.
Moreover, this is hinted to apply not only to this case, but follows the rationale that sci-
entists always present in the published records their strongest arguments. ăis philo-
sophical đxation on rational reconstructions and, as Franklin called them ‘sanitised ver-
sions’ has impoverished our image of theoretical physics, whichmakes the development
of a sociology of theoretical physics all the more important. It will be one of the prin-
cipal aims of this work to overcome this image, and to argue in the strongest terms that
the heart of theoretical physics lies not in the post-sanitisation results that are Franklin’s
object of analysis, but rather in the process that has the publication of the sanitised ac-
counts as its very last stage, a stage that is not representative in any way of what ‘doing
theory’ is like. All professional bodies have an internal working structure, and an exter-
nal, public façade that is very diﬀerent to how the professional work is actually carried
out. Science is no diﬀerent to any other profession in this respect. In an interview with
distinguished theoretical physicistMichael Berry, the relationship between theoretical
physics’ ‘polished’ form and its inner working was considered in some detail. In our
đrst interview round, Berry oﬀered the semi-automatic, expected, Franklin-like answer
to my question of how to understand theoretical physicists’ work. He literally recom-
mended me to “go and read the published literature”. However, aĕer a bit of friendly
confrontation, the initial oﬀ-hand answer changed radically:
Reyes: Yesterday at the beginning of our interview I asked you ‘what is it
that theoretical physicists do?’ and you said that if one wants to know, it’s
very easy, you just have to go look at the papers.
Berry: Yes, then you told me— and I agreed with you— that this doesn’t
give a clear picture of how you do things. It gives a picture of what you’ve
done, beyond the results. It doesn’t always give a clear picture, as with
any creative activity. It’s the phrase, ‘Art that conceals art’. Which is đne.
People don’t want to know when they go to a music concert; they don’t
want tohear all thepracticingof the scales, up anddown, that themusician
has spent hours and days doing.
Reyes: What would be your equivalent of the practicing of the scales, and
what doesn’t go into your đnal work?
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Berry: Lots of little details of calculations that don’t go in the paper. I
always make sure, because I have a bad memory, that I write enough that
when I come back some years later I could reconstruct the argument. I
can’t always do it butmostly I can. Anybodywho is technically competent
will have enough information to pick up unusual steps, but all the rest are
routine things I don’t bother to write down. So my equivalent of these
scales is…youknow, I oĕen like to just bymyself reproduce old arguments.
I forget how to do things and get out of practice and so I do something to
reproduce some result and remindmyself. I don’t publish that, I just do it
formyself. Oĕen, as part of somethingbig. If I’mdoing someproblemand
I need a resultwhich I remember, I’ll sometimes stop andderive that result
myself without going back, for the exercise of doing it. Like we discussed
yesterday, practicing. It’s very much like musicians with their scales.
Reyes: So if I read your papers and I tried to say how it is that you do your
work, is that the only part that’s missing?
Berry: Well, I never thought about it. Well, of course there’s the whole
culture of science and theoretical physics in particular that lies behind
things. It depends who I’m writing it for. So of course if I’m writing a
technical paper I don’t explain every technical term if it’s standard. If I
say ‘Schrödinger’s equation’ I don’t go and write it down, or reference it
in the paper and describe it. People know it. If I’m giving a public lec-
ture or writing something non-technical then I wouldn’t just assume that
those things are known. It depends on the audience howmuch is leĕ out.
Because it’s tiresome to go back and you can’t do it, to go right back to
the principles. Science is communal. ăere’s a body of commonly under-
stood work, and I don’t bother to repeat that. […] When I read a paper
that contains huge amounts of review and if it’s not a review paper, I oĕen
say, ‘You don’t need all this. You’ve got to cut it out because, đrst of all
it wastes space, but not only that, you’re obscuring the original thing that
you’ve done by going back and repeating all these referenceswhich arewell
known. Anybody who is going to understand your paper will know this.
So leave it out; only a few carefully chosen sentences to set the context.
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But you don’t need to repeat.’
Unlike a concert-going member of the public, a ‘sociologist of music’ would be in-
terested in seeing a musician learn his trade and practice his scales. If one were only
interested in the rational reconstruction of theories (or the ‘performance reconstruc-
tion’ of music) then it would make no sense to see what goes on behind the scenes of a
concert. For a sociologist, such limitations are contrary to the professional trade. ăe
question posed by the Franklin-Collins alternatives can be put in these simple musical
terms: who ‘knows’ the practice of music better, the musical aesthete that listens solely
to studio-sanitisedCDversions of a band’s performance, or the groupie that sometimes
sneaks backstage into a band’s practice jam, and clicks pictures of the musician’s both
on- and oﬀ-stage? Of course, if ‘music’ is purely the enjoyment of a perfectly recorded
performance, it is the philosopher’s whose case is stronger; otherwise, sociology is the
better alternative.
Putting published papers aside, a similar thing happens with accounts that rely on
textbooks, but in a more extreme way. Peer-reviewed publications are full of results
that will most likely never have great impact in the larger community. Of those that do
have impact, even fewer will transcend time, and all but the most minuscule percent-
age will then make it to the textbooks. When and if they do, entire research programs
and traditions are reduced to snippets of the type, “ăe fundamental observation, that
magnetic đelds exist in the neighbourhood of currents, and hence of moving charges,
was made by Oersted in 1819”. ăe simpliđcations inherent to these characterisations,
whatever pedagogic purpose theymay serve for physicists, renders themvacuous for the
purpose of gaining any understanding of scientiđc practice and its creative dimensions.
Kaiser’s workmust be mentioned again because although it relies heavily on analysis of
textbook, it does so very diﬀerently by analysing the manner in which textbooks have
presented particular theoretical tools diachronically. Kaiser (2005a, ch. 7) argues that
although the changes in theoretical tools lag behind their real-time use at the research
level, a historical analysis of textbooks can give a good picture of the evolving trends
and usages of theoretical tools.
ăe moral that sociology has drawn from these observations, that practice cannot
be reduced to rational reconstructions in the forms of scientiđc publications, or is iso-
morphic to them in any reasonable manner, is that in order to study science properly
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a diﬀerent approach than the philosophical one has to be taken. Hence social studies
of science has become preoccupied with case studies of actual scientiđc activity, and
concentratedmainly on the labours of laboratory science. Sociologists in particular are
interested in how scientiđc knowledge claims can come about despite the fact that sci-
ence is a messy aﬀair far removed from the clear-cut rationality of either positivism or
their early commentators.
1.7 Two diﬀerent deđnitions of knowledge
ăediﬀerences between philosophical and sociological accounts of science are not lim-
ited to the aspects of science they concentrate upon, rational reconstructions for the
former, and social action and practice for the latter. Philosophy and sociology hold
completely diﬀerent deđnitions on the ‘nature’ of scientiđc knowledge. In most cases,
when philosophers talk about scientiđc ‘knowledge’, they mean something very diﬀer-
ent to what a sociologist would understand. Since both disciplines are aĕer all con-
cerned with understanding how scientiđc knowledge is created, one must understand
what the epistemological underpinnings of each one are.
ăe classic philosophical deđnition of knowledge is that ‘knowledge is true and
justiđedbelief ’ (theTJBdeđnition). Although this is bynomeans anunchallenged and
untroubled deđnition within classic epistemology, as shown most clearly by Gettier’s
celebrated counterexamples, it does capture the essence of what is commonly held as
knowledge by philosophers.Ʋ⁷ Philosophical discussions upon the subject typically take
Ʋ⁷In his landmarkGettier (1963), the author oﬀers examples of situationswhere subjects could be said
to hold beliefs that are both true and justiđed, but that intuitively cannot be said to correspond to actual
knowledge . Basically, Gettier’s counterexamples involve situations where the epistemic subject believes
that something is true and the person can exhibit good enough reasons to hold that these beliefs are true
(i.e. the beliefs can be openly and suﬃciently justiđed by the believer on the outset). Alas, the reason
why the beliefs are true are not in tune with the epistemic subject’s explanation, but because of a com-
pletely diﬀerent causal connection than that given by the believer. Gettier’s counterexamples show that
there may be cases when an epistemic subject can believe something which happens to be true, and give
suﬃciently good reasons for that belief, and yet for an outsider the belief could hardly say to constitute
knowledge because those are not the actual reasonswhy the belief should be held. Gettier’s counterexam-
ples are a bit contrived, but they have put epistemology in hot water. ăe đrst class of counterexamples
goes along these lines: before the next World Cup starts, I claim to my friends that the statement “the
best football team in the world will win the next World Cup” is a plausible knowledge claim, because I
believe that England is the best team in the world (say, by FIFA rankings) and that they will deđnitely
win the World Cup having gone unbeaten for one hundred straight matches. Eventually, Mexico wins
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it as its starting point. Moreover, it matches our mundane conceptions, our everyday
idea, of what we usually think of as knowledge. ăe Oxford English Dictionary for
example includes the following deđnition for ‘knowledge’:
1. Acknowledgementor recognitionof thepositionor claims (of anyone).
2. ăe fact of recognising as something known, or known about, before;
recognition. 3. ăe fact of knowing a thing, state, etc., or (in general sense)
a person; acquaintance; familiarity gained by experience. 4. Personal ac-
quaintance, friendship, intimacy. 5. Acquaintance with a fact; percep-
tion, or certain information of, a fact or matter; state of being aware or
informed; consciousness (of anything) […]
From the OED deđnition and from the TJB perspective, it makes sense to talk of
knowledge in terms of particular epistemic subjects — individual persons — notice
words such as “recognising”, “personal acquaintance”, “acquired”, “experience”, “under-
standing” in the OED deđnition. ăis philosophical subject-centered deđnition talks
about beliefs, acquaintance, and other personal states of the mind. In traditional epis-
temology and in our common manner of speech one may very well speak of a person
that knows certain propositions, and call those propositions knowledge. Knowledge in
philosophical accounts refers to an individual’s actions, states of mind, and beliefs.
A more clear example can be gained by browsing modern, professional, epistemo-
logical texts, where in exemplary expositions it is standard usage to begin discussions
about knowledge-claims with phrases such as “suppose that Tiago believes that …” and
work around the facts surrounding Tiago’s beliefs, Tiago’s utterances, Tiago’s claims,
etc. and examine them in the light of the TJB deđnition (or whichever alternative epis-
temic criteria is alternatively proposed).Ʋ⁸ Similarly, in everyday speech one is inclined
the nextWorldCup, and being the best team in the world at that time (according to say, a public opinion
poll), my previous statement turns out to be both true (the best team won) and justiđed (by the infor-
mation available at the time, it was a well supported claim). But one could hardly say that my statement
was really knowledge. It just happened to be true by coincidence.
Ʋ⁸Even texts that try to subvert the traditional deđnition, such as Gettier’s, insist on this subject-
centred position; Gettier wrote about the beliefs of particular men — Smith and Jones, Jones and
Brown— and their subjective beliefs. Although some accounts from the relatively new school of ‘so-
cial epistemology’ have attempted to grasp the concept of a ‘collectivity-based’ epistemology, these are
rather crude attempts that have ignored basic sociological investigations on the subject; see for example
Goldman (2010) and Strevens (2010).
35 śăeoretical and hiﬆorical background
to say that one knows something whenever one feels conđdent in one’s beliefs or in the
facts that one is aware of, and call that knowledge.Ʋ⁹
1.8 ăe epistemology of the social analysis of scientiđc
knowledge: thought collectives
In another example of how he anticipated contemporary sociological accounts of sci-
ence, Fleck (1935) noted that statements, data, observations, theories, principles and
concepts do not become ‘true’ by the eﬀect they have on individual minds, but by the
way inwhich they are taken up by relevant social groups and become accepted enmasse.
According to Fleck, accepted statements only become knowledge when they become
part of thought collectives. In explaining the development of the concept of ‘syphilis’,
(Fleck, 1935, p. 41) noted that “not only the principal ideas, but all the formative stages
of the syphilis concept, however, are the result of collective, not individual eﬀort. Al-
though we spoke of Schaudin as the discoverer, he really no more than personiđed the
excellent team of health oﬃcials whose work […] cannot be easily dissected for individ-
ual attribution.” Fleck argues that even when individuals working on their own make
discoveries, they only becomewidely accepted as truths once they are incorporated into
the social pool of accepted knowledge. In this sociological epistemology, a subject’s
claim-of-knowing is no longer ‘knowledge’ for the element of analysis is a socially and
Ʋ⁹In the holistic Russell (1946, p. 516) the author notes that there are two elementary traditions in
modernphilosophy concerning the relationship betweenknowledge and the knower. Cartesianmethod-
ological doubt is the foundation for the đrst tradition, whereby the world is abolished and all that is leĕ
to base knowledge upon is the subjective mind. “Most philosophers since Descartes have attached im-
portance to the theory of knowledge, and their doing so is largely due to him. ‘I think, therefore I am’
makes mind more certain than matter, and my mind (for me) more certain than the minds of others.
ăere is thus, in all philosophy derived from Descartes, a tendency to subjectivism, and to regarding
matter as something only knowable, if at all, from inference from what is known of mind. […] Modern
philosophy has very largely accepted the formulation of its problems fromDescartes, while not accepting
his solutions.”ăe second tradition is empiricism, which Russell introduces mainly through the work of
Hume, whose most salient criticism against Cartesian philosophy is elaborated through the elimination
of the ‘Self ’. Hume notes that even when going into the deepest sort of deep self-reĔection, one never
really experiences ‘oneself ’, but only a series of sensations and perceptions. “[T]he self, as deđned can be
nothing but a bundle of perceptions. In this I think that any thoroughgoing empiricist must agree with
Hume.”ăus, the empiricist tradition supposes that the foundation for any knowledge, even philosoph-
ical and psychological knowledge, can only come from observation. However, Russell also argues that
the continuation of theHumean argument (whichHume himself in the end abandoned) leads to radical
scepticism and an even deeper subjectivism, and is a philosophical cul-de-sac.
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collectively constructed truth-reservoir, and not the individual idiosyncratic belief.
ăe idea of knowledge espoused by Fleck resonates once more with the philosoph-
ical project set out by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein (1953, §43 p. 18e) recommended
that in order to understand a word’s meaning, philosophers should turn away from try-
ing to capture what the word represents, and rather focus on how it is used: “For a
large class of cases — though not for all — in which we employ the word “meaning”, it
can be deđned thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the mean-
ing of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.” Sociological analyses
of knowledge have embraced this proclamation, rejecting traditional epistemological
analysis of knowledge claims and instead focusing on the question of when and how
statements, belief and data sets produced by individuals become linguistically incorpo-
rated into the pool of accepted scientiđc knowledge. ăus, ‘scientiđc knowledge’ for
social studies of science is not the set of beliefs that the philosopher can give good rea-
sons to believe himself; scientiđc knowledge is the set of statements that scientists (as a
collective) choose, declare and demand to call knowledge. As the pioneers of sociology
of scientiđc knowledge noted early on, the role of the sociologist is to develop a nat-
uralised epistemology that is not concerned with what should or should not be called
knowledge in traditional terms, but on what is in fact called knowledge by those who
produce it.Ƴ⁰
For theWittgensteinian epistemological project, the phrase “Tiago believes that…”
cannot lead to a conclusion about knowledge, but only about what Tiago as a person
believes to be the case. ăat by itself is not sociologically deđned knowledge, because it
does not incorporate any notion of how the individual actually uses that bit of informa-
tion within a social context. Returning to Fleck andWittgenstein, the usage of a con-
cept, of that bit of knowledge, is established by social convention, and thus ‘knowledge’
cannot be analysed outside its social context in any meaningful way. ăe individual is
of no concern other than as an embodiment of socially-instantiated knowledge, whose
location is within communities and epistemic collectivities.ƳƲ
Ƴ⁰Barnes (1977, ch. 1)
ƳƲSociologists would not say that one deđnition is better than the other, but that in each case ‘knowl-
edge’ is referring to two very diﬀerent though connected phenomena. In everyday life we say ‘I know’
to mean ‘personal-knowledge’, but also use ‘knowledge’ to mean ‘collective knowledge’. Perhaps if there
was a widespread substitution of the verb ‘to know’ (as in ‘I know that…’) for something like the Scottish
verb ‘to ken’ the confusion might not arise, but this is of course impractical.
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1.9 Matching theoryandexperiment: contemporaryphi-
losophy of science
Philosophical studies of science have undergone a deep transformation during the past
twodecades.ƳƳ An important andoĕen referencedpublication in theđeld is vanFraassen’s
ScientiĖc Image and its proclamation that the aimof science is ‘to save the phenomenon’,
i.e. to account for the empirical facts. ăis central tenet of van Fraassen’s ‘construc-
tive empiricism’ was adopted by other philosophers and produced an important disci-
plinary rearrangement that brought philosophy of science closer to ‘phenomenological’
physics, as can be seen for example in the work of Cartwright (1983) and Giere (1990,
1999). All these authors proclaim that experiment ought to be retaken as the primary
guidance for knowledge creation in physics, while also downgrading the role of high-
theory. Cartwright (1983, p. 8) for example writes, “I have repeatedly said I do not
believe in theoretical laws” and Giere proposes a version of ‘science without laws’. For
this philosophy the new approach is to highlight the role of models in physics, mathe-
matical statements with only localised validity that are created with the sole purpose of
accounting for the phenomenal world. As Lenoir (1988, p. 22) explains, this new phe-
nomenologically oriented philosophy tries to address the situation that “experiment,
instrumentation, and procedures of measurement, the body of practices and technolo-
gies forming the technical culture of science, have received at most a cameo appearance
in most histories. For the history of science is almost always written as the history of
theory”.
In this way contemporary philosophy of science has traded ‘model’ for ‘theory’ as
its central point of interest. ăis is fortunate because it has put the importance of mod-
elling real phenomena in physics into the spotlight, and model building had been a
piece of theoretical practice that had indeed long been neglected by science studies.
Nevertheless, in doing this many philosophers of science seem to have swung the pen-
dulum to the other extreme, declaring theory dead, which very much contradicts the
role that pure theory holds within the world of physics.
Talking to theoretical physicists shows that many do indeed devote a good deal of
their time to exploringmodels and experiments rather than concentrating on pure the-
ƳƳSee Portides (2011) and references therein for a more comprehensive overview.
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ory. Although phenomenology is oĕen seen as second-rate theoretical physics, in terms
of the number of phenomenologists versus pure theoreticians, it is equally if not more
signiđcant. As a necessary bridge between autonomous theory and experiment, phe-
nomenology, applied physics, computer simulations of theoretical predictions, com-
puter simulations of experimental setups, and the interpretation of the data churned
out by laboratories is massive work. ăis is not meant to undermine the role of pure
theoretical physics, but rather to highlight the importance of all the pieces of the horse-
shoe diagram in holdingmodern physics together. ăus, an initial purpose of this work
is to highlight the equal importance of phenomenology, theoretical and experimental
physics, in order to understand the the connections between these domains.
CHAPTER 2
ăeoretical ﬆyles
Ƈe senses are too gross, and he’ğ contrive
ŧ sixĭ, to contradiĊ ĭe oĭer Ėve,
ŧnd before cerĬin inﬆinĊ, wiğ prefer
ŸeĆon, which ĖĜy times for one does err;
ŸeĆon, an ignĝ fćuĮ of ĭe mind,
Žhich, leaving light of nćure, sense, behind,
Ŷćhless and dangeroĮ wand’ring ways it Ĭkes,
Ƈrough ūrror’s fenny bogs and ĭorny brakes;
— ŰohnŽilmot, ūarl of Ÿocheﬆer, Ěom ‘ŧŹćyreŧgainﬆųankind’
2.1 ăeoretical thought styles between theory
and experiment: phenomenology
ăis chapter will focus on phenomenology, theoretical physics that lies between fully
theoretically and fully empirically oriented physics, in order to illustrate how the dif-
ferentmicro-cultures of the lower half of the horseshoe diagram—understood as types
of Fleck-type thought styles— shape theoretical practice. Itwill also exemplify how the
disunity thesis arises in theoretical activity and theoretical discussions, and thus allow
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the disunity between diﬀerent micro-cultures to be better appreciated.
Phenomenology is concerned with creating descriptions of actual empirical phe-
nomena. However, theoreticians approach empirical phenomena from diﬀerent an-
gles. I identify three main ‘styles’ for carrying out empirically-oriented work, and for
creating descriptions of empirical phenomena, which I have termed Ėrst-principle mod-
elling, data-Ėtting modelling and simulation. ăese are the thought styles that make up
the central-lower portions of the horseshoe diagram, at that form the interface between
pure theory and pure experiment.
Knorr–Cetina (1999, p. 1)has proposed a category that is similar toFleck’s thought
styles in her concept of ‘epistemic styles’, which she deđnes as “those amalgams of ar-
rangements andmechanisms—bonded through aﬃnity, necessity and historical coin-
cidence—which, in a given đeld,make uphowweknowwhatwe know. Knorr–Cetina
(1995) argues that the notion of epistemic cultures draws attention to the fact that
diﬀerent scientiđc communities have their own ‘strategies’ and ‘styles’ of consensus-
formation. In other words, the reasons that scientists give to justify their knowledge
claims can vary from group to group, and the diﬀerent modes of justiđcation can be
grouped together into distinct classes. ăe đrst-principle style and the data-đtting style
ofmodelling can be seen as an extension ofKnorr-Cettina’s analysis to theoretical prac-
tice. An interesting point is that while Knorr-Cettina has posited ‘simulation’ as a form
of experimental style, it is mostly theoreticians that carry out simulations in physics (al-
though these same theoreticians constantly highlight how simulation has many of the
same characteristics of experimental practice).
ăeprincipal productsofphenomenological theoreticians’work aremodels/theories
(the ambiguity between these concepts will be discussed from a sociological stand-
point) and simulations. I will đrst examine the general use of models in physics and
in a later section that of simulations.
‘Modelling’ in physics is generically used to denote a theoretical description of a
piece of the physical world, as opposed to theory that deals with the actual phenomenal
and tangible world very indirectly. Models and their role in theoretical physics have
received a lot of attention from science studies, particularly from philosophers, and
thus Bailer-Jones (2003, p. 59) writes that “scientiđc models represent aspects of the
empirical world”, whileCartwright (1997, p. 292) states thatmodels “mediate between
our various parcels of general and speciđc scientiđc knowledge and the world that that
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knowledge is about”. Scientiđcmodels are therefore generally understood as theoretical
means to represent the phenomenal world, where ‘representation’ should be taken in
the widest sense possible.
2.2 Sidestepping the philosophy of models
Concerning scientiđcmodels, contemporary philosophy of science tends to take amore
practice-based approach than is typical for the đeld. As Knuuttila et al. (2006, p. 4-5)
explain, although “there has been some division of labour between philosophers of sci-
ence and STS researchers […] the studies of models by philosophers and STS scholars
can be seen to interact with, intersect and complement one another, with the practice-
orientation laying out a bridge between the two”. Frigg &Hartmann (2009) for exam-
ple focus on the utility of models in diﬀerent practical contexts rather than turning to
ontological, essentialist or methodological categories, partitioning the usage of models
into: the role of models as representational tools of real phenomena; the role of models
as data-organisers, so that amodel is a “corrected, rectiđed, regimented, and inmany in-
stances idealised version of the data we gain from immediate observation, the so-called
raw data”; models as instantiations of a formal language, in the sense of mathematical
logic, where “a model is a structure that makes all sentences of a theory true, where
a theory is taken to be a (usually deductively closed) set of sentences in a formal lan-
guage”.Ʋ
Yet the semantic multiplicity of models is complex enough that ‘model’— for both
scientists and science studies scholars— canmean, amongst other things: idealised de-
scriptions of the physical world, half-baked descriptions of the physical world, approx-
imate descriptions of the physical world, preferred descriptions of the physical world,
standardised descriptions of the physical world, pedagogical illustrations of how to de-
scribe the physical world, archetypes of the physical world, explorations of the physical
world through theory, amongst many, many other uses. Or as philosopher N. Good-
man describes the situation, ‘model’ is an extraordinarily promiscuous term, so that “a
model is something to be admired and emulated, a pattern, a case in point, a type, a pro-
totype, a specimen, a mock-up, a mathematical description — almost anything from a
ƲElectronic resource, no page numbers.
śChapter 2 42
nakedblonde to aquadratic equation—andmaybear towhat itmodels almost any rela-
tion of symbolization”. Ƴ For example, philosopher such as Black (1968) have embraced
this richness of meaning by linking ‘models’ to the linguistic object of ‘metaphor’, itself
a semantically exuberant concept. Rather than trying to work out a pseudo-philosophy
ofmodels and attempt to address questions concerningwhatmodels ‘are’ or the general
way in which models are used in a general framework of science, I will try to draw out
the essential sociological features of models and simulations.
In order to avoid getting lost in discussions that might obscure the sociological
dimensions of phenomenology, it is necessary to start out from as simple a working-
deđnition of models as is possible. As mentioned previously, the most general feature
of all models is that they are the media through which theoreticians incorporate the
physical world directly into their work. But— a cunning reader may object— isn’t this
what all theoretical physics is about, describing bits of the physical world ?
To proceed in understanding the use of models, I will juxtapose them against an-
other important theoretical product that is tied to the phenomenal world: theoreti-
cal laws. When theoreticians refer to the laws of physics they typically mean statements
about the physical world that are universally acknowledged— for all practical purposes
— beyond doubt. I will brieĔy examine a paradigmatic example, the Law of Conserva-
tion of Energy, also known as the First Law of ăermodynamics. Although it can be
stated in a variety of ways, a typical one is the following statement by Fermi (1936)
“ąe variation in energy of a system during any transformation is equal to
the amount of energy that the system receives Ěom its enĂironment during a
transformation”.
An important feature of the First Law is that it is, in the strictest sense, universal. It
is not valid for one particular system, or class of systems but for every physical system in
existence in the past, present and future. Feynman et al. (1964, Section 4-1) describe
a law as being “a fact […] concerning all natural phenomena that are known to date.
ăere is now exception to [a] law— it is exact so far as we know”. As Feynman explains
concerning the First Law in his fantastic ‘Dennis theMenace parable’, when there seem
to be ‘violations’ of the First Law, physicists move all sorts of resources — intellectual
ƳCited inWinsberg (1999).
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and material — in order to đnd Ĕaws in the analysis, argument or experiment that lead
to the cancellation of the violation. Feynman describes the conservation of energy as
analogous to a conjecture byDennis theMenaces’motherwhenDennis keeps losing toy
construction blocks. WhenDennis loses a block (analogous towhen a physicist ‘loses’ a
bit of energy which appears as a the violation of the First Law) the mother conjectures
that it cannot have simply disappeared. If the mother then looks hard enough, then
the missing blocks will be found, under a rug, behind a sofa, etc. If there are missing
blocks, or extra blocks, the mother may be sure that Dennis has brought them from or
taken them from outside the room, and thus that ‘the Law of Conservation of Blocks’
has not been broken. According to Feynman, this is how physicists go about using the
First Law, by believing in it as a hardcore and honest truth. Moreover, says Feynman,
“it is important to realise in physics that we have no knowledge of what energy is. […]
It is an abstract thing in that it does not tell us themechanisms or reason for the various
formulas” (emphasis in the original text).
2.3 ăeories and Truth,Models and Contingency
Laws in physics are thus statements that are, for all practical purposes, beyond doubt.
But this doubt cannot refer simply to personal doubt, as one can đnd instances where
particular physicists may bemomentarily convinced of a potential violation. It is collec-
tive truth status that a law commands, and that orients physicists in đnding strategies
to ‘đx’ anomalous violations. A physical law is not ‘true’ by personal conviction (al-
though it can of course be probed by individuals), but made ‘true’ by collective belief
through generalised personal conviction. To use a phrase coined by Zimmermann &
ăorne (1980), a law like the First Law ofăermodynamics is one of the physics com-
munity’smost cherished beliefs, one that would be hard to give up without good reasons
despite the fact that, like all scientiđc knowledge, physicists are aware that it may be
fallible. ‘ăeory’ is thus sociologically standardised belief. ăeories, as generalised and
universal beliefs thus contrast stronglywithmodels asmore localised descriptions of the
physical world, which in their idiosyncrasy necessarily have a lower level of universality,
and of belief.
But truth, as sociology of science knows full well, is a category that evolves with
time, and this is reĔected in the eclectic usage of both ‘law’ and ‘model’ referred to
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earlier. Emch (2007) has used examples fromphysics that reĔect the semantic Ĕexibility
given to the distinction between ‘model’ and ‘theory’ in its real world usage. Emch
cites the Stanford Linear Accelerator’s webpage description of the Standard Model of
particle physics:
ăe Standard Model is the name given to the current theory of funda-
mental particles and how they interact. […] Today, the Standard Model
is a well-established theory applicable to a wide range of conditions. […]
One part of the StandardModel is not yet well established. […]ăus, this
one aspect of the Standard Model does not yet have the status of theory
but still remains in the realm of hypothesis or model.ƴ
Frigg&Hartmann (2009) similarlynote that “in commonparlance, the terms ‘model’
and ‘theory’ are sometimes used to express someone’s attitude towards a particular piece
of science. ăe phrase ‘it’s just a model’ indicates that the hypothesis at stake is asserted
only tentatively or is even known to be false, while something is awarded the label ‘the-
ory’ if it has acquired some degree of general acceptance” (emphasis added). Yet Frigg
& Hartmann add that “this way of drawing a line between models and theories is of
no use to a systematic understanding of models”; while possibly true for philosophy,
this is deđnitley untrue for sociology of science. ăe essential sociological distinction
between models and theories is in fact the manner in which this line is drawn.
Further elaboration on this point is given elsewhere in SLAC’s internet site, in a
page that is titled “Is the StandardModel a theory or a model?”, which again illustrates
howmodels seep into scientiđc language as less stable forms of knowledge:
To scientists, the phrase “the theory of…” signals a particularly well-tested
belief. A hypothesis is an idea or suggestion that has been put forward
to explain a set of observations. It may be expressed in terms of a math-
ematical model. ăe model makes a number of predictions that can be
tested in experiments. Aĕer many tests have been made, if the model can
be ređned to correctly describe the outcome of all experiments, it begins
to have a greater status than a mere suggestion. (emphasis added)
ƴStanford Linear Accelerator Virtual Visitor Center: ăe Standard Model, http://www2.slac.
stanford.edu/vvc/theory/model.html.
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Nevertheless, the same text points towards the sometimes ambiguous use of both
‘theory’ and ‘model’. In particular, it discusses how the Standard Model of Particle
Physics — one of the crowning achievements of 20th century physics that aims to de-
scribe all the fundamental interactions between matter/energy— is in reality a theory:
Scientist do not use the term “the theory of…” except for those ideas that
have been so thoroughly tested and developed that we know there is in-
deed some range of phenomena for which they give correct predictions
every time. (But, language being Ĕexible, scientists may use ”a theory” as a
synonym for ”a hypothesis”, so listen carefully.) […]ăe fact that we have
a theory with the name ”Standard Model” is a bit peculiar. ăere were a
number of similar competing models. ăe one that kept passing the ex-
perimental tests became the Standard Model and eventually this became
the theory of fundamental particles and their interactions. Physicists con-
tinue to use the name Standard Model, but add capital letters to denote
its status as more than just a model!⁴
So in fact at some point in time the Standard Model was ‘just a model’. As a the-
oretician who is a specialist in Standard and beyond-Standard Model theory brieĔy
summarised:
Mondragón: If you look at how the Standard Model was built, it was
built phenomenologically; this symmetryworkshere, this onedoesn’t, etc.
ăat is how physics is done. ăat is how physics is built. ăe Standard
Model that now everyone accepts was made by trial and error: “this sym-
metry works, but this gives me more information; this charge is not as I
thought…”
ăe transition of the Standard Model from being classiđed as a ‘model’ to a bona
đde ‘theory’was simply a reĔectionof it’smutation fromhypotheticaldata organiser that
competed with othermodels, into standardised commonly-accepted physicists. In per-
haps the most detailed historical account of the development of the Standard Model,
⁴Stanford Linear Accelerator Virtual Visitor Center: Is the Standard Model a theory or a model?,
http://www2.slac.stanford.edu/vvc/theory/modeltheory.html.
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Pickering (1984, p. 46, 60) has identiđed two stages in the theoretical development
of high-energy physics theory, the initial stage being clearly an empirically-driven phe-
nomenologicalphase, and the secondonebeing guidedmostly by a ‘fundamental theory’
approach.
Pickering refers to the đrst stage as ‘the old physics’ of the early 1960s, which “was
characterised by its common sense approach to elementary particle phenomena. Ex-
perimenters explored high cross-section processes, and theorists constructedmodels of
what they reported.” In fact, the construction of these models was a massive eﬀort of
data-Ėtting,where “the use of conservation laws, symmetry principles and group theory
brought some order into the proliferation of particles”. Pickering shows how the đeld-
theoretic, symmetry-based explanations that laid the ground for the Standard Model
appeared as a result of trying to gain further insight into the ‘population explosion’ of
particle physics whereby the number of fundamental particles discovered in accelera-
tor experiments grew from a handful to over seventy types in just a few years. Pickering
points out that the ‘symmetry’ school that gave rise to the Standard Model was one of
two major theories to tackle the population explosion problem, and that in fact by the
later part of the ‘60s the alternative classiđcation known as S-matrix/ bootstrap the-
ory dominated the đeld in terms of publication numbers. Eventually this alternative
was surpassed by the đeld-theory/symmetry approach, but during the late 1960s the
nowadays dominant đeld theory approach was not yet established truth.ăemost soci-
ologically relevant point is the transformation in terms of levels of belief. In time, the
theoretical data-đtting model started gaining distance from experiment and, impor-
tantly, started making successful predictions of unseen phenomena, until eventually it
mutated into a ‘theory’ that could advancewithout being tied to the data đtting process.
ăe diﬀerentiation between models and theories as more or less stable elements of
belief are found throughout theoretical physics’ parlance, and descriptions of the Stan-
dard Model as a ‘permanent achievement’ is quite common. Weinberg (1998, p. 6)
for example explains how “aĕer our theories reach their mature forms, their hard parts
represent permanent accomplishments. If you have bought one of those T-shirts with
Maxwell’s equations on the front, youmayhave toworry about its going out of style, but
not about its becoming false.” ăe Standard Model is one of such permanent accom-
plishments. At this point in thehistory of physics, the StandardModel is acknowledged
to be the ‘best’ theoretical explanation available to theoreticians, and so it acquires airs
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of ‘truth’ and ‘theory’ rather than of a tentative ‘hypothesis’ or a ‘model’.
ăere is of course a certain tension between seeing a theory as ‘true’ — which is
a scientists’ natural attitude towards their work, and seeing it as merely ‘socially fash-
ionable’ which requires a second-order analysis of the discipline.⁵ But as the following
exchange illustrates, this is at the heart of the semantic Ĕexibility and occasional inter-
changeability of ‘model’ and ‘theory’. In it, the interviewee rapidly and oĕen switched
from ‘model’ to ‘theory’ when describing theoretical elements that were outside/within
his own area of expertise:
Reyes: What is a theoretical model? Could you give me an example of
one?
Fairhurst: Sure. String theory is one. It’s a huge theory. […] It’s a model
of possibly the entire Universe. […] People use these theoretical models
of galaxy formation and star formation to predict the rate of black hole
mergers there are going to be in the Universe. It’s not directly based on
observation, or it may have some observation input, but then there’s some
theoreticalmodelwhere youhave to assume thingswhich aren’tmeasured.
I guess the other big one is QCD; they’re looking for the Higgs. So the
Higgs has been theoretically predicted, but it’s not been found. (emphasis
added)
In order to highlight this ambiguity, I tried to juxtapose the dichotomy of model
versus theory, which the interviewee immediately understood, although he again en-
tangles their usage:
Reyes: It seems funny that you call string theory a ‘model’, because I think
many of the guys that do string theory would call it a ‘theory’, no?
Fairhurst: But it’s a theory to model the Universe, right? Strings theorists
are on the borderline. Half of them are in maths departments and half are
in physics, and so some of the guys in maths departments are just doing
‘really cool maths.’ […] Some of the ones in the physics department are
⁵Where natural attitude should be understood as in the traditional spirit of phenomenological anal-
ysis, that is, the suspension of doubt concerning the immediate social and material world; see Schütz
(1932, p. 98).
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actually claiming and trying to work out how you can take this elegant
theory and predict something about the Universe, something we could
measure, be it in the very earlyUniverse, at very high energies, or very small
length scales, whatever. In that sense it’s a model, a model of theUniverse.
Just like Newton’s gravity is a model of the Universe. […] ‘ăeory’ and
‘model’ are almost interchangeable.⁶
Fairhurst herementions another important element that gives ‘theories’ their power:
prediction (and retrodiction). As prediction extrapolates the applicability of a ‘theory’
beyondmerely a localised set of data, it is a constitutive element of building up theoret-
ical belief in what is initially a model (as Pickering points out concerning the Standard
Model). Continuing from the above Fairhurst returned to the topic of a theory as an
attempt to “model the universe”. Nevertheless, when referring to his ownwork in Gen-
eral Relativity—where GR is the basic and unchanging mathematical framework that
needs to be taken as the natural attitude simply in order to begin computational work
— he identiđed GR as a theory:
Reyes: When youwere doing things as a pure theoretician, were youwork-
ing with models or were you working with theories? How would you put
it?
Fairhurst: It was within General Relativity, which I guess I would call a
theory. And I guess for the same reasons string theorists would call string
theory a theory. It is trying to model the Universe. What we tried to de-
velop was a theoretical model of black-hole horizons. ăere you go, I used
bothwords! It’s not ‘these are theories and these aremodels and I candraw
a line between them.’ (emphasis added)
To sum up this section, theoreticians’ usage of the terms ‘model’ and ‘theories’ is
highly Ĕexible, but nevertheless exhibits two general features. ăe đrst are mostly un-
derstood as empirical, localised and hypothetical pieces of theory, while the second
⁶Notice how Fairhurst is again pointing to the connection betweenmodels and the empirical world.
Nevertheless, the standard SM textbook Cottingham & Greenwood (2007, p. 153) unambiguously
identiđes the QCD as being a theory, “In the Standard Model, the strong interaction also is described
by a gauge theory. […]ăe theory is known as quantum chromodynamics (QCD)”.
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are usually reserved for more stable theoretical statements. Of course, what is ‘stable’
within a form-of-life is a strongly-socially mediated category, with ‘stability’ encom-
passing the elementary parts of an individual’s social world. For Fairhurst, working as a
data-analyst and simulator requires him to suspend belief in General Relativity, speak-
ing of it as a theory. String theory, which lies outside of his immediate social world, can
then be seen as a model, although he clearly understands why a string theorist himself
would posit it as a theory: it is part of each form-of-life’s immediately stable knowledge.
2.4 Two theoretical styles of phenomenology
RecallingKnorr-Cettina’s ‘epistemic styles’, we cannow identify twoepistemic approaches
to modelling, at the interface between pure theory and phenomenology. On the one
hand is a ‘theory’ driven approach, where theory is to be understood as in the above sec-
tions, that is, as socially stabilised belief in theoretical-mathematical laws. Once a the-
oretical law-like belief-system becomes stable and mathematically formalised within a
community (what could broadly be described as a Kuhn-type paradigm), then a theo-
retician can proceed in terms of ‘applying’ this paradigm to derive results that match
empirical observation (prediction or retrodiction). ăeoreticians who fundamentally
place belief in an established piece of theory and its ‘principles’ work within what I will
refer to as the Ėrst-principles style, in reference to theway thatmature theories tend to be
stated in terms ofmathematical axiomatisation-like schemes (e.g. Newtonian dynamics
and theăree Laws, Maxwell electrodynamics and the four Maxwell equations, quan-
tummechanics and its four ’postulates’ and bridge principles, etc.) ăe đrst-principles
style thus places belief in thismethod of production of theoretical results, or paraphras-
ing Knorr-Cettina, the belief in the method and the postulates allows theoreticians to
understand “how they know what they know”. ăis style pulls on the lozenge labelled
‘modelling’ in the horseshoe diagram towards pure theory.
On the other hand, phenomenology may be driven by what I term a data-Ėtting
style, or a belief in the primacy of matching theory with experimental results, possibly
in determent of established đrst principles. ăus, if an ‘anomalous’ experimental result
seems to contradict a stable theoretical description, a data-đtterwould have noproblem
revising what is apparently stable theory in order to achieve empirical adequacy. For
example, a theoreticians could introduce non-trivial modiđcations to an established
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Modelling
Data- tting
(towards experiment)
First principles
(towards theory)
Figure 2.1: ăe tension inherent to ‘modelling’ is due to the convergence of two
thought styles: data-đtting and đrst-principle theorising.
theory (or a semi-stable theory/model), even if those modiđcations have no immedi-
ate ‘physical’ justiđcation. ăis does not mean that a data-đtter does not care about
producing theory that is physically justiđable in terms of đrst-principles, but only that
the creation of theory is more closely connected to the empirical tradition than to pure
theory.
ăese two styles can be visualised in terms of the tension they create on modelling
as a whole. In fact, the social worlds of the two styles are so interconnected that placing
‘modelling’ within the family of ‘high theory’ is only a mere convention if one focuses
on the đrst-principle approach, as it could also be seen as part of phenomenology if
emphasis is laid on the data-đtting eﬀorts. ăis is encapsulated in Figure 2.1. Summing
up, these styles are characterised as:
1. First-principle style: the justiđcationof empirical claims follows an ‘axiom-theorem’
account of truth that borrows terms from logico-mathematical parlance. In this
case the modeller believes that the fundamental ‘axioms’ of a theory, i.e. the
‘laws’ that govern the system can be đrmly established, and that once these laws
are stated one only has to đnd the actual description of the system or the initial
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conditions and solve a set of equation to obtain the necessary solutions. ăe idea
is connected tomathematical foundationalism, so that if the axioms are ‘true’, the
truth value is inherited by all the theorems derived from them. For physics, this
leads to the belief that if the laws or đrst-principles are true, then all models that
are consistent with the đrst-principles are valid descriptions of a possible reality.
2. Data-đtting style: in this case, the belief is placedmost strongly on the data. One
supposes that the data is a true and accurate description of a physical system’s
properties. If a set of equations can be made to đt this data, then it is a good
model of the systems, and the truth-value of the data is inherited by the model.
ăedata-đtting strategy is, however, still a general strategy for constructing theo-
ries and not simply đtting numbers to a meaningless equation. Fitting equations
to a set of number data may be part of a data-đtter’s methodology, but it is not
the đnal aim in itself.
2.5 A debate on darkmatter: a clash of epistemic styles
A recent debate on how to approach one of themost important problems of contempo-
rary physics will serve to illustrate the diﬀerence between the đrst-principles approach
to phenomenology/modelling and the data-đtting one.⁷ One of the debaters was S.
Sarkar, who presented himself as a ‘theoretician’, and whose work involves the produc-
tion of cosmological models and the associated phenomenology starting from funda-
mental principles. His opponent A. Jaﬀe described himself as an ‘astrophysicist’ whose
work focuses “on various topics including the formation of structure in the Universe
and gravitational radiation” while also being “involved in the analysis of data from var-
ious experiments”. Sarkar embodied the ideal pure theoretician doing đrst-principle
modelling, and Jaﬀe the ideal data-đtting phenomenologist.
ăe debate centred on the plausibility of the dark energy hypothesis that was to be
defended by Jaﬀe. Dark energy is one of the most intriguing topics in contemporary
physics that is used to explain several anomalous astronomical observations that physi-
cists interpret as evidence that the universe is expanding at a faster rate than was pre-
⁷Imperial College public debate “ąe Big Questions: Does Dark Energy Exist?”, recorded on
21/7/2009.
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viously though. ăe expansion of the universe is described by using Einstein’s General
Relativity’s đeld equations. Famously, at one point Einsteinmodiđed his equations and
plugged in a term that is known as theCosmological Constant, a parameter that can be
given an arbitrary value without this having consequences over the general mathemat-
ical features of the theory, although it aﬀects the type of solutions that are admissible.⁸
Einstein initially introduced the constant to allow his đeld equations to have a solution
where theUniverse was static at cosmological scales, as it was thought to be at the time;
if the constant is zero then only expanding universe solutions are allowed. Hubble’s ob-
servations on galaxy redshiĕs later suggested that the Universe is not static, but seems
to be expanding, and so Einstein removed the constant.⁹
ăe constant has been revived by so-called Standard Cosmology (also known as
-CMD, or ‘Lambda-Cold Dark Matter’), a theoretical framework that unites theo-
retical proposals from cosmology, astrophysics and particle physics to ‘explain’ anoma-
lous data. Jaﬀe works within this framework. Amongst these suppositions is that dark
energy exists, and that this is reĔected in Einstein’s equations through a positive (non-
zero) Cosmological Constant.Ʋ⁰
ăe debate was centred onwhether dark energy is a solid theoretical proposal, with
Jaﬀe being in favour and Sarkar against the concept. Jaﬀe’s arguments weremostly con-
cerned with the match between the accepted data and -CMD, while Sarkar stressed
that he did not “consider the fact that a model đts the data at any given time to be crit-
ical.” Sarkar continuously referred to Einstein’s supposed dismissiveness of experimen-
tal data to support his view that observation, though an important guide, is considered
secondary to working from fundamental principles in theoretical physics, as “Einstein
famously did not believe in looking at data. He relied on his instinct and his intuition
and of course as we know, served him very, very well”. Sarkar pointed out that all of the
accelerated redshiĕ observations could be misled if it happened that our galaxy was in
themiddle of a relatively low-density portion of theUniverse. “Wedon’t knowwhether
we might be in a void in which case all the observations that Andrew talked about can
⁸See Lawden (1962).
⁹Creating another one of physics great stories, Gamow (1970) wrote in his autobiography how Ein-
stein conđded that he deeply regretted this mistake, with Einstein remarking that introduction of the
cosmological term was “the biggest blunder of his life”.
Ʋ⁰ăe energy’s source is still quite controversial, but it is generally agreed that the most plausible can-
didate as of now is the energy of the quantum vacuum.
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be mimicked”.
ăe important diﬀerence between a đrst-principle approach such as Sarkar’s and a
data-đtting one like Jaﬀe’s was summed up by Sarkar as follows:
Sarkar: ăe reasonwhy I thinkAndrew and I diﬀer in our perspective […]
is simply that he is an astronomer and I am a theoretical physicist. ăe
diﬀerence between us is that Andrew looks at the sky and he interprets
the data according to a model and that has given him this idea that three
quarters of the Universe is made of something called dark energy which
apparently none of us has ever seen […] whereas as a theoretical physicist
[…] I will show you that Nature has solved that problem even if we have
not. My faith is in fundamental physics. (emphasis added)ƲƲ
Sarkar thus linked Jaﬀe’s phenomenological work with the use of models and data
as the starting point, while his ownwork is based onmore ‘fundamental’ elements, that
is, based on established theoretical suppositions that are completely data-independent.
Commentingon thedebate someweeks later, and again illustrating the tensionbetween
the Standard Model-as-a-model and Standard Model-as-a-theory dichotomy, Sarkar
wrote:
Sarkar: [We]must be precise about the distinction between experimental
data concerning a theoretical prediction and, as in the present case, Ėt-
ting the observations to the parameters of an assumed model. To illustrate,
the “Standard Model” of particle physics (which should really be called
the‘Standard ăeory”) predicted that the W and Z bosons should exist
with speciđc masses — I was at CERN in 1983 when they were discov-
ered. ăat is indeed experimental evidence and conđrmed that the elec-
troweak uniđcation theory is correct…and every test since then has con-
tinued to conđrm the theory. It has even been tested at the quantum (1-
loop) level and found to be correct. ăe only question today is at what
energy does it break down, as it surely must since it does not unify grav-
ity (but it is quite possible that it might hold up to the Planck scale). By
ƲƲJaﬀe actually described himself as an astrophysicist, not an astronomer, jokingly adding that he had
never actually done telescope work himself.
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contrast the‘Standard Model” of cosmology does not predict anything—
it is the simplest possible model of the universe based on assuming max-
imally symmetric space-time containing ’ideal’ Ĕuids with the dynamics
determined by the theory of general relativity. (emphasis added)ƲƳ
Sarkar embodies a theoreticianworking from ‘đrst-principles’, whose trust in exper-
imental data and the knowledge that can be derived to it is secondary to ‘fundamental’
arguments, while Jaﬀe is the prototypical ‘data-đtter’ who is guided mainly by experi-
mental data. An important point to notice is that both theoreticians are confronting
their styles of approaching phenomenology while focusing on the same object of re-
search: dark energy. Sarkar does comprehend Jaﬀe’s data-driven approach perfectly,
and vice versa, but chooses to place his belief on đrst-principles. Jaﬀe mentions the
‘StandardModel of Cosmology’, which is of amuchmore recent creation and although
consolidated as standardised belief within the astrophysics and cosmology community
still has a fair share of ‘fundamental physics’ lacunae. As an outsider to the cosmology
community, Sarkar does not accept their standardised belief even though it has the
same phenomenological origins as the SM of particle physics. Although it of course
has epistemic elements, this is clearly a sociological judgement from one thought style
upon another.
2.6 ăeoretical styles in early quantum theory
In the following pages I will present some historical studies that further illustrate the
diﬀerences between the two modelling styles. ăis will also serve to make the point
that a thought style does not determine theoreticians’ approaches to their practice, and
in fact some of the most able theoreticians were known to be quite the ‘epistemologi-
cal opportunists’. Nevertheless, theoretical styles do tend to shape a physicists’ overall
work (aswill be illustrated throughout the rest of this thesis), and even themost ‘oppor-
tunistic’ theoreticians tend to have periods where they practice one style over another,
and are uncomfortable with results that are produced from outside their ‘natural’ style
(see sections on Planck and Einstein below).
ƲƳPersonal communication with the author.
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In a historical analysis of the early history of quantum physics and of Arnold Som-
merfeld’s theorising and pedagogy, Seth (2010) has labeled Sommerfeld’s approach to
physics as a problem driven style, which emphasised “a new, more physical perspective
[where] technical applications were blendedwithmathematical and physical methods”
which Sommerfeld carried over from his engineering-centred background. As Seth
(2010, p. 16) explains, his theoretical method ‘shows a striking similarity to part of the
Königsberg paradigm for theoretical physics: essentially the mathematical analysis of
experiment”. ăis Seth juxtaposes with the approach of Sommerfeld’s collaborator, Fe-
lixKlein, whose theoretical approachwasmuchmore driven by puremathematical con-
siderations. In fact, Seth argues that while in his earlier stages Sommerfeld described
his style as that ‘of a mathematician”, Sommerfeld gradually refashioned himself to a
data-driven approach.
However, these historical styles need not map perfectly to the styles as outlined in
the previous section. For example, Seth (2010, p. 33) describes how despite its empir-
ical adequacy, Sommerfeld remained unconvinced that Planck’s formula for the black
body radiationproblemwas fundamentally correct, because Sommerfeldwas immersed
in what Seth calls ‘the electromagnetic worldview’, while Planck’s method came from
the old mechanical worldview’ of a previous generation of theoreticians. Yet, a con-
nection does seem to appear between them, as Seth (2010, p. 43) similarly diﬀerenti-
ates between “Sommerfeld’s physics of problems from Planck’s physics of principles”. ăis
does not lead to a contradiction between these historical đndings of my account, but
rather suggests that — as would be expected — theoretical styles change across time;
worldviews are historically contingent. Nowadays, the electromagnetic vs. mechanis-
tic worldview distinction no longer exists as such, these two world-views having been
both stabilised within canonical theoretical physics. As Seth explains, it is not that a
particular style or worldview determines or gives a đnal shape to theoretical outcomes,
nor that theoreticians are blinded to other approaches, but the more modest conclu-
sion that framing a particular problem from within particular conceptual frameworks
moulds the pathway— the actual theorising—which a physicist adopts.
ăese styles of theorising are not meant to be understood as ‘recipes’ to solve a
problem, but rather as a loose network of attitudes and very general methodologies
towards what constitutes the ideal ways to approach a problem. A đrst-principles theo-
reticianwould tend to frame a particular problem, the general puzzle related to the phe-
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nomenology of dark energy, fromaStandardModel approach, while a data-đtterwould
đrst and foremost start from a desire to explain anomalous data as a starting point.
What this does entail is that the general methods to carry out such work will change
depending on this framework. As historical studies on theory have shown, this is socio-
logically relevant in that these ‘styles’ are not just amatter of pure personal choice, but in
fact create ‘schools’ or networks of collaborators who share these methodological com-
mitments. ăus Sommerfeld’s style not only shaped his own theorising, but also that
of his numerous students, just as he himself had been immersed in the electromagnetic
worldview that marked his own generation. Likewise, Kaiser (2005a) has shown how
adherents to particular schools inmid 20th century physics relied deeply on training of
doctoral student, postdocs and colleagues to disseminate particular methods of resolu-
tion that were also tied to speciđc Ĕavours of technique and— to use the terminology
coined by Lakatos (1978)— competing research programs.
2.7 Max Planck, the awkward data-đtter
A further example of how theoretical styles do not determine the outcomes of theory
can be glimpsed in Max Planck’s method to arrive at his famous black body radia-
tion formula. Kuhn (1987) has detailedly described the processes that lead from the
empirical problem of ‘black body radiation’ in 19th century German experiments, to
M. Planck writing up its deđnitive equation which marked the beginning of quantum
physics. ăe problem of black body radiation entailed the necessity of devising a theo-
retical explanation for the measured radiation spectra of a ‘black body’ (essentially, the
radiation emerging from a closed oven at a given temperature). Since it’s mid-century
formulation up to the turn of the century, various formulae had been proposed tomake
sense of the spectrumby some of the brightestGerman physicists, mainly theWien dis-
tribution and the Stephan-Boltzmann equation). When these formulaewere compared
with the actual spectrum, some were seen to match the spectrum well at high frequen-
cies but failed for the low ones, or vice versa; no formula was seen to match the entire
spectrum. All major theoretical proposals were based on ‘physical principles’, that is,
could be derived from very basic suppositions that did not have anything to do speciđ-
cally with the black body problem.
Planck, who became interested in the problem in the 1890s, was particularly inter-
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ested in the formal connection between electromagnetism and the second law of ther-
modynamics, and thought that the blackbody problem should be solvable solely from
these considerations since these were for him two fundamental basic principles (Kuhn
argues that it was Planck’s orientation towards a particular interpretation of the Second
Law as a statistical lawwhich actually set the ground for a solution to the problem). ăe
problem for Planck then had then two elements:
1. Determining an equation that would đt the spectral data.
2. ăe equation had to be derived from basic principles.
In 1900 Planck gave a brief seminar presentation in which he put forth a tentative
solution to the problem. He started from these theoretical assumptions:
1. Planck (1900) stated that theWien distribution “at most [had] the character of
a limiting case, the simple form of which was due only to a restriction to short
wave lengths and low temperatures” according to the best experimental data at
that moment.
2. ăat the solution ought to be found by combining the use of the Second Law of
thermodynamics and combining it withWien’s ideas of the walls being thought
of as being made up of electromagnetic oscillators. ăe general strategy was that
to solve the problem by đrst giving the expression for the entropy of the sys-
tem (the entropy is the physical stuﬀ with which the Second Law deals with di-
rectly) and from there to derive the spectrum. Planck (1901) explained that “the
physical foundations of the electromagnetic radiation theory, including the hy-
pothesis of ‘natural radiation’, withstand the most severe criticism; and since to
my knowledge there are no errors in the calculations, the principle persists that
the law of energy distribution in the normal spectrum is completely determined
whenone succeeds in calculating the entropyS of an irradiated,monochromatic,
vibrating resonator as a function of its vibrational energyU”.
3. ăat the solution had to follow the ‘Wien displacement law,’ which limits the
possibilities of the mathematical form the equation can take (the equation for
the energy at a particular temperature could only depend on frequency divided
by temperature).
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Planck (1900, p. 2) stated, “I have đnally started to construct completely arbitrary
expressions for the entropy which although they are more complicated than Wien’s
expression still seems to satisfy just as completely all requirements of the thermody-
namic and electromagnetic theory”. Because of all these considerations Planck knew
that, whatever the expression he needed might be, it had to be reduced to aWien type
equation at high energies. He proposed a speciđc modiđcation to the Wien law, jus-
tiđed because “it is by far the simplest of all expressions which leads to S as a loga-
rithmic function ofU—which is suggested by probability considerations— andwhich
moreover reduces to Wien’s expression for small values of U”. From these considera-
tions Planck then directly derived an equation for the energy, which is the now-famous
Planck distribution law. ăe equation is very oĕen wrongly said to have been derived
supposing that the oscillators radiated ‘quanta’ of discrete energy; Planck never men-
tioned the concept of a ‘quantum’ in the early papers, nor did he ever seem to look
favourably on the quantum hypothesis. As is well-known, Planck described his turning
to a data-đtting approach as a desperate attempt to comeupwith a phenomenologically
favourable formula.
ăus inhisNobel prize acceptance speech, Planck (1920) stressedhowhe still viewed
the new quantum physics as fundamentally incomplete so that, “ăe diﬃculties which
the introduction of the quantum of action into the well-tried classical theory has posed
right from the start have already beenmentioned byme. During the course of the years
they have increased rather than diminished, and if, in the meantime, the impetuous
forward-driving research has passed to the order of the day for some of these, temporar-
ily, the gaps leĕ behind, awaiting subsequent đlling, react even harder upon the consci-
entious systematologist. What serves in Bohr’s theory as a basis to build up the laws
of action, is assembled out of speciđc hypotheses which, up to a generation ago, would
undoubtedly have been Ĕatly rejected altogether by every physicist. ăe fact that in the
atom, certain quite deđnite quantum-selected orbits play a special role, might be taken
still as acceptable, less easily however, that the electrons, circulating in these orbits with
deđnite acceleration, radiate no energy at all. ăe fact that the quite sharply deđned
frequency of an emitted photon should be diﬀerent from the frequency of the emitting
electron must seem to a theoretical physicist, brought up in the classical school, at đrst
sight to be a monstrous and, for the purpose of a mental picture, a practically intolera-
ble demand”. ăe data-đtting success of the quantumhypothesis did not, fromPlanck’s
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perspective, provide a successful solution to the original problem as it was lacking the
motivation of a solid đrst all-out principles approach.
2.8 Einstein the epistemological opportunist
Finally I wish to address a piece of theoretical mythology which can be found in many
popular science texts, regarding the diﬀerence between high-theoretical methods and
phenomenological ones. ăis is the myth of ‘beauty’ as the prime mover of theoretical
practice. It is oĕen claimed by high-theorists that the search for ‘simplicity’ or ‘beauty’
is the crucial feature and the culmination ofmodern physics. In such popular accounts,
theoreticians oĕen point out that the entire enterprise of twentieth century theoretical
physics can be seen as a march towards a Grand Uniđed ăeory of physics, that is, a
single physical theory to understand all interactions. Most accounts begin this story by
pointing toMaxwell’s uniđcation of electricity andmagnetism as an important piece of
this enterprise, and then discussing Einstein’s uniđcation of time and space, and đnally
the uniđcation of the electromagnetic, strong, and weak interactions that ended with
the StandardModel of particle physics. ăis development is said to be correlated with
the search for ‘beauty’ inherent to physical uniđcation. Gell-Mann (2007) for example
has stated that
Beauty is a very successful criterion for choosing the right theory. And
why onEarth could that be so? Here’s an example frommy very own expe-
rience, fairly dramatic actually to have this happen. ăree or four of us in
1957 put forth a partially complete theory of [the] weak force, and it was
in disagreement with seven — seven, count them, seven — experiments.
Experiments were all wrong. And we published before knowing that, be-
cause we đgured it was so beautiful, it’s gotta be right! ăe experiments
had to be wrong, and they were. Our friend over there, Albert Einstein,
used to play very little attention when people said, ‘you know, there’s a
man with an experiment that seems to disagree with special relativity. D.
C. Miller, what about that? And he would say, ‘that will go away’.
In this story Einstein is oĕen portrayed as the father of the uniđcation ideal, and
his search for the ‘symmetry’ and ‘beauty’ đlls theoretical mythology. Zee (1986) for
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example writes, “my colleagues and I in fundamental physics are the descendants of Al-
bert Einstein; we like to think that we too search for beauty. Some physics equations
are so ugly that we cannot bear to look at them, let alone write them down”, adding
that, “when presented with two alternative equations purporting to describe Nature,
we always choose the one that appeals to our aesthetic sense. […] Such is the rallying
cry of fundamental physics”. Zee then juxtaposes the attitude of ‘fundamental physics’
with those of “phenomenological theories, constructed simply to ‘explain’ a given phe-
nomenon. ăeorists craĕ such theories to đt the data, and get out as much as they
put in. ăey lead their phenomenological theories, rather than the other way around.
Such theories may be of great practical importance, but typically they tell us little, if
anything, about other phenomena, and I đnd them to be of no fundamental interest”.
According to Zee, the ideal of beauty for these physicists is captured in the idea of sym-
metry in nature. “When I think of the intellectual history of symmetry in physics, I like
to picture two schools of thought, united in their devotion to symmetry but diﬀering
in their outlooks on the character of symmetry. On one side stand Einstein and their
intellectual descendants. To them, symmetry is beauty incarnate, wedded to the geom-
etry of spacetime. […] on the other side stands Heisenberg with his isospin, shattering
the aesthetic imperative of exact symmetry”.
ăis does not mean that symmetry arguments are not crucial to modern physics,
of course. Symmetry arguments have roots in geometry, but nowadays are stated in
mathematics through the algebraic language of group theory. Noether’s (đrst) the-
orem, one of the most important results of mathematical physics, dictate that if the
equations that describe a physical system exhibits a certain kind of symmetry, then one
can derive a ‘conserved quantity’ for the system. Time invariance in the Lagrangian
can be associated to the conservation of energy via Noether’s theorem: if the so called
Lagrangian function (which completely describes the dynamics of a system) does not
depend on time explicitly, then the system’s energy is conserved. Conservation of linear
momentumandangularmomentumcanbe shown to follow fromthehomogeneity and
isotropy of space, respectively, which correspond to a system’s invariance under transla-
tions and rotations. ăe majority of modern particle physics involves the construction
of equations that follow particular symmetries or combinations of symmetries.Ʋƴ Nev-
Ʋƴăe collected essays in Wigner et al. (1997) beautifully close the gap between popular treatment
and technical argumentation concerning symmetry.
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ertheless, romanticised versions of the history of physics that portray symmetry as the
prime mover of theory do great injustice to phenomenological approaches.
Yet Einstein himself is a counterexample to the ‘beauty is the prime mover of the-
oretical physics’ myth. Norton (2000, p. 135) has argued that although “Einstein pro-
claimed that we could discover true laws of nature by seeking those with the simplest
mathematical formulation […] he came to this viewpoint later in his life. In his early
years and work he was quite hostile to this idea”, and further on that “his indiﬀerence
to mathematical simplicity persisted up to and through the years in which he worked
on completing the theory [of General Relativity]”. Norton describes Einstein’s attitude
towards a theory of gravitation that Abraham published in 1912; although he initially
received it enthusiastically, Einstein soon came to disregard it as fundamentally Ĕawed.
Norton cites a letter fromEinstein to Besso in 1912 that sheds light on young Einstein’s
thoughts regarding what he saw as an erroneous application of ‘simplicity’ arguments:
Abraham’s theory has been created out of thin air, i.e. out of nothing but
considerations ofmathematical beauty, and is completely untenable. How
this intelligentman could let himself be carried awaywith such superđcial-
ity is beyond me.Ʋ⁴
Norton’s point is not that considerations of beauty played no part in Einstein’s the-
orising, which they clearly did in the development of General Relativity, but that his
brilliance came from a deep understanding and ability to tackle problems using many
heuristic devices without limiting himself to one exclusive type. ăese included math-
ematical, physical, aesthetic and phenomenological resources whenever any of them
seemed appropriate. Norton (2000, p. 148) cites another letter to Besso in 1914 where
he conveys how invariance arguments had at times proven counterproductive for Ein-
stein:
At the moment I do not especially feel like working, for I had to struggle
horribly to discover what I described above. ăe general theory of invari-
ants was only an impediment.
Einstein’s đnal completionofGeneralRelativitynevertheless did comeabout thanks
to a đnal push to incorporate covariance into the theory, and this is the reason thatNel-
Ʋ⁴Cited in Norton (2000, p. 143).
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son believes led Einstein to overstress the importance of ‘beauty’ and ‘simplicity’ argu-
ments in his later career over all others, in opposition to the methodological diversity
of his earlier years.
Hon & Goldstein (2006, p. 657) have also questioned whether the relevance of
symmetry arguments can be extended as far as popular and philosophical accounts
claim, and in reference to Einstein the authors consider that the story that he was mo-
tivated by symmetry arguments in the creation of special relativity is inaccurate. Al-
though Einstein used the word ‘symmetry’ in his 1905 paper on relativity six times,
Hon and Goldstein’s detailed historical analysis shows that Einstein was not thinking
of symmetry in themodern sense, but was referring to a long standing discussion in the
literature that had been going on since the 1880s when Rowland introduced the term
in reference to the uniđcation of electric and magnetic phenomena under one single
physical scheme, that is, as manifestations of a unique phenomenon. Although ‘sim-
plicity’ was a key heuristic, the authors have argued that there is no proof to show that
there is any ‘aesthetic’ component to Einstein’s argument, for “Einstein sought to unify
the phenomena, that is, to come up withminimal presuppositions that underlie the va-
riety of phenomena— notably those of electrodynamics andmechanics— and realised
that indistinguishability is the key rather than interchangeability. ăis is neither an
aesthetic consideration nor an epistemological one. It is the result of a methodology in
which physical arguments play an essential role. Einstein responded in a most original
way to a discussion in the literature that had been going on for some 25 years”. No one
exempliđed methodological multiplicity better than Einstein, and to lose sight of this
is one of the greatest untruths of modern physics’ myth-based history, for as Einstein
stated
Science without epistemology is— insofar as it is thinkable at all—prim-
itive and muddled. However, no sooner has the epistemologist, who is
seeking a clear system, fought his way through to such a system, than he
is inclined to interpret the thought-content of science in the sense of his
system and to reject whatever does not đt into his system. ăe scientist,
however, cannot aﬀord to carry his striving for epistemological systematic
that far. He accepts gratefully the epistemological conceptual analysis; but
the external conditions, which are set for himby the facts of experience, do
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not permit him to let himself be too much restricted in the construction
of his conceptualworld by the adherence to an epistemological system. He
therefore must appear to the systematic epistemologist as a type of unscrupu-
lous opportunist. (emphasis added)Ʋ⁵
Kenneđck (2007) and the exhaustivelymeticuloushistorical studies of Janssen (2007)
both support the view of Einstein as ‘methodologically opportunistic’. ăus Janssen
(2007, p. 819) notes that Einstein did not hesitate in varying his viewpoint on ‘fun-
damental issues’, for “when he was under the impression that the rotation metric was
a vacuum solution of the đeld equations, he claimed that rotating and non-rotating
frames of reference are equivalent in his theory. When he was under the impression
that it was not, he claimed that the theory explained why rotating and non-rotating
frames of reference are not equivalent. I am not saying that this was an unreasonable
thing to do. On the contrary, it would have been foolish for Einstein to hold on stub-
bornly to the letter of his heuristic requirements if he felt that an otherwise attractive
theory simply lacked the resources to meet this or that requirement. Creative scientists
may need a healthy dose of opportunism”.
Although Einstein was a strong believer in working from fundamental principles,
the assertion that Einstein was an exclusively a đrst-principles theoreticians that chose
to ignore experimentdoesnot standup tohistorical scrutiny. Galison (1987)has shown
how Einstein was heavily involved in the elaboration of at least one important exper-
iment, the measurement of the electron’s gyromagnetic ratio, and how this stemmed
from a deep regard for experimental technology which he had been developed ever
since working as a high-level oﬃcer in a Zurich patent oﬃce. As is also well known,
Einstein worked in phenomenological topics throughout his life but particularly in the
early stages of his career, including the photoelectric eﬀect, the speciđc heat of solids,
Brownian motion in liquids, critical opalescence, and many others. It is unfortunate
that the ‘oﬃcial’ history of physics reminds us of only a very partial segment of hiswork,
the theories of relativity, that he held towards the end of his life.
Ironically, it is oĕen said that Einstein was motivated into producing the Special
ăeory of Relativity looking for an explanation to the Michelson-Morley experiment,
a statement that historical studies have debunked. Holton (1969) has argued that that
Ʋ⁵In Schlip (1949).
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although Einstein may have been aware of the Michelson-Morley experiment before
his work on Special Relativity was published, it certainly was not determinant at all
as an experimental source if we are to believe Einstein’s own testimony. Holton cites,
amongst others, an interview with Shankland where Einstein clearly stated (to Shank-
land’s surprise) that Michelson’s work had not been crucial in any way to his đrst pub-
lication, although he knew of the result and came to greatly value Michelson’s work in
later years:
ăe đrst visit [4 February 1950] to Princeton to meet Professor Einstein
wasmadeprimarily to learn fromhimwhathe really felt about theMichelson-
Morley experiment, and towhat degree it had inĔuenced him in his devel-
opment of the Special ăeory of Relativity.... He began by asking me to
remind him of the purpose of my visit and smiled with genuine interest
when I told him that I wished to discuss the Michelson-Morley experi-
ment performed at Cleveland in 1887... When I asked him how he had
learned of the Michelson-Morley experiment, he told me that he had be-
come aware of it through the writings of H. A. Lorentz (Arch. Neerl. 2,
168 [1887], andmany later references), but only aĕer 1905 had it come to
his attention! “Otherwise,” he said, ‘I would have mentioned it in my pa-
per.” He continued to say the experimental results which had inĔuenced
him most were the observations on stellar aberration and Fizeau’s mea-
surements on the speed of light in moving water. ‘ăey were enough,” he
said. [cited in Holton (1969, p. 154)]
2.9 ăeoreticians and computers
Although theoretical physicists increasingly rely on computers to carry out their work,
it is important to distinguish between computers as calculating machines, and comput-
ers as sites of simulation. In the đrst case, a computer may be used simply as a gloriđed
pocket calculator to obtain a numerical resultwhich it is not practical to obtain by hand
calculations. Consider for example as simple an integral as the following:Z p
sinx
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ăe solution to this integral is a function called an elliptic integral of the second kind:
Z p
sin x dx =  2E

1
4
(   2x)j2

Adeđnite numerical value for the integral can be calculated using variousmethods,
all of them cumbersome but not particularly diﬃcult. Nevertheless, a program like the
very popularMathematica can provide an accurate numerical answer in a fraction of a
second by simply entering the command:
EllipticE

1
4
(   2x); 2

;
(where x is substituted for a numerical value to turn the indeđnite integral into a deđ-
nite one) and pressing a button. ăis is no diﬀerent to using a calculator to obtain the
value of a trigonometric function like sin x, which may also be calculated by hand, but
seldom is.
In fact, programs likeMathematica can be used for much more complicated tasks
such as solving complicated diﬀerential and integral equations which would prove in-
credibly time-consuming through purely human means. Moreover, Mathematica has
one characteristic that also makes it an interesting theoretical tool, the ability to do
symbolic mathematics, that is to ‘do algebra’. But, thoughMathematica can also func-
tion as a platform for higher-end numerical computing, it has one characteristic that
many physicists đnd undesirable: that most of its underlying mathematical engine is
‘black boxed’, meaning that users cannot manipulate the inner core of the program’s
computing engine.
Before the age of easily available desktop computers, physicist relied on hardcore
programming skills to obtain numerical results using lower-level programming, with
FORTRAN being a particularly popular language in physics, even to this day when
more advanced programs like C have rendered FORTRAN obsolete elsewhere. Un-
likeMathematica, FORTRAN’s numerical algorithms are open for users to inspect and
modify, and are thus in principle ‘veriđable’. FORTRAN’s numerical libraries can be
modiđed, built upon and tinkered with, and so đt very well with physics’ hands-on-
approach to problem solving, corresponding to what Turkle (2009, p. 32) has called
“the aesthetic of transparency”.
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Most theoreticians at the phenomenological end of the spectrum require numerical
results of some sort, and so some degree of programming skills are nowadays part of the
skill set of all but the most mathematically oriented theoreticians:
Now we include computer work as part of the curriculum too. I learnt
how to use FORTRAN when I was still very young. I tried switching to
C, but then I became frustrated when I realised that even though C was
superior to FORTRAN, it turns out that when you look for a routine or a
subroutine online, or in soĕware libraries, they’re written for FORTRAN.
It’s absurd! It turns out you have to translate them, or use a converter, and
I said…to hell with it. When the Cray đrst appeared, everyone said, use
FORTRAN— of course — so I switched back to FORTRAN. I still use
FORTRAN. Around 1991 or 1992 I discoveredMathematica and I loved
it. I even wrote a program that did some diﬀerential geometry because
I was then working on a two dimensional diﬀerential geometry problem
andwrote a program to handle repeated indices and to calculate somemi-
nor stuﬀ, nothing really big. Nevertheless, with time I grew disappointed
byMathematica because when you used it tomake hard calculations it got
stuck. I was very surprised that as years went by…Computers are much,
much better nowadays than back then. ăe computer here onmy desktop
is quite superior to that Cray we used twenty years ago; processors, etc. I
rediscoveredMathematica a couple of years ago, and now I’ve become fas-
cinated byMathematica again. I’ve again become a ‘Mathematicaoloist’.
ăe things that I did with FORTRAN I do now with Mathematica, be-
cause it’s got enough power; the number crunching power that it lacked.
ăe algebraic manipulation power is still there, it’s absolutely marvellous,
in addition to the numerical power. It’s another tool you use,Mathemat-
ica or FORTRAN.
2.10 Simulations and complexity
Unlike simple ‘number crunching’, computer simulations are not just a tool that makes
standards theoretical work easier or faster, but are in themselves a third style of phe-
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nomenology that has experienced tremendous growth in recent times. It is necessary
to somewhat delimit the concept, since as with the term ‘model’, ‘simulation’ does not
have a solidly đxed meaning and is sometimes used to describe any sort of computer-
mediated theorising; Sismondo (1999)writes that “Models and simulations donot […]
form a homogeneous category [but] form a continuum, from spare symbolic entities to
somewhat more complex sets of equations that are computerized largely for ease of cal-
culation and manipulation, to computer programs so large and intricate that no one
person understands how they function.” Nevertheless Sismondo đnds that this contin-
uum has two endpoints, so that “the endpoints of this continuum are large enough that
complex computer simulations can be said to use models, of many diﬀerent types, or
to have some particular models at their heart. Simplemodels and complex simulations,
then, are in at least thisway diﬀerent types of objects, while they are related as endpoints
on a continuum” (emphasis added).
ăe simulation that I will deal with here are at the ‘complex’ end of the continuum
described by Sismondo. Hence I will use simulation in the same sense as Knorr–Cetina
(1999, Ch. 1), that is, simulations as representations of phenomena that attempt to
reproduce the structural features of the phenomenon to be represented as closely as
possible. Simulations in this sense need not be limited to computer programs. Knorr-
Cettina presents the example of sandbox war games as a type of simulation. ăese
games, oĕen portrayed in historical đlms where a general is overviewing an upcoming
battle with his đeld commanders by placing enemy and friendly ‘troops’ on a miniature
version of the battleđeld, are carried out by supposing that each piece has a predeđned
possible movement (depending for example on the type of troop, and the terrain it sits
on) and predeđned eﬀect on close enemy troops. Chess can be seen as a particularly
simpliđed example of a simulation of sorts in this sense. A war game will evidently be
‘better’ themore it resembles theway an actual complex battle is carried out. Of course,
this would in turn require extremely complex ‘rules’ which can never fully capture the
‘real’ battleđeld’s and the troops’ features, but the point of an ideal game would be to
increase the complexity of the game as much as is manageable. An ideal simulation
would then be a pocket-size version of the real thing.
In striving for an isomorphic relationship between a phenomenon in the real world
and the simulation, a physicist would be working against the traditional way in which
theoreticians pose their problems, that is, by making the system under investigation as
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simple as possible.Ʋ⁶ ăis search for simplicity is oĕen of a pragmatic dimension tied to
the search for exact results, which are the ideal outcome of pure theory; theoreticians
are never happier than when their results can be reduced to an exact algebraic equation
or a deđnite algebraic number. But in order to accomplish this, theoreticians tend to
simplify physical systems so much that they oĕen end up studying systems that look
nothing like the original piece of the world that inspired their investigation. An old
joke— of which there are many versions— that went around the science school where
I carried out my undergraduate physics studies reĔects this. I write it here more or less
as I recall it frommemory:
A millionaire racehorse breeder sets up a million-dollar scientiĖc challenge.
ąe challenge is to use any means whatsoever to produce horses that run as
fast as possible. ąree scientists — an engineer, a biologist, and a physicist
— are inĂited to proĂide an answer to the challenge. Aěer one month, the
millionaire summons all three and asks for their answers.
ąe engineer says, “I have come up with a new horseshoe design based on
space-age materials that will increase any horse’s speed by at least 15%”. ąe
millionaire is of course quite impressed and congratulates the engineer and
his team.
ąe biologists says, “I have drawn up an aggressive genetic manipulation and
breeding program that will yield horses that are 30% faster within two gen-
erations”. ąe millionaire can hardly believe his luck.
ąe physicist approaches the millionaire and dumps a large bunch of dirty,
hand-scrawled paper on his desk, and haughtily says, “I have devised ameans
to make a horse gallop unaided at the speed of sound’.’ ąe millionaire is
about to shout with joy, but then the physicist adds in a hushed Ăoice, “the
only caveats are that it must be a perfectly spherical and Ěictionless horse in
a vacuum”. Ʋ⁷
Ʋ⁶SeeWinsberg (1999).
Ʋ⁷ăere is a similar ‘spherical cow’ joke that appears to be very popular in Russia. See: http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Spherical_cow.
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2.11 Simulations as strategies to tackle complex physical
systems
A central diﬃculty in producing amodel of anything ‘in the real world’ is that nomath-
ematical model can ever mirror, exactly, the complexity of real physical phenomena.
Here complexity is meant in terms of the amount of variables that would be needed to
make a mathematical set of equations that could ‘mirror’ the properties of a real sys-
tem. In general, the đrst-principle approach and the phenomenological approach are
not well suited to describe complex systems, and much eﬀort is carried out to simplify
the system’s description asmuch as possible.Ʋ⁸ In particular, the đrst-principle approach
is severely limited to oĕen very simple and idealised systems, as one theoretician ex-
plained
Volke: ăeoreticians nowadays are increasingly turning to numerical ex-
perimentation. It’s not that there aren’t analytical things to do. ăere will
always be analytical things, but it’s only so far that you can go with analyt-
ical things. Ʋ⁹
Consider for example a simple gas, helium, inside a cylindrical container, for which
onewants to create ‘amodel’ of the gas to describe its behaviour. Even a small container
would contain millions of millions of molecules. From the đrst-principles perspective,
amodel for the gas at this level would include several equations for eachmolecule, given
that the interaction between them is known, and thus the đnal solution would require
to solve a set of equations with an absurd amount of variables, which is of course not
feasible ‘by hand’ if one is to treat the gas molecule-by-molecule. An alternative đrst-
principle approach would be to ‘simplify’ the problem in somemanner, for example, to
work from thermodynamic, macroscopic frame and come upwith a three-variable, per-
fect gas model which would work reasonably well in describing how changes in the gas
macroscopic quantities of temperature, volume and pressure are correlated. ăemodel
beingmuch, much simpler than the actual system, the results could be reasonably good
Ʋ⁸See Schweber (2000) for an analysis of the relationship between ‘complexity’ in physical systems and
the increasing use of computer simulations over ‘pencil-and-paper’ methods in contemporary physics
research.
Ʋ⁹See alsoWinsberg (1999, §1).
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but not perfect in the sense of it being a picture-perfect depiction of what an actual gas
looks like. Another đrst-principle approach would be to work from a statistical me-
chanics perspective, and think of the molecules as simple bouncing balls with a certain
statistical kinematic distribution, from which statistical information can be drawn to
describe the thermodynamic variables. Needless to say, molecules are not rigid balls,
and the result would be expected to diﬀer from the real system in some ways. A phe-
nomenological approach could start, for example, by measuring the actual response of
the gas to changes in pressure and temperature, and then one could establish a poly-
nomial equation of arbitrarily high degree that would describe the changes with a few
thermodynamic variables. ăis would provide a much better ‘description’, but with a
loss of explanatory power compared to the ‘đrst-principles’ approach
ăe simulation approach would turn the problem around, tackling the complex-
ity of the problem head on. Simulationists have come up with a family of programs
known as Molecular Dynamics in which a space ‘grid’ (a discretised Cartesian space)
is created, and underlying it is an equally discretised time-dimension. Molecules are
‘placced’ within this grid, and given precise velocities. An equation relating the interac-
tion between individual molecules is chosen (it can be a data-đtting or a đrst-principle
sourced one) to be used as a theoretical base. ăe simulation tracks the movement of
all molecules and all speciđed interactions between molecules (usually within a đnite
range) at each step, calculating what eachmolecules position and velocity will be at the
next step. ăe choice of the equation for the interaction is of course crucial, as are the
initial parameters, the range of the interactions, the algorithms to calculate the interac-
tions, amongst many other possible variations (one can include probabilistic quantum
eﬀects, for example).
ăese typeof simulationshavewhatonemay call a ‘building-block’ approach,where
the object to be simulated is literally built upon a virtual ‘space’ piece by piece. ăese
simulations as the extreme end of complexity have distinct characteristics:
1. Simulations, before they are coded into a computer, must borrow equations and
relations fromtheory, and thushave the support of ‘established’ theoretical knowl-
edge.
2. Simulations try to ‘mirror’ the system that is to be described as closely as possible,
within the computational and time resources that the simulationist can aﬀord.
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Simulations oﬀer as close a ‘picture’ of a phenomenon as is materially possible to
achieve, compared to the other two phenomenological approaches.
3. Simulation work can oĕen be directly compared to experiment.
4. ăeobjects that are entered into a simulation aremade to closely resemble theob-
jects in the empiricalworld asmuch as possible, unlikemany ‘ideal’ đrst-principle
systems which are abstract enough that the similarities between them and the
‘real’ systemmay be only superđcial.
‘Building block’ approaches have an added strongpoint that should not be over-
looked: the possibility of translating the simulation into adirect visual representationof
the object being simulated. Simulations can ‘seduce’merely by the impact they produce
through visual means; Turkle (2009, p. 28) describes how “physics students described
feeling “closer to science” and “closer to theory” when their laboratory classes began to
use soĕware for visualization and analysis” and how “faculty acknowledged that there
they would increasingly be competing with the seduction of screens”, amongst many
other case studies where visualisation plays a crucial role in simulations’ gain of epis-
temic acceptance, and epistemic power. Turkle (2009, p. 17) thus đnds that “screen
versions of reality will always leave something out, yet screen versions of reality may
come to seem like reality itself. Weaccept thembecause they are compelling andpresent
themselves as expressions of our most up-to-date tools. We accept them because we
have them. ăey become practical because they are available. So, even when we have
reason to doubt that screen realities are true, we are tempted to use them all the same”.
2.12 Simulations as autonomous domains of practice
Turkle (2009) has also amply investigated processes which lead to the paration of the
world of simulation from their wider professional setting across various professions.
Turkle found that across professions as varied as architecture, design, biology andphysics
simulations become highly autonomous practices to the point that not only the simu-
lation itself becomes an alternate reality, but simulationists become technically inde-
pendent from their wider professional settings. Simulations then become black-boxes
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to all but the most dedicated experts.Ƴ⁰
Simulations have become such areas of specialisation, now having become scien-
tiđc expertises that can boast numerous specialised journals, professional and educa-
tional associations, and many other markers of a mature autonomous science.ƳƲ Pro-
gramming and coding have become sets of skills used by the simulationist that are not
part of the ‘traditional’ theoretician’s tool bag. Debugging for example is thought to
make up at least 50% of a dedicated programmer’s work.ƳƳ Debugging is relatively triv-
ial in programs such as Mathematica, but it becomes a daunting task in the low-level
programming work using programs like FORTRANwhere the computer code may be-
come tremendously large. Computational techniques such as Molecular Dynamics,
can include code with over 150,000 lines.Ƴƴ ăe use of these massive codes of course
requires much more serious programming work, including both debugging and struc-
tural planning that are not encountered in ‘traditional’ theory’s simple computational
tasks.
Debugging, the ‘art’ of đnding errors in computer code, is a particular example of a
skill that simulationists posseswhich is outside the scope of the traditional theoretician.
ăis hands-on skill requires careful consideration of how code is built up, even in cases
where the code used is very familiar to the programer. As a simulationist explained,
Loke: At each step [of writing the code] it’s wise to test each step. […]We
develop toolboxes: tried and true components that have been used over
and over again, so we’re at least conđdent that some parts are complete
[…] We try to build these separate components then use them together
and eliminate as much [error] as possible each step. We try to check each
step. When we didn’t, when we’ve approached it like, ‘Ok, just chuck ev-
erything together andwe’ll test it at the endof it’, you’ll đnd that you spend
Ƴ⁰See also Dowling (1999, p. 265).
ƳƲA non-exhaustive list of journals includes Communications in nonlinear science & numerical simu-
lation, Computational geosciences, International journal of modelling & simulation, International journal
of simulation: systems, science & technology, Journal of applied mathematics and simulation, Macromolec-
ular theory and simulations, Engineering, Modelling and simulation in materials science and engineering,
Simulation, Simulation digest, Simulation modelling practice and theory, Transactions of the Society for
Computer Simulation.
ƳƳSee Lee &Wu (1999).
ƳƴăeCPMD consortium (2011) gives this đgure for the CPMD (Car-ParrinelloMolecular Dynam-
ics) code, which is “a plane wave/pseudopotential implementation of Density Functional ăeory, par-
ticularly designed for ab initiomolecular dynamics”.
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a lot more time debugging if you did that than if you write a little, test a
little, write a little, test a little. It saves you more time in the end. You
have to check, ‘At this stage, the đeld at this second or third step it should
be, according to the theory…does that look right or is your sign is totally
out? Oh yeah, you’re out of the ballpark!’ So you’ve got to know, as much
as possible, to know what you’re expecting, within reason. Some things
are unexpected, and some new scenarios can be surprising but at least its
within a certain range.
Because debugging actuallymakes up such ahugeproportionof programmingprac-
tice, this ability is recognised as a mark of expertise in computer programming. Vessey
(1985) concludes that debugging techniques are signiđcantly diﬀerent between novice
and expert programmers, concluding that while novices tend to scan code line by line,
experts are more likely to look at a code in ‘chunks’ and thus get a better feel for the
general structure of the code, which also tends to make their work more eﬃcient. ăis
diﬀerentiation is one clear indication of how simulationist practice has departed from
traditional theory. Simulationists can even develop a sort of ‘debugging intuition’ as a
senior computational physicist explained:
Noguez: ăe ‘gut instinct’ you develop [to avoid bugs or bad program
structures] that I’m talking about is simply experience translated intoknowl-
edge, and it’s just like intuition. ăere may be illuminated geniuses that
are born with these skills, but I’ve yet tomeet one amongst my colleagues,
although they might think diﬀerently about themselves. I spend most of
my life in front of the computer. Literally.Ƴ⁴
Dowling (1999, p. 269) has similarly argued that “A sense of direct manipula-
tion encourages simulators to develop a ”feel” for their mathematical models with their
hands and their eyes, by tinkering with them, noticing how they behave, and develop-
ing a practical intuition for how they work”, and that “A large element of skill and tacit
knowledge is involved in developing this “intuitive feel” for a computer simulation”.
Ƴ⁴Intuition will be introduced in chapter 6 as a form of tacit knowledge - somatic tacit knowledge;
somatic tacit knowledge is a marker of an autonomous skill domain which can only be gained through
hands-on immersion into the actual practices of the domain, as happens with debugging.
śChapter 2 74
ăedevelopment of a set of skills independent from that of traditional theoretical work
is a marker of the fragmentation of computational physics from pure-theory, and even
from modelling. ăough simulationists necessarily need to use knowledge from the
upper levels of the horseshoe diagram, this knowledge is not per se part of their core
skills as simulationists.
2.13 Sociological evidence for simulations’ epistemic au-
tonomy: regress phenomena
Further evidence for the autonomy of simulation practice from that of either theory or
experiment can be garnered from the existence of ‘regress phenomena’ which parallel
Collins experimenters’ regress.Ƴ⁵ BrieĔy put, regress phenomena arise in science when
two autonomous knowledge domains face oﬀ discrepant result concerning the same
piece of the phenomenal world, i.e. scientiđc controversies. Because of their epistemic
autonomy, the domains — which are typically in positive epistemic feedback when
there are no controversies — have no way to set up common standards of settling the
dispute, and the traditionally positive epistemic loop instead turns into a negative vi-
cious circlewhich according toCollins canonly be broken either by social ‘negotiations’
or through the arbitration of a third, independent domain (although in the latter case
the creation of further regresses is always possible).
ăe ‘classic’ experimenter’s regress is encountered when an experimental commu-
nity acknowledges results which are in disagreement with the accepted results of a the-
oretical community. A match between theory and experiment is a common ‘objective’
standard of epistemic strength for both theory and experiment (Collins thus rejects
either an traditional empiricist or idealist philosophies of science), but in such a con-
troversy there is no absolute standard to judge either theory or experiment wrong. ăe
appearance of a regress is tied to the fact that in real situations, one can never be as-
sured that either theory or experiment have been performed in an absolutely correct
manner; partly because of the complexity of real-life scientiđc enterprises, and crucially
also because of the role that tacit knowledge plays in experimental practice that disal-
lows absolute ‘internal’ standards of performance within a community to exist (thus
Ƴ⁵See Collins (1981, 1985).
75 śăeoretical ﬆyles
invalidating in practice regress-breaking arguments that seek to use standards of repli-
cation as a standard of successful performance).
Sociological studies about simulationists’ practice have discovered regress phenom-
ena when simulations are faced oﬀ against other theoretical domains. In the case of
simulation versus high-theory, Kenneđck (2000) has described a controversy where a
debate was carried out between simulationists and đrst-principle modellers tackling
one same phenomenon in gravitational wave astronomy. A group of simulationists
presented results to a mostly đrst-principle community that clashed with the expected
theoretical results. Kenneđck (2000, p. 18) discusses how the group that presented the
controversial simulations results had a very hard time being listened to by the General
Relativity communitywhere theseweremost relevant,mainly because “they had a quite
diﬀerent institutional background from their opponents.”
Kenneđck (2000, p. 21) also presents evidence to attest that one of the main rea-
sons why the high-theoreticians did not accept the results was the simulationists’ “fail-
ure to speak the correct language”, and also because high-theoreticians were “failing to
make their arguments in a language which [the simulationists] would appreciate”, what
Pinch (1986) has referred to as the ‘evidential context’ of the claims. Turning back to
Fleck’s terminology, the episode shows how the simulationists were unable to grasp the
‘thought style’ which would have allowed that result to be presented in a manner that
would have made it understood— if not agreed upon— by the GR community. Ken-
neđck (2000, p. 27-28) understands the impossibility of understanding between these
groups based on the diﬀerences between their theoretical ‘styles’, noting that “assess-
ments of theoretical work take into account the style of the theorists, the manner in
which they do theory, and this is an important factor in any theoretical controversy.
[…] A theorist’s style aﬀects his or her choice of topics on which to work, how he or she
looks at a problem once selected, and the choice of methods when tackling it”, thus giv-
ing clear evidence to the fragmentation of simulation work from that of đrst-principle
theory.
In a second, more general analysis of simulations confronted with external stan-
dards, Gelfert (2011) has reconsidered Kenneđck’s case study among others and anal-
ysed the role of both the soĕware and hardware dimensions of the problem, by intro-
ducing the concept of the (computer) simulationist’s regress. Gelfert’s analysis encom-
passes the following steps:
śChapter 2 76
1. ăe open-endedness of modelling and simulation do not in general permit the
simulationist to unambiguously aﬃrm that the simulation has been correctly im-
plemented, once the simulation situation is of suﬃcient complexity.
2. Because simulations are oĕen used to probe situations which one cannot have
easy, immediate or practical empirical access to, one cannot use external ‘data’ to
verify that the simulation is working properly.
3. ăerefore there is no unambiguous way to say that the situation is working ‘cor-
rectly’ using ‘external’ parameters, and complexity prevents ‘internal’ parameters
from being leading to absolute surety.Ƴ⁶
ăe end result is that the simulation process can become so complicated that the
programmer is leĕ clueless as to where the speciđc mistake might be at all. ăe point
to emphasise is that in a intricate program, the situation may be complex enough that
no amount of minute examination of the code itself may give the programmer full as-
surance that the program is giving out ‘the correct’ result, even if such a thing were
possible. Many if not all commercial programs are typically released withmany known
but unđxed bugs.Ƴ⁷
Gelfert has put forth criteria which he considers ‘break’ the regress, i.e. criteria
which allow the simulationist to aﬃrm that a simulation has indeed been correctly im-
plemented at all levels (callibration of simulations against exact analytic results from
theory, calibration against other simulations, arguments from ‘robustness’).Ƴ⁸ ăese
criteria are not incompatible with Collins’ original thesis, although Gelfernt has posi-
tioned them as philosophical criteria, when in practice they are in fact instantiations
of social ‘negotiations’ in Collins’ sense. ăerefore the social epistemics of simulation
have a structure that exactly parallels traditional accounts of experimentation. In fact,
this parallelism is not only well-noticed by simulationists, but is in fact seen as one of
the strengths of simulation work:
Volke: Numerical experimentation is a bit similar to…well…real experi-
mentation. Inprogramming the same things canhappen, that things come
Ƴ⁶See also MacKenzie (2001, ch. 7)) for a detailed case study of ‘bugs’ in a microprocessor’s architec-
ture and its relation to errors in arithmetical calculations and mathematical proofs.
Ƴ⁷See for example http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Windows_Vista.
Ƴ⁸See also Gelfert (2005).
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up which you hadn’t even considered. Numbers will shoot oﬀ and then
your result won’t be trustworthy. ăings don’t converge, sometimes, and
you’ll have to go to plan B. […] In numerical computation you do đnd
things there that you never expected to đnd; you have to rule out that it’s
not an error in your program. I do think experiment and computation
have many similarities. I think the people that really know how to do nu-
merical analysis, and numerical experimentation— because it really is ex-
perimentation— have a really powerful tool in it. It’s a growing practice.
We increasingly want to see what is happing with a graph, with a scheme,
with a diagram. And it makes us understand things better. In my experi-
ence— I do numerical thingsmyself—numerical experimentation is very
similar to laboratory experimentation.
Reyes: Sometimes you’re running a simulation and then you get some sin-
gularity that you don’t know the origin of. You don’t know if the program
is wrong or the results are wrong.
Volke: Exactly, and the same thing happens with experiments. ăe same
thing happens. Suddenly you start getting strange results.
Yet like Gelfert notes, regress phenomena are indeed resolved — when the result
is non-controversial — through mechanisms such as calibration and robustness, and
in these cases a ‘double’ positive feedback loop arises between experiment-simulation-
theory which permits the full connection of the epistemic chains to proceed:
Reyes: So when you want to đnd ‘the’ đnal solution to a problem do you
use diﬀerent methods and compare them?
Loke: Yes. One example is that there are lot of non-analytical solutions
for scattering oﬀ spheres. You can use a homogeneous sphere in free space,
that’sMie’s solution. Two of the methods that I developed were… their đ-
nite diﬀerence frequencydomain in vector sphericalwave functionbound-
ary conditions, hybrid system, for modelling an arbitrary shaped object
with continuous rotational symmetry. You can build up like a sphere, and
then see if your scattering results are the same as those of theMie solution
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or use this Discrete Dipole Approximation with discrete rotation sym-
metry. I suppose a sphere doesn’t have discrete rotation symmetry but
all…you can say it has inđnite discrete rotation symmetry. ăey can split
out into four, and test that. ăose tests pass, but they pass for a sphere.
ăere was one instance where, ‘Yes, it passed for a sphere but it doesn’t
guarantee that it works’, so we tested it against a known solution scatter-
ing oﬀ a cube. But then we said, ‘Hang on a minute, yes the đelds are the
right amplitude but the phases are diﬀerent’, because the sphere has this
unique geometry and symmetry in rotation, and mirror symmetry in any
plane, basically. So some of these sign errors can be revealed only if you use
anything other than a sphere so we use cube and other more complex ob-
jects with known analytical results. ăat’s how we usually test them, and
of course ultimately —more importantly- experimental results. I used to
work with a number of experimentalists in our group. ăey had their re-
sults and we did our best to đt themodel to it and we had some predictive
results aswell which they used to design these newdevices and conducting
experiments and either conđrm or refute out theory— our model.
Simulationists then have the advantage that they are placed at the crossroads of the-
ory and experiment, and yet are neither and draw on speciđc tools, practices, knowl-
edge, traditions and epistemic styles to produce knowledge. As in the case of the mod-
els/theories they use, they constitute families of practice that have their own profes-
sional identities and forms of closure. By having illustrated how the lower lozenges
of the horseshoe diagram exhibit this fragmentation I have laid down the terrain for
next chapter, where I will explore how despite this fragmentation of practices and the
parallel fragmentation of languages and thought styles physics still remains a solidly
interlinked discipline.
CHAPTER 3
Bridging the gap between contiguous micro-cultures
ũommon reĆon should perswade, ĭćmuch reading and long praĊĝe in ev-
eryŧrt makes men expert. Ŷer ũontrarium ů conclude, you ĭć haue nei-
ĭer read nor praĊĝed, mĮt needs be egregioĮly ignorant.
—Ůenrie ũhċtle, Ěom ‘űind-hartes dreame’ (1592)
3.1 ăe fragmentation of high theory and pure experi-
ment
In previous sections I have argued that diﬀerences in theoretical styles lead to fragmen-
tation between communities that are side-by-side in the horseshoe, even communities
that are working on a same direct research topic. In communities that are further away
from each other, such as high-theory and pure experiment, the diﬀerences are even
more radical because physics is diﬀerent to many other natural sciences, like molecular
biology or astronomy, in that there is a radical divisions between the high-theoretical
and the pure empirical extremes.Ʋ ăus, one oĕen đnds that when a theoretician says
ƲAs an ex-molecular biologist now-theoretician conđded
I was a sort of semi…I both did experimental work as I quite rightly thought you had to
that, to go into the đeld, but I was meant to be a sort of semi-theoretical biologist. I con-
sider it to be a bogus profession. Almost nothing came out of it. In biology…when I say
it’s a bogus subject…there isn’t theory. Imean, there’s no theory thatmakes any…it begins
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that his theory is ‘empirically adequate’ or ‘đts experiment’, the experiments are not
performed by the theoretician but by a professionally independent group, in contrast
tomany other sciences where those that produce the theory and those that produce the
experiment are usually in close collaboration. ăis is made evident by the way many
theoreticians admit they are perfectly able to work without ever consulting ongoing
experimental research. Even when their theory is ‘empirically-minded’, many times ex-
periment enters only very indirectly in a high-theoretician’s work. When questioned
about the role of experiment in his own theoretical work, Berry explained:
Reyes: You’vemade quite a few theoretical predictions of phenomena. Do
you have any direct contact with a laboratory where you can say, ‘do this,
don’t do this’?
Berry: No, no, no… with this conical refraction, astonishingly, and actu-
ally for the Ėrst time, I had some contact with an [experimental group] in
Dundee. I’ve just recently encountered them. […] And I’m predicting all
kinds of things, like if you put crystals in series what would you get, and so
on. So there’s something where I’m directly involved, but it’s unusual for
me. I don’t normally do that. ăere are diﬀerent types of theorists, and
some people work very close with the experimentalists. It’s fun to do that,
but I tend not to.
Berry is not a theoretician who works in an esoteric đeld of physics to which there
is no easy empirical access. He in fact specializes in optics, one of the most empirically
focused and well-probed đelds of physics (he is proud to mention how he even once
managed to publish peer-reviewed experimental papers using a table-top physics kit).
Berry, as anyother optics expert, has access to and is familiarwith aplethoraof empirical
to make sense when, and in fact I sort of leĕ molecular biology just when it was becom-
ing once again to become a theoretician of a diﬀerent kind the kind that does computer
science and tries to organise all the data.
Molecular biology ‘theory’ is a đeld that comes and goes as experiment requires it, in contrast to
physics where theory can exist independently from the needs of the experimental side. Moreover, molec-
ular biologists seem to be comfortable with the supposition that even theoreticians ought to have ample
lab experience, an attitude rarely seen in theoretical physics circles. Immunologist Medawar (1969, p.
57) wrote that “most scientists cannot be classiđed as either experimentalists or theorists, because most
of us are both…”, a statement that while plausible in the biological sciences would be false in physics, as
the number of people that work in both theory and experiment simultaneously is negligible.
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knowledge created around the world during the last two centuries or so, and yet has
never performed the majority of the experiments that concern his own theory. Berry
is not an exception to the rule. Another high-theoretician evidenced his own work as
being divorced from direct experimental contact:
Reyes: Many of the theoreticians that I’ve talked to have told me that
when you’reworking inpure theory and then—forwhatever reason—you
actually want to go and understand an experiment, it’s extremely hard.
Tong: Yeah! I’ve never done it. Never, no. Understanding an experiment
means understanding the quirks of the beam at LHC and you know ex-
actly what all the layers of the detector are seeing, blah, blah, blah, but
really knowing what the Ĕaws in the detector are, no, no. ăere are people
that do. ăere are theorists that do. But you know, the whole thing is this
continuum, where there are hardcore theoreticians at one end who only
work on string theory, all the way through to the guy with the spanner,
tightening up the nuts and bolts. ăere’s thankfully big overlaps between
each section but yeah, I’ve never chatted to the guywith the spanner. (em-
phasis added)
3.2 Diﬃculties inmigrating frompure-theory to pheno-
menology
Another theorist who started out as a high-theoretician but has now ‘migrated’ tomore
phenomenological approaches conđded:
Romero: ăe opinion of many theoretical physicists is… actually, it’s a
kind of satire, something between dark humour and caricature and also
with a hint of truthfulness… is that the further away you are from experi-
ment the better things are; the idea of rigour. I myself grew up a bit with
that idea, and with the years I changed, I turned around completely. In
my opinion that is not physics; it’s mathematics. It’s something that’s on
the edge of mathematics. I think that doing physics is to have in mind a
real problem from ‘out there’ as I like to refer to it.
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Romero nowadays works closely with experimenters attempting to model the phe-
nomena that they encounter in the lab. One would suppose that if a phenomenally
oriented theoretician had the capacity to deal with experiment directly it would be one
like Romero. And yet, when asked if this contact with his collaborators’ experimental
culture had increased his ability to access experimental data more directly, his answer
was negative:
Romero: ăere’s a part of [experimental procedures] that’s very obscure.
It’s the actual assembly of the experiment, and everything that you need
around it. […] ăey tell me things like “here’s where we switch on the
magnetic đeld, and then we’re going to send a radiofrequency pulse and
then we’ll send a pulse of light and take a photo”. I understand what a
radiofrequency pulse is, I know what it is. I understand the numbers. I
understand the đnal results, and a few details. But if you askmewhere the
pulse originated from I have not the slightest idea! Lasers, yes. Coils, well,
I can see them. But the assembly part is very obscure.
Even a phenomenal theoretician has a hard time accessing the instrumental side of
experiment. Indeed, phenomenal theoreticians don’t gain ‘broad’ phenomenal knowl-
edge, but usually only manage to understand the phenomenology of experiments they
have direct contact with:
Reyes: You work with one experimental group, but do you ever have to
read work from other experimental groups? Do you ever have to contrast
with things that come from experimenters with whom you don’t deal di-
rectly?
Romero: It’s practically impossible. It’s practically impossible unless you’re
friends with them and they give you the data directly. In these our times,
it’s impossible to verify directly anything of what’s published. You see a
graph and they tell you, “I’m graphing this against this”. It’s something
worth commenting upon, as I was also involved in this issue. I was in-
volved in this stuﬀ about light that travels faster than light. We never had
our own experiments, and it involved reading other people’s experimen-
tal graphs. It turned out that in all experiments, there ought to be a re-
quirement of an additional graph that contains the non-analyzed raw data
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[laughter]. What is it that you measured? You looked at an oscilloscope?
You measured voltage. ăen from that you gave me a time measurement?
How did you manage that? How did you do that? “Well, because of this
formula that…” Well, things turn sour there because at that stage they’ve
already introduced a theoretical đlter. ăat’s typical. ăey obtain graph-
ics where you really wonder how they’ve managed to obtain the results.
And, now that I deal more with experimenters, you ask them about it and
it turns out they actually didn’t measure that. […]Unless you have contact
with an experimental group that shows you the rawdata, and tell youwhat
they measured […]. ăen they do data massaging. Data massaging to do
this and this with this well-known formula, and the end result is quite lost.
Sometimes you believe them, when the results are very well established.
But when there is controversy, or it’s a new eﬀect…
Other phenomenologically oriented theoreticians similarly conđded that a full un-
derstanding of the experimental culture was not within their grasp. Even Volke whose
work comprises the last link of theory immediately above fully experimental work, the
interpretation of experimental data, testiđed to only partial ‘Ĕuency’ in experimental
material culture:
Volke: An experimenter in acoustics who does acoustical levitation ap-
proached me, and he thought, “optical trapping…acoustic levitation…we
could work together”. And it was really great. We did a wonderful collab-
oration. But there my proposals were like mapping my experience in op-
tics. As far as working on the experiments, well, only like a robot! Hewould
tell me to push some button and I would push it. He’d say ‘raise that and
lower that’ and I would raise it and lower it. But he was the one that did
all the experimentation part and designed the whole experiment. Once
we started seeing results, then I could tell him if something was happen-
ing because maybe we had to use a bigger disc. In the interpretation and
in proposing things to measure, yes, I could do it. ąere I was playing the
part of theoretician, essentially. (emphasis added)
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3.3 Diﬀerences in epistemic distance
ăeoretician like Romerowho start oﬀ as high-theoreticians can choose to bring them-
selves closer to experiment, but it is not a easy task, and it can take years of dedication
to migrate from being a pure-theoretician to an empirically-oriented one. Romero de-
scribed how in his early years he started out as a theoretician ‘distant’ from experiment,
and then made an eﬀort to transform himself from that kind of ‘abstract’ theoretician
to one with more experimental links:
Romero: In your work you make an eﬀort, an enormous eﬀort, to see if
what you are saying has anything to do with what is out there, with an
experiment. […] Anyway, I think there are two kinds of us. I do feel more
of the pragmatic kind, although if you look at the everyday stuﬀ I do it’s
just as abstract as the people who do mathematical physics. [laughs]
Romero’s clearly stressed that to include experiment in a theoretician’s work re-
quires massive amount of work if one starts from the pure theoretical side:
Romero: Once […] we needed to design a light detector. I had no idea
how to do it! If you give me a month I’m sure I could manage, but then
along comes a guy with a little machine, a circuit that only needs batteries,
and everything is done. ăat experimental part, when they talk about the
laser being unstable…I have no ideawhat the hell they’re talking about. In-
stability? ăen they explain and…well, there’s a lot that’s obscure, very ob-
scure. However, in general, the more you speak to them the better you’re
at it. You start saying, “hey yes, this is where the laser comes out”. Of
course, it has to be tuned into the transition I want tomake, and here’s the
cell and here’s the detector, which is a black box. (emphasis added)
3.4 Languages in theory... in theory
Anyone who has ever tried to learn a foreign language understands the cultural shock
associated with having studied a language— possibly for years— and then đnding one-
self at last in the countrywhere that language is themother tongue. Evenwhen onemay
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know the correct grammar and syntax of the language, sometimes even better than the
natives, one usually fails to understand a lot of what is being said. However, nothing
can compare to full immersion in an alien culture for raising a foreign speaker’s lin-
guistic skills. ăe equivalent of full linguistic immersion was the pathway followed by
Romero and Volke, who were very explicit about the necessity of setting up personal,
face-to-face communication in order to break down the linguistic barriers:
Romero: Electronics in particular, I’ve only very rudimentary knowledge
of it. So if you tell me that you get a signal and then you convert it from
analogue to digital…it really irritates me. It irritates me because I can say
nothing about it. […] ăe more I talk to them the deeper my knowledge
about the experiment and the experimental results. Nowadays I can actu-
ally see naked experimental results without any analysis and know what
it is they did. But that’s the whole of it. ăe part that I participate in the
most is when I tell them, “Look, why don’t you try this new thing” and
they’ll just reply, “No, that’s way too hard”. “Why?” “Because you can’t do
that to the coils”. “Well, ok”. ąen you keep on talking.
Romero, like other theoreticianswho interactwith experimenters directly,
was emphatic on the necessity of constant, prolonged, face-to-face inter-
action in order to achieve mutual understanding between experimenters
and theoreticians:
Romero: With theBrazilian experimentalists it’s no longer a thingof them
givingme data andme adjusting curves. I do talk to them. But it’s still a lot
of me telling them tomeasure something and themmeasuring it and then
we talk, and look over the results. Every timewe talkmore about their tech-
nical setbacks, why this laser or that laser is used. And sometimes it goes
the other way round too. Due to my liking of laser-cooling and related
things— not in the case of the principal researcher, but rather with the
postdocs and the student— it turns out that sometimes I’ve understood
things better than them. ăey knew that they had to treat the lasers a cer-
tain way and such, and there were some curves there with which they đt
things. And I deduced these curves. Well, a Nobel prize winner deduced
them, but I found the papers and grew to understand themverywell, and I
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noticed one day while talking to them that they did not, that I had caught
them in a misunderstanding. (emphasis added)
Another theoreticianwhomigrated fromhigh-theory to experimental analysis also
explained how the process was carried out by ‘jumping in with both feet’ into the new
context:
Reyes. When you started doing this numerical analysis work having been
trained as a pure theoretician, how did you go about that transition? I
suppose it required diﬀerent skills.
Fairhurst : Yes, it does. What happened is I đnished a postdoc and applied
for another postdoc in a groupwhich had theorists and also these guys do-
ing gravitational wave searches. I was basically applying to work with the
theory guys and I got oﬀered a job from the analysis people because the
gravitational search đeld was booming. […] I just jumped in with both
feet. ăey said, ‘Start in some simple project,’ like you might do as a be-
ginning grad student, and away you go. […] I moved to this group and it’s
what they did everyday. I was meeting with a professor who worked on
this. I worked very closely with a đnal year PhD student and we got along
very well. […] I’d got to him everyday, and I’d go, ‘what’s going on? What
does this mean?’ He was writing his thesis so I read large parts of it, read a
lot of papers. It was a lot of writing code so I just sat down and tried and
learnedhow todo it. […]ăerewas no grandplan. Itwas amess, trial-and-
error. […] And being able to walk down the hall to people…it took me a
week to solve a problem that guys down the hall could’ve done in twenty
minutes, but it was worth it because the second one I could solve in a day,
and so on. But they were down the hall and so if I got really frustrated I
could go to them. I think that’s very important.
ăese two examples show that migration between the lozenges of the horseshoe
diagram can be carried out in the same way as migration from an ordinary culture to
another culture can be accomplished in real life: by full linguistic immersion into a
new culture. One would expect that ‘related’ or ‘close’ cultures require less immersion
than very ‘distant’ ones, both in the wider world and in theoretical physics; as a Latin
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Americans one đnds it relatively easy to speak to and relate to other Latin Americans,
but much less so with many European cultures. ăeoretical physics works similarly if
modelled according to the horseshoe diagram: cultures close together would đnd com-
munication fundamentally easier than with faraway ones. ăis is partly because closer
cultures have similar characteristics, but also because cultures that are close together
have more opportunities to interact directly, and therefore be partly immersed in each
other’s social worlds.
We can see that in these examples, there are two families of theoreticians: thosewho
choose to practice their theory ‘far’ from experiment (high-theoreticians), and those
who choose to get close to and understand experiment ‘phenomenologists’. ăe rest of
this chapter will be devoted to setting up a theoretical approach to expertise and expert
languages to describe how the interaction and transfer of knowledge is carried out in
the latter case— generally, where the interaction between dissimilar cultures or forms-
of-life is ‘forced’ to interact.
3.5 Collins & Evans’ framework of tacit knowledge
If one takes the disunity thesis seriously by considering that that science is fragmented
in a non-trivial way into autonomous micro-cultures or heterogeneous linguistic do-
mains as has been argued happens in physics, one is faced with the task of explaining
how collaborations, communication and transmission of knowledge are carried out be-
tween these diﬀerent micro-cultures. I will introduce Collins & Evans SEE (Studies in
Expertise and Experience) framework to give an answer to the problem of communi-
cation, and I will argue that ‘close’ micro-cultures retain their autonomy as đelds of
practice, yet communicate by maintaining ties that rely on ‘interactional expertise’, the
ability to speak the language of a social domain prođciently without actually becoming
an ‘active’ member of that domain.
In Collins & Evans’ framework, interactional expertise is established through lin-
guistic immersion in another culture and it is based mainly on the acquisition of large
amounts of tacit knowledge from the ‘host’ culture. I have shownhow theoreticians like
Romero and Volke who force themselves into interaction with an initially ‘alien’ exper-
imental culture do just this: full linguistic immersion with the ‘parent’ culture. Collins
&Evans posit that full immersion is necessary not only to gain bits of explicit language,
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but more crucially, to understand the tacit dimension of the culture the foreigner wants
to interact with. Tacit knowledge has been widely discussed in the academic literature
starting with work by Polanyi (1958, 1966), and has been inĔuential in numerous soci-
ological studies of science.Ƴ To give a brief working deđnition that stems directly from
Polanyi’s work, tacit knowledge is knowledge that is not explicit: it is knowledge that
has not been verbalised or encoded in any linguistic form.
Tacit knowledge is intimately tied to the problem of communication. Collins has
evidenced in numerous case studies how the existence of tacit knowledge in experimen-
tal physics deđnes the boundaries of ‘core-sets’, the sets of legitimate experts that con-
stitute a đeld of specialisation. Collins has shown that because tacit knowledge is an
intrinsic part of any esoteric knowledge domain, the transmission of knowledge from
one đeld of expertise to ‘laymen’ outside it (or to experts in other esoteric domains)
is impeded by the inability to transmit the tacit knowledge on which full comprehen-
sion of the expertise depends. InCollins (1974, 1985), analyses of experimental physics
replication has shown that mismatches in tacit knowledge arise when scientists belong
to diﬀerent đelds of specialisation because tacit knowledge is highly localised and con-
text dependent. An expert in an esoteric đeld of experimentation may not be able to
communicate eﬀectively enough with another expert in the same đeld that is working
in a diﬀerent laboratory, to the point that the second expert may be unable to replicate
some of the đrst’s experimental results. Collins argues that the reason behind this is
that there is a component of tacit knowledge in scientiđc practice that can only be car-
ried out through physical immersion in the situation where the tacit knowledge is be-
ing applied.ƴ In this chapter I will introduce the tacit knowledge framework posited in
Collins (2010), which includes amuchmore sophisticated typology of tacit knowledge
than was present in previous works. Importantly, Collins argues that tacit knowledge
comes in at least threemain types, and these oﬀer amuchmore sophisticated analytical
tool than is found in the literature.
ƳSee for example Collins (1974, 1985, 2001), Pinch (1981), MacKenzie & Spinardi (1995), Ken-
neđck (2000), Schmidt Horning (2004) and Doing (2004, 2011).
ƴNielsen (2011) oﬀers a very interesting critique of positions that try to delimit esoteric domains by
appealing to tacit knowledge, arguing that tacit knowledge has become the new ‘ghost in the machine’
for the deđnition of social groups, and is particularly critical of using this strategy to ‘obscure’ the so-
cial bonds that hold professions together. Nielsen nevertheless does not give an account of what the
alternative explanation could look like.
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3.6 Types of tacit knowledge
AsTsoukas (2003) argues, although tacit knowledge has been the object ofmuchphilo-
sophical work and its study has inĔuenced areas distant from philosophy such as man-
agement studies, most of the research shows minimal conceptual evolution beyond
whatPolanyi himselfwrote. SincePolanyi, for example, tacit knowledgehas been classi-
đed into two basic types, ‘know-how’ and ‘know-that’. In the đrst case, tacit knowledge
includes the classic case of bicycle riding (‘I know how to do X’, although I cannot ex-
plain it) while the second case typically includes knowledge that has been leĕ unsaid.
As Tsoukas notes, the second case ignores a central proposition from Polanyi: there is
knowledge that may be not only unstated, but unstatable. ăis leads to the question
of what is the source of this inability to state what someone knows, a question that
has received careful examination in the work of Collins (2010), where he also traces
the ‘unstatability hypothesis’ to the work of Wittgenstein (1953). Collins (2010, ch.
4-6) begins elucidating the problem by noting that one must think not only in terms
of whether knowledge can be unstated or not, but also of why it remains unstated. He
proposes three categories of tacit knowledge in order to better understand the problem:
1. Relational tacit knowledge, which is knowledge that has the status of ‘tacit’ or
non-explicated merely by circumstance. It can be knowledge that has been de-
liberately been kept secret, or knowledge that has not beenmade explicit because
the knower does not realise the importance of making it explicit. An example of
the đrst casewould be towithhold an ingredient in a food recipewhenhanding it
to someone else, an ingredient that would prove crucial to achieving exactly the
same taste as the original dish and which is non-evident. In the second case, one
may not include a tip on how to perform a particularly diﬃcult step in a recipe
simply because one is not aware that the information is not evident to whoever
the recipe is meant for. For example, when making meringue with an electric
whisk it is crucial that the blades are ultra-clean or the eggs won’t ‘sponge’. A
goodway to do it is to clean the blades with lemon juice or a small bit of cream of
tartar, whichmay or may not be mentioned in a recipe for making a Sachertorte,
which requires meringue (according to grandmother Galindo who obtained the
recipe from a Viennese chef decades ago). A seasoned chef is probably aware of
śChapter 3 90
this, but may not put it in writing when handing the Sachertorte recipe to a less
experienced person, simply assuming that it is ‘awell known fact’. Relational tacit
knowledge is the lowest type of tacit knowledge in the ‘tacitness’ scale because
with enough eﬀort or desire for transparency, it could be made explicit.
2. Somatic tacit knowledge has been central to the topic since Polanyi’s famous ex-
ample of bike riding: no amount of explicit amount of bike-balancing instruc-
tions will prepare an aspiring rider to accomplish the feat; the novice must sim-
ply try and try again to ride successfully, and aĕer a few falls will (most likely)
accomplish balance. Because of the Polanyi connection to physical body ac-
tion, somatic tacit knowledge has been the hallmark of all other types of tacit
knowledge; Collins’ new typology goes beyond this initial deđnition. While
recognising the importance of somatic tacit knowledge, he classiđes it only in
a mid-range category within the ‘tacitness’ scale. In theory one could build a
machine that could achieve bike-balancing performance; without going into the
argument, Collins supports the idea thatwhen tacit knowledge can bemimicked
by a machine, it is in principle explicable. “We ask the standard question once
more: can all somatic knowledge be made explicit? ăe answer is ‘yes’ if here
‘explicit’ means ‘expressed scientiđc understanding of causal sequences’.”⁴ Along
with bike riding, Collins presents chess-playing computers as an important ex-
ample of how somatic tacit knowledge can be embedded into a machine; the
somatic comes into play when one realises that these machines are intended to
mimic an essential part of the human body: the brain. ăis point will become
important further on because of the role thatmental processes play in theoretical
physics as opposed to physical acts. ăus we might simply say that somatic tacit
knowledge is tacit knowledge that can be gained only through actual attempts at
implementation of successful praxis, be it related to the soma or to the psyche.
⁴ăe full argument is set out inCollins&Kusch (1998). Collins (2010, ch. 5) recognises that “there
is nothing philosophically profound about somatic tacit knowledge, and its appearance ofmystery is only
present because of the tension of the tacit with the explicit: if we did not feel pulled towards saying what
we do, and if we did not make the mistake of thinking this central to the understanding of knowledge,
we would đnd nothing strange about our brains’ and bodies’ abilities to do the things we call tacit. And
that is why too much concentration on the body as the seat of the tacit takes one away from a proper
understanding of the idea.”
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3. Collective tacit knowledge is themost sociological and tacit of tacit knowledges,
because it can only be gained through full immersion into the social and cultural
contextwhere the knowledge is relevant. Collins places the ‘location’ of this tacit
knowledge not on the ‘individual’, but in the ‘collectivity’. At best, the individ-
ual can ‘tap into’ a reservoir of collective tacit knowledge, but the individual can-
not transmit it in full to another individual who has not tapped into the same
reservoir. Collective tacit knowledge can be transmitted to an individual who
becomes socialised into a collectivity, but it cannot be exhaustively transmitted
between individuals.
Notice that collective knowledge in general need not be tacit. In fact, this is seen
by remembering a central point of the early sociology of science: knowledge in science
does not become knowledge until it passes the đlters of the collective. Once a localised
bit of knowledge becomes ‘a fact’, say, when an experimental result is published and
becomes acknowledged as one of the papers that should be canonically cited by the-
oreticians, the result will probably be disseminated far and wide. Authoritative texts
or handbooks that are widely accessible will probably cite it, thus ensuring that prac-
tically anyone may ‘tap’ into this knowledge. ăus the knowledge becomes collective,
and explicit.
3.7 Interactional expertise andCollins&Evansmodel of
expertise
ăe nature of expertise in esoteric domains, its foundation on tacit knowledge, and
the access to expert ‘languages’ by laypeople and experts from other domains has been
analysed in depth by Collins & Evans (2007). One of the most signiđcant concep-
tual developments of this theory is the introduction of the category of ‘interactional
expert’ to expertise studies. Interactional expertise is deđned within Collins & Evans’
framework as “expertise in the language of a specialism in the absence of expertise in its
practice.”⁵ Collins&Evans consider interactional expertise is exhibited by demonstrat-
ing mastery of the language of a domain by people who do not necessarily contribute
⁵Collins & Evans (2007, p. 28).
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to the development of the expertise domain.⁶ According to Collins and Evans, one of
the aims of introducing interactional expertise is to đll a conceptual gap between the
two traditional ways of treating expertise in a language domain. Collins & Evans name
these the ‘Informal View’ — which says that to master a language requires full immer-
sion in a form-of-life—and the ‘FormalView’—which claims that all that is needed to
master a language is the acquisition of suﬃcient amounts of propositional knowledge.
One of basic tenets of Collins & Evans’ model is that any and all forms-of-life incorpo-
rate suﬃcient amounts of tacit knowledge to render the Formal View untenable. ăat
is, mastery of a language associated to any form-of-life is intrinsically embedded with
tacit knowledge, which is not prone to communication or transmission without con-
tact with the ‘parent’ culture.
ăe existence of interactional expertise allows the possibility of bridging the gap
between two genuinely diﬀerent forms-of-life or cultures because interactional experts
are, by deđnition, prođcient in the language and form-of-life of a group outside their
own, by establishing ‘parasitic’ language relationshipswithother cultures or socio-linguistic
groups. Collins & Evans claim that one can master the language of a form of life with-
out physical immersion in the form-of-life corresponding to that language by uphold-
ing prolonged and continuous linguistic immersion in another culture’s talk, the so-
called ‘minimal embodiment’ thesis. A central point of Collins & Evans’ model is
that the acquisition of interactional expertise is crucially carried out through sociali-
sation and language enculturation processes, which are the only possible ways for the
transmission of tacit knowledge to occur. Socialisation leads to the acquisition of tacit
knowledge, which is an indispensable component of interactional expertise. However,
Collins (2010, p. 137) explains in reference to the importance of tacit knowledge and
interactional expertise that “drawing on the tacit knowledge of the collectivity through
language alone is oĕen not themost eﬃcient way to do it. Engaging in physical activity
with other people tends to create more opportunities for conversation than engaging
in talk alone, so even if the sole means of transmission was the word, the transmis-
sion would be enhanced by physical activity.” Although interactional expertise can be
acquired in principle exclusively through talk and without physical immersion in a do-
⁶In SEE jargon, full-blown experts that possess the full skills of an esoteric domain are said to have
contributory expertise. Contributory experts have both contributory expertise and interactional exper-
tise.
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main, physical immersion speeds up the process.
In theprevious chapter, the contact between close cultures, such as the ‘đrst-principles’
and ‘data-đtter’ cultures, automatically allows constant interaction to occur, and there-
fore interactional expertise between these cultures arises naturally. In contrast, physics
cultures that have little contact with each other andwhose social networks do not over-
lap do not develop interactional expertise ties. High-theoreticians who migrate to a
distant phenomenological culture must then carry out enculturation into the new so-
cial group. Of course, tacit knowledge is not the sole component of enculturation. ăe
acquisition of a ‘basic vocabulary’ of explicit knowledge is necessary for any activity
that involves other human beings, be it commercial exchange, simple banter, or aca-
demic collaboration. But the main barrier to overcome by an aspiring interactional
expert who wishes to communicate in signiđcant ways with an expert within that ex-
pert’s own form-of-life is gaining tacit knowledge. ăis is, to stress the point, akin to
learning a new language and wanting to practice it prođciently in a foreign country not
as an alien foreign speaker, but ‘as a native’. It is not enough to know the correct way
of constructing sentences, or avoiding spelling or syntactic mistakes, or having a large
vocabulary which are all explicit knowledge skills. Although these skills permit basic
communication to occur, they are not the deđning features of a native speaker.
3.8 Delimiting esoteric expertises
In order to understand how expertise domains can be delimited, and how tacit knowl-
edge plays a part in this, one can begin by considering the signals whereby expertise is
exhibited:
1. Knowing something.
2. Knowing how to do something.
3. Being able to do something.
4. Being able to talk about doing something.
In any social group there is a wide range of things that people know, know how to
do, and do well. For example, living in the United Kingdom successfully (in a socio-
logical sense) implies a number of things. It may be something as trivial as knowing
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that onemust drive on the leĕ side of the street, or something as subtle as knowing that
one should never skip a queue wherever there is a queue (or for that matter, knowing
themeaning of the word ‘queue’, since the word is unusual for most North Americans).
ăis ‘ubiquitous’ knowledge can even lead to extremely diﬀerent ways of applying insti-
tutionalised rules: bribery is an accepted and oĕen times required part of Mexican ev-
eryday life that would be heavily punished in most British situations. Similarly, drunk-
enness inMexican streets is severely prosecuted, when in Britain it is tolerated in many
public places. Collins & Evans refers to this sort of ‘self-evident’ knowledge as ubiq-
uitous expertise. One is ‘an expert’ in these matters simply in virtue of belonging to a
particular social group, or being enculturated into a group.
Collins & Evans recognise that by virtue of growing up within a society, one is al-
ready ‘an expert’ (one possesses, at the very least, the tacit knowledge pertaining to that
society which a foreigner would not have). InCollins&Evansmodel onemust presup-
pose that there is such a thing as an expertise ‘universe’ in order to start any sociological
analysis of esoteric or specialist forms of expertise. ăus, proper bribing etiquette is not
particularly esoteric if the ‘expertise universe’ is deđned as allMexico, but it is not ubiq-
uitous at all if the UK population is the universe-set. ăe sociologist can in fact limit
the ‘universe’ by deđning what ‘ubiquitousness’ is for each context. A sociologist could
start their analysis taking not the culture of Britain as ubiquitous, but limiting oneself
only to Cardiﬀ. ‘Ubiquitous’ would then mean the sort of thing that a Cardiﬀ local
would likely know.
For the purposes of this work, the ubiquitous universe is not the wider world that
Collins & Evans originally contemplate, but is muchmore restricted: it is the ‘universe
culture’ of research physics and of the professional physicist. I will borrow loosely from
a deđnition concerning “the things that any physicist should know’’ given by one ofmy
interviewees: the knowledge that is generally acquired by themiddle stages of graduate
work, either in experiment or theory. In reference to the amount of knowledge that
one can presuppose an audience of physicists possesses and needn’t be explained when
giving a talk, Tong (2011) gives the following heuristic pointers:
ăere’s no hard and fast rule which determines the amount of knowledge
you can assume of your audience. It depends very much on who you’re
speaking to and you should try to get a good idea of this when preparing
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the talk. But a good rule of thumb is that anything taught at an advanced
Masters level — say the level of Part III in Cambridge— can be assumed
to be common knowledge.
3.9 ăeubiquitousuniverse-set and lower levelsof exper-
tise
Collins & Evans’ connection with Collins’ tacit knowledge scheme is most noticeable
when one begins to analyse specialist esoteric domains and particularly howknowledge
from these ‘spills out’ into the wider world. Although autonomous expert domains are
by deđnition ‘closed’ to the outsideworld, there is a Ĕowof knowledge from them to the
outside, as clearly occurs in science and it various connections to ‘the public’. Although
thewider public has very limited knowledge of the scientiđcworld as seen ‘fromwithin’,
scientiđc ‘facts’ are part ofmanynon-scientists’ cultural baggage: it is ‘a known scientiđc
fact’ that man is genetically related to other apes, or that the Earth moves around the
Sun, both facts being familiar to laypeople with minimal scientiđc literacy. Making a
simile with another esoteric domain, it is also commonknowledge that white wine goes
betterwith lightmeatswhile redwine tastes betterwith redmeats, or thatMexican food
is quite hot. Knowing this does not imply that one is in any way a gourmet specialist,
even though it does imply possession of a piece of knowledge related to an esoteric
domain. Again, what is specialist or esoteric and what is ubiquitous depends on the
sociological universe that is chosen. If the universe-set is the wider world of British
society, then the above bits of knowledge are ubiquitous. In contrast, any physicist
possessing anundergraduate degree—even an experimenter—is expected toknowhow
to derive the wave equation for light propagation usingMaxwell’s equations in vacuum.
It is ubiquitous knowledge for the physicists-layman but not for the ‘general’ layman.
Once the universe-set is chosen, one can start looking at how esoteric domains arise
there. ăus, the wider world of British culture exhibits all sorts of esoteric đelds of
expertise: literary circles, professional academies, sports stars, etc. ăese domains are
populated by individuals who possess skills that are beyond the reach of the rest of the
wider social group, and that deđne the crème-de-la-crème of these esoteric domains;
these are named contributory experts. Nevertheless, Collins & Evans recognise that in-
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dividuals may still posses ‘lower’ levels of expertise or knowledge about these domains,
even though they do not contribute towards the evolution of the esoteric domain itself.
ăere are three types of knowledge about specialist domains within the universe-set
that ‘outsiders’ to these specialist domains can acquire. In order of increasing sophisti-
cation these types of knowledge are:
1. Beer-mat knowledge. ăe enunciation of this kind of knowledge is parrot-like
and there need be no other skill implied than to enunciate the ‘facts’, as in a pub
quiz.
2. Popular understanding. ăere is a mild comprehension of the mechanism that
gives rise to the knowledge that the knower can in articulate. Popular science
books inspire the terminology, in most of which the author tries to teach the
reader a bit more than ‘just the facts’ and provides more background aimed at
a better comprehension without going into a technical discussion as an esoteric
expert would have with another expert. ăe knower can then give a rational re-
construction of the mechanisms of knowledge production, with a bare-bones
description of the mechanism whereby the knowledge came to be.
3. Primary source knowledge. In this case one has actually read and understood,
located or is able to cite the sources of knowledge, and work out their basic prin-
ciples as stated in the primary texts of an esoteric đeld.
ăeproblemof communication in physics can nowbe set up usingCollins&Evans’
mosdel. Essentially, the problem involves understanding how in the expertise universe-
set thathas been chosen (physics as awhole) thediﬀerent esoteric domains (the lozenges
of the horseshoe diagram) are inter-linked, as shown in Figure 3.1.
3.10 ăe importance of interaction
In the following sections I will concentrate on elaborating on how collaboration arises
between epistemically closermicro-cultures in physics collaborations where themicro-
cultures are forced to interact. Collins & Evans posit that in order for true comprehen-
sion to occur, there has to be prolonged linguistic immersion in the ‘foreign’ culture or
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Experimental
analysis
Simulation
Modelling
Interactional
Primary source
Popular/beer-mat
Pure theory
Figure 3.1: Physics communicating using Collins & Evans’ model. Only a portion of
the ‘unfolded’ horseshoe is shown, with the chain continuing at each endusing the same
mechanisms. ăe interactions at the edges of the diagram also rely on the establishment
of sociological trust, which will be treated in depth in Chapter 4.
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expertise, unlike the case of isolated high-theoreticians that have no such exposure, and
thus that cannot apprehend tacit knowledge or development of interactional expertise.
Consistent with the Collins & Evans’ model, theoreticians that were interviewed who
are in collaborative projects with experimental groups emphasised the importance of
personal and prolonged linguistic interaction:
Horgan: You have conferences or things like that or smaller meetings. So
we had a meeting this weekend, andMatt next door has gone to Durham,
and so he’s taking some of the preliminary results up there and he will dis-
cusswith these people, theywill go away and thenof course they can e-mail
back. So you can then set up a dialoguewhere they don’t quite understand
exactly what we did, you see. And we don’t understand what they want to
do. So you have to understand their physics. ăey sometimes are scepti-
cal, and we’re sometimes sceptical because you think, ‘You didn’t do this.
You didn’t do that. How does this work? I don’t understand that.’ And
then either that’s true and they change or you change, or it was a misun-
derstanding and so very gradually you can pull their understanding into
your thing but that’s because you communicate […].
Whenaskedhow long the establishmentof cooperationusually takes,Horganmade
it clear that it was a time consuming process of years of duration:
Reyes: How long does [the] communication setup take?
Horgan: Well, sometimes it can take years. Normally…it depends if the
calculations are large. In this kind of lattice QCD a computer calcula-
tion can take months. Partly writing the code, debugging it, but also just
the processing. So in this particular project I’m talking about, through a
two-year project you get these numbers. Now there will be a sort of post-
project interaction with people. And maybe it doesn’t come to anything
in the end. Maybe it was too hard. It’s important to have a relationship
with the people so that you’re not just talking to a machine through a ma-
chine. So you don’t know such and such a person…you communicate with
them, you meet them at some workshop, and then maybe they come over
for two weeks and so on. And then you have a long term…or sometimes
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you don’t, but know you know them. You can talk to them. You can ask
them, ‘I don’t understand this, can you tell me about that?’ and so on. So
yes, it can take a few, you know six months only if you get the initial thing
going but it could take…it could have this eﬀect. Your group just gets big-
ger, at least your local group where you can walk next door, but there’s all
these people like the people in this picture who are in Ohio and Dallas
and…you name it.
3.11 Collaboration in small- andmid- scale physics
ăeoreticians like Tong or Berry tend to work in isolation from experimental physics,
and high-theoreticians tend to be the ‘lone wolves’ of physics. One of the more math-
ematically oriented theoreticians interviewed even commented:
No real theorist everworks in a group. Younever say a ‘team’of researchers,
and I immediately…when somebody says this— not everybody, but far
and large— they’re not thinking clearly.
ăis is a rather idealised view for theory as a whole, as some collaborations in mod-
ern physics do require signiđcant theoretical input beyond what single individuals can
provide. For example, teamsof researchers are increasingly commonas theoreticalwork
in particle physics becomes more and more complex. Particle physics led projects such
as the massive experiments that form part of the European Organisation for Nuclear
Research (CERN, from the original Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire)
require the coordinated eﬀorts not only of hundreds of experimenters and technicians
on the site, but also of theoreticians working in collaborations in CERN headquarters
and smaller ‘teams’ around theworld. ăis same pattern is followed inmany other areas
of modern experimental collaborations that require theoretical input:
Mondragón: I’m […] interested in dark matter, on both direct and direct
detection of dark matter, and how it relates to these models beyond the
Standard Model, because with new cosmological measurements — you
can no longer ignore the precision of astrophysical and cosmological mea-
surements when you write up models beyond the StandardModel— and
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we have worked with a group of very interested people on a criterion for
entropy. ăere we have people that do general relativity, me and another
guy doing particle physics, people who do more of astronomy, and this
project we have kept on going. What we are trying to do is đnd indepen-
dent criteria for particles: abundance, astrophysical processes, etc. and to
contrast themwith concrete suppositions of possiblemodels or extensions
and see if these are compatible. ăis has proven very interesting and it’s a
large working group because you need people frommany đelds.
Horgan is another theoreticianworking in collaborative work that involves particle
physics simulations:
Horgan: ăis is thewebpage for ourparticles physics collaboration,HPQCD,
that’s High Precision õuantum Chromodynamics. […] All these people
do simulation, and I do calculation […] So there’s a whole QCD thing
there, and that relates to experiment, and it’s meant to help the experi-
menters see if there are any anomalies in their experiments that could be
‘beyond the StandardModel’ physics.
Reyes: When you say you give this information to experimenters…you
produce a number, and then you give them that and what do they do with
it?
Horgan: Well, I mean, it takes a long time. We haven’t done this yet. […]
ăere’s an experiment called LCHb which is looking at the physics of b-
quarks. ăeywill measure the decays of b-mesons which aremesonsmade
of a b-quark and a light quark like an anti-up or something. […] So it
tends to be one ingredient in a much bigger attack on the calculation, and
so in the end ‘the best’ numberwill come out, not necessarily straight from
us, but from us in collaboration, or we’ll write a paper, or somebody else
will use it and say, “ah, this group in Cambridge has done the best num-
ber calculation of this and now we can put this into this model over here
and that reduces the systematic errors on that,” and eventually somewhere
down the line we’ll pop out the best number for the decay rate. […] So
yes, in the end the knockdown thing is that you give the experimenters a
number, and they see if the number agrees.
101 śBridging the gap between contiguous micro-cultures
Horgan’s ‘collaboration’ involves only theoretical calculations, not an orchestrated
eﬀort with experiment. Horgan described the interaction with experiment as forming
“a chain” where his group is only one link in the path to experiment, which suggests
a picture similar to the horseshoe diagram where each link in the chain works inde-
pendently from the others. Horgan identiđed four links also similar to the diagram: a
group above his that did ‘analytic calculations’, his which supplied QCD parameters to
a group that uses them to make the actual predictions, which are then handed down to
the group that actually carries out the experiments:
Reyes: So you produce your number and you hand it to whoever connects
in the chain.
Horgan: Yes, yes.
Reyes: Who would that be?
Horgan: It might be…I don’t hand it directly, right? You publish the pa-
per. ăe paper goes out. ăe title obviously attracts the other people. So
theymight be the experimenters directlywhohave their ownpet theorists,
but itmight be other people who have a parametrisation for the decay rate
which takes into account things we can’t calculate but in the middle sits
this number we can calculate. I mean, I can’t tell you their names. I can
think of people that might do that. […] Sometimes somebody has an idea
but there’s a hole in the calculation, and they can’t do these calculations,
so it’s not important for them to đnish this idea. But then somebody pub-
lishes apaperwhocalculated this thing, and suddenlynowyoucandoyour
own thing and use that, and then your idea becomes much, much better
and that happens you know. We had an idea in this group some years back
to actually do some calculations but using the computer, but wewanted to
compare it with an analytic calculation. […]ăe point is that these other
guys did a calculation thatwas completely independent ofwhatwewanted
and for a completely diﬀerent reason and we had an idea, “ah, wouldn’t it
be nice to do this,” and we can do some things with this method, but then
putting the two together actually gives you a much better result. So it’s
important to just seed the world with this knowledge in chunks, and it gets
picked out. ąat’s kind of how that works. (emphasis added)
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What implication does this have for the communication problem? Horgan’s ac-
count provides a highly fragmented view of his đeld of physics, so that even within col-
laboration ‘chains’ the basic method is to work within one’s own speciality and ‘seed’
theworld throughpublication. Horgan stressed that once the arduous task of settingup
the computational collaboration are đnalised, particular results are taken up by groups
who he did not knowwell enough to be able to name them on the spot. Again, one gets
a picture of physics where direct interaction— when and if it is needed— is set up by
processes of prolonged dialogue. Once a result is produced, the groups can publish the
result, in the hope that someone will take up this đnalised knowledge.
3.12 Interactional ambassadors in LIGO
If Collins & Evans framework is to be posited as a general model of communication
in theoretical physics, it should not be restricted only to particular interactions be-
tween individuals, or small groups like Horgan’s where there is a ‘natural’ tendency
to set up fragmented workgroups, but should also be able to describe physics at large
and in more complex settings. An example that can be compared to Romero’s person-
to-person collaboration and Horgan’s small-scale collaboration and that has been the
focus of decades long work by Collins (2004, 2010) is LIGO (Laser Interferometer
Gravitational-Wave Observatory), a massive project for detecting gravitational waves
that involves hundreds of scientists around the world. One would expect that in large-
scale collaborations such as LIGO that require the coordination of physicists from all
over the horseshoe diagram (unlike in small-scale collaborations like Horgan’s where
once the group’s work is done one simply ‘seed’ the world with one’s result), commu-
nications between the micro-cultures of physics would be much tighter than outside
them. But aswill be shown, LIGO is also fragmented into expertise domains that retain
high degrees of autonomy that rely on SEE type mechanisms to achieve coordination
and knowledge transfer.
S. Fairhurst leads a group in LIGO which carries out numerical analysis using the
raw data generated at the experimental site. Within the horseshoe diagram, his group
is directly next to the experimental group; the interaction could hardly be more direct.
As such, he is as close to experiment as any theoretician can get in terms of his objec-
tives. But not only that, for as part of LIGO there is an institutional drive to coordi-
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nate work that is absent in small-scale physics. Nevertheless, according to Fairhurst the
closely-interacting groups have not established an inter-group language to understand
each other better, or as permanent interaction as groups, despite having been collabo-
rating for years. In fact, Fairhurst does not feel enough rapport with the ‘on site’ exper-
imenters to call them up directly in order to discuss some problems with the data:
Reyes: Howdoes the actual communicationgo about? Doyoucall up [the
experimenters at the site]? I was curious as to whether you just picked up
the phone and…
Fairhurst: Some people do. I don’t know the guys at the site well enough
to just pick up the phone and say, ‘this is killing us’, but I know the person
I would talk to who is my expert and there’s a chain…I don’t know how it
would get to them!
When asked about this ‘expert’, Fairhurst explained there was a student in his group
whohadbeen sent speciđcally to develop skills as a ‘liaison’ so that his groups couldhave
a contact point with the experimenters on the site. ăe method to achieve this was for
the student to be physically present at the site, so as to gain ‘a foot in each camp’ and be
able to ‘translate’ for the data analysis team:
Fairhurst: You need a few people with a foot in each campwho can almost
translate, but there are a lot of people who just don’t care to make that
eﬀort. I’ve done a bit, but you know one of my PhD students went to the
site for four months and this was great for us because he came back and
we’d hear something about what the detector did. And he’s been there
and helped work on it and he’d say, ‘Yeah, that means this.’
ăis setting up of ‘ambassador’ or ‘translator’ based interaction has been posited in
previous SEE-related work such as Collins (2011) and Ribeiro (2007b), in models of
communications relying on the concept of interactional expertise. Collins has classiđed
these ‘ambassadors’ as possessing ‘specialist interactional expertise’, to stress that they
have no practical and only linguistic immersion in the domain that they translate from.
Collins (2011, p. 287) conđrms the existence of these ‘interactional ambassadors’ or
‘special interactional experts’ in gravitational wave physics, and Collins đnds that in
LIGO
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“groups of physicists do not speak each other’s practice languages. ăe so-
lution is to delegate particular individuals belonging to the GW physics-
practice to learn some astronomy practice language, to gain interactional
expertise, and to formbridgeswithdiﬀerent kinds of astronomer […]Each
delegate has to become a special interactional expert with respect to the
community to which he or she is to build a bridge. ăe delegated indi-
viduals, in so far as they succeed, can then answer technical questions and
queries from GW physicists on behalf of, say, x-ray astronomers, without
always referring back to those astronomers— this is how one detail of the
technical cooperation between these middle-level practices is made possi-
ble.”
Collins’ đndings were echoed by Fairhurst himself:
Fairhurst: We have our weekly meeting about what we analysed the last
week by telecom. We’d get our story together and try to poke in on this
data. Sometimes we will come to them. If my student was at the site he’d
just come and pass it on. ăen there were e-mail lists and things, but I
think generally these list things kind of don’t work so much. To do some-
thing like that you need a point-to-point contact between the two groups,
right? And that could be someone who’s visiting somewhere, or it could
just be a relationship that’s grown up. So we work out what we want to
say, and then whoever is sort of our liaison goes and talks to the person at
the other side. Maybe they go to their teleconference and they summarise
for the other people something. In reality it’s only a handful of people who
are really at the interface. (emphasis added)
3.13 Interactional expertise andmanagement skills
In LIGO, group coordination is carried out using the same sort of mechanisms as in
Horgan’s and Romero’s case, that is, by establishing interactional expert links through
prolonged interaction. In Romero’s case, where the theoretical side is handled exclu-
sively by he himself, the interaction is necessarily direct. In Horgan’s case, a few select
members establish these bridges, but the group being small this is still a signiđcant part
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of the collaborating population. In LIGO the same mechanism is followed, but the
scale of the project being at a completely diﬀerent scale, the interactional expertise di-
mension and the establishment of interactional expertise through personal immersion
is much more visible.
Nevertheless, LIGO is diﬀerent to small-scale physics in that there is an overarching
coordination driving the day-to-day work. In order to achieve this, there need to be
individuals that can somehow see the project ‘as a whole’, in much the same way as a
good manager at a factory needs to have a bird’s eye view of the entire assembly line
processes that lead from the worker’s individual skills to a đnal product that receives
multiple small-scale inputs. B. S. Sathyaprakash, who is part of the ‘theoretical’ data
analysis group but has been involved in LIGO since its inception, commented on his
need to acquire such a wide-angle vision:
Sathyaprakash: I have been interacting with [all] of these communities. I
think it depends to some extent on how deeply you want to get involved
in various aspects. What happened to me is that I entered the đeld in the
early stages where most of the people involved that I was talking to were
experimentalists. ăere were not many theoreticians. ăere was not data,
so therefore there were no data analysts. […] I had to talk to these guys. I
had to understand the detector đrst and foremost. […] You can say that I
am a theoretical experimentalist in that sense. ăe diﬃculty arises when
you don’t know the language, and that can happen. I do interact with all
these people, but at a level where I need to understand how I can pattern
the science behind it, not much more than that. If you try to do their
job, then it’s not good. You have to do your job. You try talk to them
and extract as much information as possible, in trying to understand how
the science that we are doing is going to be impacted. In some sense all
that you might need to worry about is… ‘oh, I will just worry about the
sensitivity. Tell me, what is the sensitivity of your instrument?’ But that’s
not enough, because they might have diﬀerent choices. So you need to
probe, and tell them that, ‘look, if you try to gain a little bit here in this
frequency region Imight be able to do this science, and try to probe a little
bit of the technology involved. And try to get a feel for it. […] You try to
śChapter 3 106
understand what they are trying to do.
Sathyaprakash’s rolewithin theLIGOcollaboration includes seniormanagerial du-
ties, whichhas thus ledhim todevelop interactional skills in order to communicatewith
the four larger-scale communities that make up LIGO (experimenters, data-analysts,
theoretical data analysts, and experimental-prototype theoreticians). Sathyaprakash
requires the ability to interact with each of the teams in their own terms. Collins &
Sanders (2007) have analysed the skills that managers require in cases where this hap-
pens, having concluded that it is through interactional expertise that they are able to
carry out their work. Although Sathyaprakash is unlikely to have gained full interac-
tional expertise in order to comprehend the aspects of the entire LIGO collaboration’s
work (an inordinately large amount of immersion and acquisition of tacit knowledge
would be necessary otherwise) he has developed enough specialist expertise to become
a ‘high-level’ liaison between the groups. As in day to day interactions, the importance
of personal interaction is mentioned as the way to deal with communication barriers,
and as SEE argues, this immersion in the language of an esoteric domain in turn leads
to interactional capacity.
3.14 Breaking down tacit barriers in LIGO
Relational tacit knowledge is reported to be a major hindrance to inter-group collab-
oration in LIGO, pointing to the generalised establishment of localised ‘languages’ in
the collaboration that make cross-lozenge communications diﬃcult. Relational tacit
knowledge arises which facilitates in-group communication, but hinders contact with
outsiders. ăe way to overcome the relational barrier is, of course, personal contact:
Sathyaprakash: People very soon will start using jargon, jargon which is
not fundamental physics. But the jargon is needed, because every time
you don’t want to say a very, very long sentence to deđne what something
is in terms of fundamental things. Over the course of their training— spe-
cially younger colleagues— they don’t know that this is not fundamental
physics, that it is something very speciđc to their đeld. Very soon there is
a tendency to get lost in jargon. ăat creates a language barrier. How do
we avoid that? One idea is to sit face to face with people and ask them,
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‘explain this to me. What do you mean by this?’ You can do it this way, or
you can try to ignore parts that are not important.
Faihurst is also very aware of the growth of ‘jargon’ within specialties, but unlike
laid more stress on how it facilitates in-group communication:
Fairhurst: It comes back to this ‘do we speak diﬀerent languages?’ Yes.
We do. I expect it’s the same with the other people you’ve interviewed,
but in our đeld we use more acronyms than you can imagine. Everything
is an acronym, because it saves time. And so if you’re in my little clique
you know the acronyms we use. We use them everyday, and that’s đne.
And the experiment people use their own. You have to put in a little bit of
legwork to understand themain ones or theywon’t even talk to you, right?
And if they use some more obscure ones you can kind of call them. But
yes, speaking the same language, understanding the basics. Yeah, I think
generally we assume people know more than they do. It’s very rare that
you assume people know less than they do. And also we assume we know
more than we do.
ăis is clear evidence of how mismatches in tacit knowledge create real-time diﬃ-
culties even amongst groups that are tackling closely related empirical work, but with
one in the experimental and the other in the theoretical terrain. Even thoughFairhurst’s
group and the people at the site have huge overlaps in the pieces of LIGO that they
develop and study, this is still not enough to create a communal language that is unam-
biguously understood by both groups.
3.15 Complexity and specialisation
ăe complexity of the chains of knowledge is linked to the high degree of professional
specialisation that has become intrinsic to modern theoretical physics. For a single in-
dividual to become an expert in every part of the chain seems highly unlikely or even
impossible. ăe story of Enrico Fermi as the last of physic’s polymaths has become stan-
dard lore in the history of physics, particularly that of the ‘Golden Age’ of quantum
mechanics:
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Tong: It’s usually said that Fermi the last guy to do this [work within the
whole spectrum of physics]. I don’t know if that’s a true statement. Cer-
tainly I don’t know people that do it. I know of very impressive people
that work on string theory, the geometry of extra dimensions, and at the
same time do nuts and bolts work of top quark analysis from the data from
LHC, so they get their hands on the raw data and try to siĕ through and
understand what’s top quarks and what’s not. ăat guy is a fairly extreme
example because it seems that— tome at least—his two bits of work don’t
overlap, but to go all the way through, I don’t think so.
Technically, it is not impossible for a theoretician to also work in a laboratory (one
theoretician that is now in charge of running an experimental optics laboratory and ac-
tually setting up experiments was interviewed for this work). But while the Fermi story
may not be completely accurate, it would be feasible to argue that Fermi was perhaps
the last physicist to do research in both theory and experiment at the level for which he
became legendary.
Specialisation thus naturally occurs in any collaborative work, even when wholly
theoretical. Wray (2005, p. 153), commenting on D. de S. Price’s work, highlights the
growing complexity of published papers in modern science, noting that specialisation
occurs “because there is a limit to how much people can read each scientist can attend
to only a đnite and rather small portion of the continuously growing body of scien-
tiđc literature.” He identiđes Price’s work as constituting a second stage of STS work
on scientiđc specialisation, which concentrated on how specialisation occurs as a sci-
entiđc đeld grows, becomes crowded, and the younger generations tend to seek new
niches for their professional development. Law (1973) has shown how specialisation
occurs even in small communities that are otherwise homogeneous in their background
research commitments by studying the diversiđcation of techniques in British crystal-
lography and the emergence of the new đeld of protein crystallography, and how these
communities eventually grew to become autonomous đelds of specialisation. Collins
(2011) has linked the existence of division of labour within large scale collaborations
to the emergence of a common interactional domain that allows the autonomous prac-
tices to function as a whole, with linguistic socialisation functioning as the integrative
element between disjoint groups.
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In small collaborations one individual may cover each of the horseshoe categories,
or itmay happen that single individualsmay be competent in several categories simulta-
neously (as in Romero’s case where he is basically coveringmany of the phenomenolog-
ical categories at the same time). In complex collaborations between theoretical and
experimental physics, the links in the chain become more closed in on themselves as
đelds of specialist expertise. As complexity and specialisation grows, the sociological
location of individuals within the diagram becomes more focused.
3.16 Comparing Collins & Evans’ approach to Galison’s
model of communication
If two foreignerswhosemother tongues are completely diﬀerent andwhodonot share a
common language are forced by circumstance to cooperate and achieve a coordinated
goal, how could they manage to do this? Galison (1997) has presented this linguis-
tic puzzle as analogy to the problem of communication between the micro-cultures of
physics, along with a highly inĔuential answer in STS, which will be considered here in
detail and juxtaposed to the Collins & Evans approach, as it has also been analysed in
depth by previous SEE-inĔuenced authors.
As one of the most inĔuential authors to tackle the problem of communication
in science directly, for Galison experimenters and theoreticians are not two sorts of
physicist diﬀerentiated by eﬀorts concentrated on diﬀerent problems, but can be better
understood as two diﬀerent cultures embedded in the larger culture of physics. Galison
thus recognises that in this sense, physics is a disuniđed science. Based on historical
work on experimental traditions in early 20th century physicsGalison found that along
with these two traditional cultures, one could deđne a third culture which was of equal
importance to the other two— technology— thereby increasing the complications for
the problemof communication. Galison showed that the development of experimental
physics was not synchronised with either theoretical or technological developments,
and therefore that the emergence of ‘revolutions’, ‘paradigm shiĕs’, etc. in one of the
cultures cannot be mapped one-to-one to those in the others, further supporting the
view of a fragmented culture of physics; theory, experiment and technology ought to be
treated as autonomousmicro-cultural entities, and conceptualmismatchbetween them
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is as real as the linguistic incommensurability between two groups that speak diﬀerent
languages.
Galison’s historical accounts include experimenters, theoreticians and technolo-
gists found to be working on common projects and goals which required input from
all three micro-cultures. In order to explain how communication does happen, as it is
seen to happen in such collaborations, Galison put forth the idea of ‘trading zones’, lin-
guistic spaces — possibly but not necessarily associated with physical spaces — where
hybrid proto-languages develop that take elements from both parent languages (‘pid-
gins’ and ‘creoles’, in increasing order of sophistication). ăe hybridisation begins with
simple exchanges of words to which both micro-cultures give common meaning, af-
ter which the trading zone language can gain in complexity so that if the trading zone
is sustained for long enough it is possible for a new autonomous language to develop.
Taking his cue from linguistic studies describing such cultural clashes, Galison saw the
coordination of the threemicro-cultures of twentieth century particle physics and their
developments as cases of the emergence of trading zones.
Galison (1996, p. 153) has exploited the metaphor in other historical studies to
highlight the role of trading zones. In his analysis of Monte Carlo simulations in nu-
clear physics, Galison for example states that “in the heat of the moment, a kind of
pidgin language emerged in which procedures were abstracted from their broader sig-
niđcation. Everyone came to learn how to create and assess pseudorandom numbers.
[…] Everyone learned the techniques of variance reduction. […] By the 1960’s what
had been a pidgin had become a full-blown creole: the language of a self-supporting
sub-culture with enough structure and interest to support a research life without be-
ing an annex of another discipline, without needing translation into a ‘mother tongue.”
A few lines later Galison points out that “of course not everyone shared all the skills
of this new ‘trading zone.’ Some focused on the game-theoretical aspect; others, more
on variance reduction or convergence problems.” Galison clearly showed that Monte
Carlo developed into a technique that grew out of the localised context in which it was
developed and oﬀers evidence that it indeed became an autonomous area of expertise,
as did all of computational physics. But as far as the intermediate hybridisation pro-
cess is concerned, he only aﬃrms that the motley crew of professionals involved in the
development ofMonte Carlo “could and did đnd common cause” without any eviden-
tial support. In fact, Galison points that in these interactions, “individuals […] could
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alternate between problem domains without diﬃculties.” ăis is not far from Kuhn’s
observation that scientists can and indeed do switch between paradigms when looking
at diﬀerent problem domains, a picture which Galison explicitly wants to reject with
the creation of trading zones as ‘intermediate’ linguistic zones between the indepen-
dent micro-cultures.
Galison’s model is one of scientiđc communication between autonomous micro-
cultures in general, and soone can examinewhether interactionbetween scientiđcmicro-
cultures are generally based on the establishment of trading zones. Going back to the
linguistic metaphor, if this were the case it wouldmean that when two foreigners inter-
act, the onlymeans they have of promoting collaboration or communication is to estab-
lish pidgins, creoles and trading zones. However, although we know that creolisation
happens in certain contexts, it is not the only way in which communication happens
between individuals from diﬀerent cultures in general. One can for example use the
services of a translator, or what is perhaps more common, one of the parties involved
might learn the language of the other person’s culture. Indeed, one need not go that
far if one allows that ‘interactions’ may not necessarily be limited to close partnerships
or personal contact. One could, for example, simply read the English translation of a
Spanish speaker’s biography to gain insight into that person’s life even if one does not
understand Spanish, and thereby gain some sort of insight into that person’s culture;
although this is hardly interaction, it does imply transmission of knowledge, which is
deđnitely one dimension of scientiđc interaction.
3.17 An analysis of the Galison-type trading zonemodel
ăe most severe limitation of Galison’s model is that it assumes that all relations be-
tween micro-cultures are of a very particular kind, one where the two parties involved
have the same footing in terms of, for example, resources or power. Critiques of this
default position have been put forward by Collins et al. (2007) where trading zones
are classiđed along two axes: the relative power between the groups, and the degree
of the homogeneity of the trading zone. Galison’s position in the Monte Carlo case is
identiđed as a maximum balance of power, maximum heterogeneity class of ‘boundary
object’ trading zone (classiđed as a type of fractionated trading zone), where although
the people involved all ‘talk’ about the same object, they do so from within their parti-
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tioned expertises with no culture dominating the other.⁷ In the case of full creolisation,
the trading zone is located in the maximum homogeneity, maximum balance class (re-
ferred to as an inter-language trading zone), since a ‘new’ culture develops that has its
own autonomous elements of self-identity independent from the parent culture.
Collins et at also consider that in the case of fractionated trading zones there is
the possibility that instead of choosing to construct a boundary object the interaction
may be shaped on the establishment of interactional expertise, which in linguistic terms
would be equivalent to the full immersion of the parent cultures into the language and
culture of the other. ăe end result is that some of the members of the parent cul-
tures become ‘interpreters’ of the other language and culture to the members of their
own culture. Ribeiro (2007b,a) has extended this idea to include cases of exchanges
where the interaction is carried out by external interpreters in technically challenging
settings where the members of the parent cultures interact minimally with each other.
Ribeiro in fact argues that in some cases the language barrier can be an aid to com-
munication for interpreters, as they can choose to ignore pieces of conversation that
would be considered oﬀensive were they translated because of culturally oﬀensive con-
tent that is unknown as such to the speaker. In interactional expertise-mediated inter-
actions, although the power is balanced in that no group dominates the discourse or the
cultural resource of the other, there is minimal interaction between groups, and only
few individual of one group become ‘ambassadors’ to the other. Ribeiro’s contribution
is relevant to the problem of communication in physics as it adds another dimension
to it, posing the question of whether all exchanges of information need be carried out
between fully interacting cultures in order to be signiđcant, or if indeed full interac-
tion between the cultures is always the ideal situation to be aimed for. Nevertheless,
the case described in Ribeiro (2007a, p. 562) is one where “two radically diﬀerent lan-
guage groups can be brought into a productive relationship with one another through
the mediating role of an interpreter who acts as a buﬀer between the cultures”.
ăe central thesis in this work is that within physics, interactional expertise acts as
the main bridge between the dissimilar forms-of-life that make up the horseshoe dia-
gram. ăis does not mean that Collins & Evans’ model rules out the establishment of
Galison-type trading zones, but it does relegate them to at most a complementary po-
sition relative to the establishment of interactional expertise. It is in fact possible that
⁷ăe concept ‘boundary object ’was đrst introduced in Star & Griesemer (1989).
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interactional expertise and trading zones work side by side in a number of instances.
For example, Fairhurst himself has been instrumental in developing programs within
the LIGO collaboration that exhibit the properties of a trading zone:
Sathyaprakash: Even within the theoretical area there might be diﬃcul-
ties amongst diﬀerent levels, to talk to, for example, numerical relativists,
numerical simulations of black holes. ăat’s one area where we had a lot
of diﬃculty understanding their language and eﬀort was put it. Stephen
[Fairhurst] was one of the leaders in starting a group calledNINJAwhich
helped create a platform in exchanging ideas. Not just ideas! Also to set
up a language, a common language between these two. It requires a lot of
eﬀort.
NINJA (Numerical INJection Analysis) is described in the group’s wiki as follows:
ăe goal of theNINJA project is to bring the numerical relativity and data
analysis communities together to pursue projects of common interest in the
areas of gravitational-wave detection, astrophysics and astronomy. (em-
phasis added)⁸
FromSathyaprakash’s description,NINJAcanbe seen tobe an exampleof an emerg-
ing Galison-type trading zone (“a common language”). Also, the group has decided to
focus on speciđc topics that signal the appearance of boundary objects, in this case a
‘topic’ with which all groups in the collaboration can deal with directly, ‘the merger
phase of binary black hole (BBH) coalescence’.⁹ Trading zones and interactional ex-
pertise mechanisms do not rule each other out and can work in parallel for the con-
struction of speciđc projects or the attainment of particular goals, but they must be
‘manufactured’ for this purpose, and at least in the NINJA case do not seem like the
‘natural’ pathway to communication found in everyday physics practice.
⁸https://www.ninja-project.org/doku.php
⁹Aylott, B. et al (2009).
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Figure 3.2: Trading zones that evolve over time beyond the ’creole’ stage lead to an
increase in complexity, which complicates the problem of communication.
3.18 A brief critique of trading zones and linguistic spe-
cialisation
I wish to present onemore argument as to why the trading zonemodel is insuﬃcient to
explain collaborative work in science. ăe full dynamics of Galison-type trading zones
develop in the following manner, schematised in Figure 3.2.
1. Two communities, A and B, are forced to interact.
2. In order to do so, A and B develop a pidgin, or basic hybrid language, let us call
it (A&&B).
3. If interaction is prolonged, amore sophisticated creole hybrid language develops,
let us call it A&B.
4. Given enough interaction, a new language— a full-blown language— develops,
let us call it C.
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5. ăe end result of prolonged interaction is then, given that the previous step is
reached, that one begins with two languages A, B, and ends with the three lan-
guages A, B, C.
ăe end result of the prolonged-interaction trading zone is then to increase the dis-
unity of practices, not to diminish it! ăus, unless one adds the supposition that trading
zones never evolve beyond creoles, the trading zone metaphor does not solve the prob-
lem of communication, but in fact makes it even more problematic. In the end, one
must still explain how aĕer prolonged interaction, giving rise to a more complex situ-
ation, the three autonomous languages A, B, C interact. If one posits that this is again
done through the establishment of trading zones, the end result is that given enough in-
teraction, one is leĕ with six total languages, and so on ad inđnitum. SEE and trading
zones are in thus at odds in the sense that prolonged interaction enables communica-
tion for the former, but hinders it in the case of the latter. ăus trading zones are not
a solution to the general problem of communication, although they may of course be
mechanisms that facilitate communication in very speciđc contexts such as theNINJA
project.
3.19 Collins&Evans’model as an answer to the problem
of communication
I began this chapter by showing that there are twokindsof physicists, thehigh-theoretical
variety for whom experiment only indirectly enters their work and that have only very
minimal overlapswith the socialworldof experiment, andphenomenologically-oriented
theoreticians who either by choice or circumstance interact closely with experimen-
tal groups. I then analysed three diﬀerent cases of physics collaborating with experi-
menters: person-to-person collaborations between individual theoreticians and exper-
imental groups, small inter-group collaborations where the groups are still fairly au-
tonomous but the eﬀorts directed towards phenomenology, and ‘Big Science’ collab-
orations where all science is subsumed into a single underlying project. In all these
instances, although the overarching form of the collaboration is signiđcantly diﬀerent,
interactional expertise is seen to work at all levels of communication, and linguistic im-
mersion into another native culture is seen to be the primary mechanism of learning to
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speak ‘the other’s’ language, as Collins&Evans dictate should happen. In the following
chapter I will deal with theoretical physics that interacts’ with experiment viaCollins&
Evans lower categories of knowledge transfer, that is, through beer-mat, popular under-
standing, and primary source knowledge, where interactional expertise is not needed
as in the above cases.
CHAPTER 4
Mid- and long-range interaĆions between micro-cultures
ſ trĮt unto here godenys,
she wolde not mysdoo;
Ƈć y wyﬆ ful wel, y-wys,
for oĜe y have y-founde hit soo.
—ŧnonymoĮ, Ěom ‘ŧs ů Ųay Żpon a Ŵight’, 15ĭ century polyphonic
carol
4.1 Knowledgeexchangebetweennon-interactingmicro-
cultures
ăe Ĕow of knowledge from empirical to theoretical physics sometimes happens with-
out there being direct interaction between the micro-cultures. ăis chapter will con-
centrate on the types of knowledge exchanged between lozenges in the horseshoe dia-
gram that are not in immediate contact and where there is no natural development of
interactional expertise due to a lack of shared social spaces. I will show that in these
cases, the Ĕow of information is based on the existence of trust between experimenters
and theoreticians, and that the underlying mechanisms for this to happen can only be
understood from a sociological perspective on the how scientiđc knowledge is sanc-
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tioned and supported. I will illustrate these aspects of theoretical knowledge-exchange
by examining the role that trust plays in the way that mathematical and pure theory
relate to experiment in physics. ăis will also serve to challenge a putative sine qua non
of scientiđc practice: the Baconian precept of science being directly based on ‘facts’,
these being presented as unproblematic objective knowledge.Ʋ I will show that rather
than based on facts, theoretical practice is actually based on external accounts of facts,
which evidences the necessity of sociological trust to bind physics’ overall structure.
4.2 Trust and autonomy
In the previous chapter I illustrated how high-theoreticians are most of the time socio-
logically ‘distant’ from experimental production, and how this isolates them from the
world of experiment (see section 3.1). Although this is a form of division of labour,
with some physicists specialising in producing theory and others in doing experiment,
there is also a partition of epistemic power. Experiment and theory become closed đelds
of expertise to ‘outsiders’, who are technically incompetent at prođciently producing
this knowledge, and thus illegitimate actors to criticise it’s production. In the words of
Bourdieu (1975, p. 23),
“in a highly autonomous scientiđc đeld, a particular producer cannot ex-
pect recognition of the value of his products (“reputation”, “prestige”, “au-
thority”, “competence”, etc.) from anyone except other producers, who,
being his competitors too, are those least inclined to grant recognition
without discussion and scrutiny. ăis is true de facto: only scientists in-
volved in the area have the means of symbolically appropriating his work
and assessing its merits. And it is also true de jure: the scientist who ap-
peals to an authority outside the đeld cannot fail to incur discredit.”
Additionally, as esoteric expertises become closed circles of knowledge production,
autonomyalso implies legitimacywhen facing the outsideworld. What ismanufactured
ƲHarré (1970) refers to this as ‘ăe Mythology of Deductivism’ and identiđes three Great Myths:
ăeMyth of Events as PrimeObjects of Knowledge,ăeMyth of the Vehicles ofăought andăeMyth
of Deductive Systems.
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by autonomous micro-cultures is presented to the outside world as ‘the’ truth, and re-
mains the most trustworthy account unless an outsider is willing to penetrate into the
specialists’ domain in their terms. ăis brings about a situation in which knowledge
about the physical world, when it enters high-theoretical practice, does so indirectly
through the accounts of experimenters whom the theoretician has no links to and may
have never met personally. And so for theoreticians to maintain the idea of physics
as an empirical science they must either relinquish authority to experimenters in mat-
ters of empirical ‘truth’, ormigrate from theory and become experimental collaborators
themselves as described in detail the previous chapter, through the acquisition of inter-
actional expertise in the form-of-life of experimenters.
ăe converse of the above is equally true; theoretical expertise is an esoteric, au-
tonomous đeld of specialisation in relation to experiment. When physicists decide to
specialise in experiment, they are also relinquishing the possibility of becoming active,
participating members of the theoretical community, which has its own practices of
technical argumentation, indoctrination and legitimisation. Experiments in modern
physics consume so much in the way of time and resources that those who create the
experimental data oĕen have to devote themselves so fully to this task that even the
labour of interpreting the data may have to be leĕ to others. ăe task of developing the
superstructure that gives coherence to experimental results is taken away from the ex-
perimenters who created it. In opposition to the experimental handbooks that simply
state ‘accepted’ experimental parameters without further ado, one can đnd handbooks
of mathematical functions and formulas of mathematical physics that simply state ‘the
results’ without any justiđcation for them.
4.3 You need a bus load of faith to get by
ăeoreticians oĕen need to appeal to ‘canonical’ experimental results and tables in
their work. Established experimental results such as those found on popular material-
property handbooks are not upheld by one or two people, but by a large number of
highly trained experts, teams and laboratories oĕen working independently from each
other. To question one of these experimental result would require either a divergent
result of one’s own (which a theoretician would be incapable of producing), or ‘to go
against the social grain’ by questioning communally sustained knowledge. ăere are
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cases where this happens: scientiđc controversies. But controversies are not the main-
stay of scientiđc activity. In most of their everyday work, theoreticians are content to
use experimental results that have been validated by a community to which they have
no direct access orwhich—as has been showed in previous chapters— it takes great ef-
fort to migrate into. High-theoreticians generally accept that this trust in experiments
is a natural part of physics:
Tong: At some point I have to take on faith what experimenters tell me.
And so I know that there are important questions that need to be an-
swered: the cosmological constant, dark matter, the spectrum of cosmic
microwave background radiation or Ĕuctuations you can see, problems
in fractional quantum Hall eﬀect or high temperature superconductiv-
ity. I’ve never done of those experiments, and I don’t understand most
of the experiments, but you know I have faith in these problems that need
answering. Because you know if I go away and I start digging so I do un-
derstand the next layer of experiment. […] I’d call it trust, but trust based
on lots of evidence. And trust that I can test it at any time. […]Certainly I
don’t understand the way LHC [CERN’s Large Hadron Collider] works.
But I could. I could sit down and spend three years of my life đguring this
out.
Reyes: Do you know anybody who has?
Tong: Oh yes, I know theoreticians who understand it. I’m sure they
didn’t put a fuse together, but yeah, I know…the peoplewhowork at LHC
full time. ăey could tell youwhat all the quirkswere, what could be going
wrong, what to worry about.
ăis last idea that theoretical physicists can ‘in principle’ always test experiment at
any time is quite common. As another senior theoretician put it,
De la Peña: Experiment is a fundamental guide. Physics is still a science
with experimental foundation. Not necessarily experimental in the sense
of the beginning of the twentieth century, like in the German tradition
where if you did not make experiments you were useless; where experi-
mental physicswas the only kind thatmade any sense. Nowadays it is quite
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clear that you can do excellent theoretical physics without any knowledge
of even how to tighten a screw (is it clockwise or counter-clockwise? I
don’t remember!) It can be done perfectly well. A capable theoretician
can acquire profound and solid physical intuition while being completely
detached from experiment.
He then added,
De la Peña: Nevertheless one must be aware of how the [experimental]
results were arrived at; one must have a clear idea of the limitations of the
experiments so that one can appreciate to what degree what one is doing
is really well-founded. ăeoretical physicists don’t usually know that, but
that is part of the complications in the đeld.
ăis belief in the possibility of reproducing experimental results is part of the lore
of theoretical physics. Despite this common appeal to the ‘openness’ of experimental
results, in practice, the theoretician does not have access to the production of experi-
ment unless he is willing to sacriđce his theoretical career for it. For a theoretician to
appreciate the reach, limitation, origins and the other inner particularities of modern
experimental work would in most cases likely prove practically impossible.Ƴ I will call
this ‘myth’ virtual empiricism: the trust that theoreticians must rely on to take up ex-
perimental results, tied to the belief that a theoretician should have the capacity to fully
understand the experiments that his work is anchored to— either directly, or ‘through’
a colleague to whom the theoreticians has access.ƴ ăis myth asserts that the ability
to understand all scientiđc knowledge is one of science’s intrinsic characteristics, even
when in practice it is through trust in ‘themechanisms of science’ that this comes about.
According to the myth of virtual empiricism science is an open book ready for any-
one willing enough to read it, but from a sociological perspective virtual empiricism
implies trust not in the individuals that produce knowledge, but on the ‘institutions’
of science. Here ‘institution’ is to be understood in a wide sense, as given to it by Ma-
linowski (1944, p. 47, 52) where he considers an institutional system as “the social
ƳAs Collins (1974, 1985, 2004) has shown, the reach of experiments can be uncertain to experi-
menters themselves in their own area of expertise.
ƴI thank Professor Collins for his help in coining the term ‘virtual empiricism’. However, as oĕen
happens with academic matters, the term has some antecedents which only became known to me in the
later stages of the writing process; see Kitcher (1995).
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scheme of organised life”, or “an organised systems of purposeful activities.” Giddens
(1990) has carried out analyses of trust working as an institutional phenomenon and
posits the emergence of this kind of trust as one of the most important characteristics
of modern societies at large. Giddens (1990, 27-28) account of trust in expert systems
oﬀers a theoretical understanding of the mechanisms behind virtual empiricism, dis-
cussing the example how when one enters the upper levels of a house, one has ‘faith’ in
what the architects and builders have done, even though “we know very little about the
codes of knowledge used by the architect and the builder”. ăere is faith in the individ-
ual’s competence (how could I know aĕer all, that either one is competent if I am not
an architect or a buildermyself ), but there is also trust “in the authenticity of the expert
knowledge which they apply — something which I cannot usually check exhaustively
myself.” Sztompka (1999, p. 13) similarly notes that “large segments of the contempo-
rary social world have become opaque for their members. […] More oĕen than not we
have to act in the dark, as if facing a huge black box, on the proper functioning of which
our needs and interests increasingly depend. Trust becomes an indispensable strategy
to deal with the opaqueness of our social environment. Without trust we would be
unable to act.” As with most sociological theorists, Sztompka explains the emergence
of this opaqueness or ‘black-boxing’ as due to the increasing complexity of today’s so-
cial world. Faced with this complexity, the individual is forced to resort to trust expert
systems in order to operate in the wider social settings.
But virtual empiricism also carries along themythos that trust is not a necessity but
a practical choice, one that could be dispensed if the individual were given enough re-
sources.⁴ Nevertheless, the theoretical veriđcation process of experimental results, the
phenomenological domain, is sociologically ‘black-boxed’ by trust. ăe idea of trust at
the collective scale has an important role in social studies of science. Shapin (1994) is
the primary reference in science and technology studies, presenting a historical analy-
sis of how trust in empirical science was established within the 17th century context
of English science through the work of Robert Boyle and other members of the Royal
Society and their ‘gentlemen of science’ inter-personal trust, which gave way to the es-
tablishment of institutionalised trust in empirical physics.
⁴If one analyses the description of the ’norms’ that make up the scientiđc ethos as set out in Merton
(1942), one can understand why the accessibility to the mechanisms of knowledge-production must be
believed to be open to all: ‘universalism’ and communism’, taken not as normative statements but as
doxastic attitudes, underlie the mythos of the virtual empiricism.
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Hence, because of autonomy, the task of deciding whether a particular experimen-
tal result merits recognition can only be settled within an experimental community
itself and high-theoreticians must rely on trust— or perhaps more speciđcally on the
suspension of doubt— on experimental results. ăis phenomenon is well known to
social studies of science, with the existence of deep case studies of how ‘core-sets’ of sci-
entiđc experts are constituted in experimental physics, the core-set being deđned as the
reduced group of experts that can legitimately contribute to an esoteric debate. Collins
(1985) and Pinch (1986) have carried out detailed studies of experimental controver-
sies, where the importance of core-sets becomes more visible than in normal science
since these discussions tend to centre around delimiting who is a relevant expert and
who is not in order to settle the controversy. Pinch (1986, p. 214) discusses how ‘black-
boxing’ scientiđc instrumentation allows it to become widespread outside the context
within which it is created, and how “black-boxed instruments are the carriers of social
relations.” Likewise, the black-boxing of experimental or theoretical results allows for
them to become as much ‘oﬀ-the-shelf ’ knowledge, as Geiger counters or oscilloscopes
are ‘oﬀ-the-shelf ’ technological devices. In this way, black-boxing allows experimen-
tal results or theoretical ‘devices’ to become ‘tried and tested’ knowledge. MacKenzie
(1993, p. 372) has proposed amodel of uncertainty referred to as the ‘certainty trough’,
tomodel diﬀerent attitudes towards ‘established’ technology, which can be extended to
general discussions of certainty and trust in esoteric domains. According toMacKenzie
there are three levels of certainty/ uncertainty depending on the ‘distance’ between the
core-set of an esoteric domain and those outside the domain. Inside the core-set, ‘un-
certainty’ is high because the core-set members are aware of the ‘human’ (onemight say
sociological) dimensions of the knowledge produced. On the borders of the core-set,
the ‘users’ of the technology/ knowledge suspend doubt on the esoteric domain’s prod-
ucts. ăis is in fact the domainof virtual empiricismand lower-level knowledge. Finally
those wholly outside of the user/consumer domain establish a đnal level, one of highest
uncertainty, as they have no sociological connections to the knowledge/technology, or
they follow alternative sources of it.
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4.4 Laboratories as producers of inscriptions: beer-mat
knowedge
Laboratories are thus socially black-boxed spaces to high-theoreticians, churning out
experimental results through mechanisms that are obscure to outsider theoreticians.
One can think literally of a lab as box with concrete walls producing ‘results’ in printed
form for the theoreticians to plug into their work. In their classic ethnographic study of
laboratory science, Latour &Woolgar (1979) use the following metaphor for a molec-
ular biology lab: a laboratory can be represented as a producer of ‘literary inscriptions’.
As one departs from the realm of experimental physics practice and tries to identify
which parts of experimental work enter high-theoretical work, it turns out to be more
than a useful metaphor: high-theoreticians using experimental knowledge are indeed
oĕen times using ’experimental results’ in the form of numbers, data-tables— in short,
inscriptions in the most literal sense.
Latour’s metaphor of laboratories as inscription-producing devices can easily be
restated in Collins & Evans’ model through the horseshoe diagram. When micro-
cultures exhibit large epistemic ‘distance’ between them — when there is no social
bonding that permits interactional expertise to arise— the principal means of trans-
mission of knowledge is through inscription-style beer mat knowledge. ‘Numbers’ and
‘parameters’ in tables and handbooks are simply bits of data which are completely de-
tached from the context within which they are produced. If a physicist has the need to
enter the numerical value for the speed of light in a calculation to produce a numeri-
cal result, or the rest mass of the top quark, or the charge of the electron, this can be
easily solved by going to an appropriate table, without the physicist having any need to
understand anything about the experiment that gives rise to the result. One can easily
imagine a physicist-only pub quiz with questions like, “what is the value of the speed
of sound in paraﬃn?” ăe answer, “1,940 m/s”, would constitute empirical beer-mat
knowledge.
Experimental inscriptions are used in all areas of physics. Experimental and theo-
retical physicists alike oĕen use handbooks of material properties in their work when
they are describing ‘real’ phenomena: these books are usually nothing but long lists of
the measured numerical values of numerous experiments which have become of stan-
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dard usage. Perhaps the best-known handbook is the massive Review of Particle Physics
(RPP)publishedby theParticleDataGroup, a teamofphysicists at theLawrenceBerkley
National Laboratory. “ăe Review”, as its authors proudly state, “has been called the
bible of particle physics. Over the years, it has been cited in 30,000 papers.”ąeReview
is a 1,340 page volume containing the ParticleDataGroup’s “determinations of the best
values for themasses [and other parameters]” of all particles that have been experimen-
tally detected.⁵ Although nowhere near as massive asąeReview, each đeld has its own
similar authoritative data tables, experimental parameter references and review papers,
so that the physicist can just look up the necessary parameters when doing computa-
tions. In its most elementary form, these kind of tables can be seen in any introductory
physics textbook as appendices listing the more important ‘measured constants’ such
as the speed of light, sound, refraction indices, etc. which enable students to solve the
more ‘realistic’ problems.
Latour and Woolgar’s metaphor works perfectly well at this level: long aĕer the
laboratory machines have been turned oﬀ, what will remain for others to use are the
inscriptions produced therein. Although Latour and Woolgar’s metaphor of labs as
producers of inscriptions may have been mostly a methodological proposition, in the
end one can see that in printouts such as the RPP or in material property reviews it
is not such a far-fetched idea. For many theoreticians, experiment enters theory only
through numbers; widely established and trusted numbers to be put into calculations
as free parameters or input values. Aĕer all, part of the advantages of standardisation
that projects such as theRPP oﬀer to the non-experimentalist (or to an experimentalist
who is not an expert in a particular đeld) is the possibility of suspension of doubt, of
fully being able to trust that the tables of data available therein are given ‘facts’.
Mathematics can also be used as beer-mat knowledge. Just as there are empirical
data tables, there are for example encyclopaedias of ‘special functions’ where physicists
can look up how to ‘apply’ a certain technique or how to write down the solution of a
well-knownequation. ăesebooksdonot require that thephysicist knowhowtoderive
the solution or the method, but simply state what the answer is. In pure mathematics,
a theoretician can also point to a particular theorem that says that a certain physical
equation has or lacks a solution, without needing to derive it, or understand where it
⁵Introduction by M. Barnett, head of the Particle Data Group: http://pdg.lbl.gov/2010/
html/what_is_pdg.html
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comes from. Likewise, soĕware likeMathematica allows theoreticians to harness the
power of black-boxed calculation soĕware without the need of fully comprehending
the mechanisms that give rise to computational results.
4.5 UnderstandingLatour’s inscriptionswithin a general
model of expertise
A particular problem arises with Latour and Woolgar’s account — or at least at odds
with the model of communication presented here — in that there seems to be a gen-
eralisation of inscriptions as themechanism for transmission of knowledge in science.
Latour and Woolgar downplay the fact that inscriptions, or beer-mat knowledge— is
only one of a number of types of knowledge that can be exchanged between scientists,
as they constantly make reference to how established knowledge is the point of con-
tact between diﬀerent ‘lab cultures’; Latour & Woolgar (1979, p. 66) write that “the
inscriptions devices, skills, and machines which are now current have oĕen featured in
the past literature of another Ėeld. […]ăe apparatus and craĕ skills present in one đeld
thus embody the end results of debate or controĂersy in some other Ėeld and make these
results available within the walls of the laboratory (emphasis added).”
Contrary to this position, Collins & Evans recognise that the transmission of beer-
mat knowledge is only part of the story. Moreover, the present work argues that under-
lying the establishment of ‘facts’ there is a sociological process of black-boxing through
sociological trust, a mechanism which Latour andWoolgar never allude to, preferring
the term ‘reiđcation’—which seems to carry with it a lot of rhetorical possibilities, but
little sociological content. In fact, analysing theoretical physics up close shows that
in collaborative settings theoreticians communicate through a collection of strategies
which Latour and Woolgar’s account does not give suﬃcient justice to. Whether this
is due to Latour andWoolgar having centred their case study in the biological sciences
and not in the physical onesmay partly explain the diﬀerence, as perhaps the dominant
form of knowledge transfer in biology is of beer-mat type. Nevertheless, it is highly
unlikely that the transmission of knowledge in biology is exempt from the other types
of interactions considered by Collins & Evans.
It is also possible that the tension between Latour’s approach (both in the cited
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work and in later developments) and Collins’ explanatory framework is due to deep
methodological disagreements on how to study science, society and cultures at large.
Although in Latour&Woolgar (1979, p. 39) the authors openly avow an anthropolog-
ical method of “participant observation”, the understanding of the term is very distant
to themethod of “participant comprehension” as understood byCollins (seeChapter 0
of this work). Latour&Woolgar (1979, Postcript, p. 278) for example insists that their
methodology follows Schutz’s prescription of the observer becoming ‘the stranger’ in-
side the place of observation, so that the authors choose to “portray the laboratory as
seen through the eyes of a total newcomer. ăe notion of anthropological strangeness
is used to depict the activities of the laboratory as those of a remote culture and to thus
explore the way in which an ordered account of the laboratory life can be generated
without recourse to the explanatory concepts of the inhabitants themselĂes”. ăus while
Collinsmaintains a version of sociologywhere the description of the scientiđc form-of-
life begins by gaining an insider’s understanding, Latour andWoolgar promote a view
where the sociological description begins with an explicit non-understanding of an ob-
served ‘alien tribe’ whose form-of-life the authors are openly wanting to destabilise. In
other methodological issues there is much in common between these authors, so that
in fact this apparently innocuous — but in reality deep — methodological diﬀerence
may have become lost among other debates. ⁶
4.6 Popular understanding of experiments
One would expect that theoreticians closer to experimenters develop ‘higher’ forms of
knowledge, which includes rational reconstructions of experiments and a mild com-
prehension of the experimental process that is absent from beer-mat knowledge. ‘Pop-
ular understanding’ can be understood as a form of rational reconstructions. A central
purpose of scientiđc popular understanding literature is for a wider audience to ‘under-
⁶Collins’ approach may seem to have a foot in each side of the sociology/anthropology divide, thus
contrasting with Latour and Woolgars quasi-positivist project — at least as stated in Laboratory Life.
From a similar theoretical position, Bourdieu— himself deeply inĔuenced byWittgenstein and consid-
erations of tacit knowledge — has similarly noted how underlying a lot of modern sociology there is a
“mistaken” theoretical presupposition that the researcher can indeed treat social phenomena as external
to his own theoretical schemata; see Lamaison (1986). For a general analysis of the inĔuence of the tacit
knowledge concept andWittgenstein on Bourdieu’s oeuvre, see Gerrans (2005).
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stand’ a piece of science better. Popular science books aim not just to convey facts, but
to present a sketch of how facts are produced, the ‘oﬃcial’ history behind their pro-
duction, and the rational reconstruction behind a scientiđc fact. Mellor (2003, p. 512)
points out the role of popular science ‘expository books’ which are “structured around
the exposition of a particular scientiđc discipline. ăis may include a narrative about
the history of the discipline, but the emphasis is on a particular subject or theme and
its logical consistency or empirical basis, rather than on a particular story.”
An example of ‘popular’ understanding of experiment by theoreticians is knowl-
edge about the Lorentz force, an important phenomenon used in many physics experi-
mentswhereby a chargedparticlemoving in amagnetic đeld experiences a force perpen-
dicular to both the đeld and the particle motion. Studying it is part of any undergrad-
uate electromagnetism course. It is used, for example, in cyclotron accelerators that
make charged particles move faster and faster using a combination of two electrodes
and a magnetic đeld. ăe Lorentz force ‘bends’ the particle’s trajectory, and keeps the
accelerated particles inside the machine. ăe equations to describe the motion can be
easily understood by anyone with a ‘minimal’ physics background. Any physicist can
understand the general mechanism that makes a cyclotron work, which is in essence
the Lorentz force, but of course this does not imply that any physicist can actually go
and build one or operate one without spending a non-trivial amount of time attempt-
ing to do it. Any theoretician knows similar ‘basic principles’ behind plenty of modern
experiments, and in many cases would be able to understand a general description of
the ones that are unfamiliar in a ‘popular’ talk by an experimenter.
‘Popular understanding’ of mathematics can come about, for example, by brows-
ing through the proof of a theorem, even if the full fundamental proof is not worked
out step by step. A superđcial read over a proof, or the ‘bare bones’ of a proof as is of-
fered in many theoretical textbooks gives some insight into the mathematical nature of
a theorem or method, even if mathematical-level rigour is not provided. An important
means to acquire knowledge beyond the beer-mat level, one that is found in all physics
institutions, is the organisation of seminars and colloquia:
Romero: One thing that I think is crucial to both theoreticians and ex-
perimentalists, is going to seminars. Seminars open you up. It’s a funny
thing, when you go to a seminar for the đrst time because you understand
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nothing. Absolutely nothing! And as years go by you look back and you
say, “hey, this is the same thing which that guy talked about a long time
ago.” For example, I was never an expert, but I grew to know quite well, on
the surface, the topic of superconductivity at high temperatures because it
was discovered at the time when I was a PhD student, in 1986. I was do-
ing something else, but there were somany seminars about it and I went to
so many seminars about it; and I knew about superconductors type one,
two and three; or what Anderson had said about it; or about RGVB, the
Resonating Valence BondApproximation; about tight binding. And only
from going to seminars, without sitting down to read even a single paper!
Of course, that does not make you an expert, nor does it enable you to
work on that topic. It’s baggage that you acquire.
Seminar talks also make reference to the classic or foundational publications in the
đeld, as well as current developments, and usually end with an ‘open problems in the
đeld’ slide topoint outwhat the community deđnes as interesting (legitimate!) research
lines. A time for questions is usually allotted at the end of the talk, when the audience
has a brief chance to interact with the speaker (one may also use this time to massage
the speaker’s ego, or to break into an open argument with the speaker; Q&A time can
sometimes be the most exciting part of the seminar to witness a good sparring round
between colleagues).
Seminars function as popular introduction to esoteric topics, but they are also grounds
formeeting and interactingwithmembers of other groups, thereby also imparting small
amounts of tacit knowledge to attendants. ăus, although he never became ‘an expert’,
in being able to ‘understand’ a lot of talk about superconductors aĕer having attended
many seminars on the topic Romero is exhibiting medium-range levels of interactional
expertise in the đeld.
4.7 Primary source knowledge
Given suﬃcient familiarity with an experimental topic, theoreticians may take up and
consult experimental publications. Yet most experimental publications only approx-
imately reproduce what an experiment was really like when being performed. Read-
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ing an experimental paper probably gives insight into some of the technical aspects of
an experiment complimentary to that a seminar would, but the insight is limited to a
polished account of the main points that the author wants to highlight. Just as a pub-
lished theoretical paper is a ređned exposition of the results of a lot of work carried out
on paper, blackboard and computers, experimental publications are ređned versions of
months or even years spent at theworkbench or lab. Again, this is due to the fact that in
order to understand a piece of physics— theoretical or experimental— surpasses what
can be transmitted in terms of explicit knowledge, and in a short session. Otherwise,
all that theoreticians would need to do to ‘connect’ with experimenters or ‘understand’
their work would be to read their publications, or attend their talks. Nevertheless, I
have shown that high-theoreticians tend to not to use these publications directly, even
in cases like Romero’s where the interaction has been prolonged. It is still however
possible that theoreticians can consult experimental primary sources directly aĕer long
exposure to phenomenological work.
4.8 Asymmetries between theory and experiment
Although experiment and theory share epistemic power, it should also be pointed out
that the trust necessary to support a theoretical result and an experimental result to
the outside world is asymmetrically distributed. ăe amount of trust that a physicist
is willing to put in another physicist from a diﬀerent domain is important when one
considers the asymmetry between the time and eﬀort it takes to develop and carry out
experimental and theoretical research programmes. Whereas serious theoretical work
is relatively easy to ‘set up’ for—asmany of the interviewees noted—a lot of theoretical
work involves simply playing around with ideas, concepts and equations, experimental
work generally requires much more temporal and material investment in deđnitive re-
search directions. ăeoretical research programs because of their non-materiality are
much more Ĕexible than experiment. One oĕen đnds that theoreticians involve them-
selves in several research lines at the same time, even when these are usually connected
by some underlying themes,
Tong: It’s impossible for experimenters to be that ‘Ĕighty’ [as us theo-
reticians] just because for a particle physics experiment, the run-up time
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is about twenty-đve years but even for a condensed matter experiment it
takes a couple of years to get things up-and-running. You can’t just switch
and change that easily. So people working in those groups are just tied to
doing that. Probably if you get more towards the mathematical side…it’s
easy for me. I just throw a bunch of papers on my desk, print out a bunch
more and just sit there with pen and paper and just start playing. So that’s
why I suspect the more Ĕighty theoretical physicists are on the more the-
oretical side. […]
…in contrast with the material ‘investment’ that experimentation oĕen requires,
Volke: Sometimes problems come up which lead to delays. Here [in the
lab] sometimes the time between the request for a piece of equipment and
its delivery can be a couple of months or up to a year. You have to adapt to
those changes and always have a plan B. In experiment, you always have to
have a plan B. You have to think about it, or you will have to start think-
ing about itwhen anunpredicted event appears. [As an experimenter] you
begin to work slightly diﬀerent. On one hand there’s teamwork, and hav-
ing to rely on other people. On the other hand, adapting yourself…it can
happen when you’re working in theoretical problem that you have a clear
idea of where you want to go, that you begin down a road and it wasn’t
the correct one and you have to take another one. You also need a plan B
there. But as far as methodology goes you probably đnd fewer surprises.
ăis has strong implications concerning the amount of trust that is invested in the-
oretical and experimental results. If an experimenter is aware that a research program
will very likely cover his entire professional lifetime, this translates into a very serious
investment of personal resources, and of the necessity for a lot more stability of trust
relationships. One would not be likely to spend twenty years setting up an experiment
to discover or probe a certain physical phenomena that is highly unlikely to exist.
Pinch (1986) carried out a study on solar neutrino detection that includes an anal-
ysis of the interaction between Davis’ experimental project and Bahcall’s theoretical
(phenomenological) analysis of Davis’ ‘anomalous’ results. Pinch describes howDavis’
“openness and his willingness to consider all criticisms [were] mentioned by most re-
spondents as one of themain reasons why they believe this experiment is good”, despite
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the fact that the results were at somepoints heavily criticised and ‘in contradiction’with
Bahcall’s predictions. A decrease in the community’s belief and trust in Davis’ results
would have entailed the failure of a project with high investments— in terms of time,
money and reputation— inwhich several high-prođle physicist (experimental and the-
oretical) had stakes.
In contrast, Bahcall was allowed signiđcantly more Ĕexibility. Bahcall’s initial pre-
dictions were in conĔict withDavis’ results, and for a while he was severly disheartened
by the mismatch between his predictions and Davis’ experiments. Nevertheless, aĕer
the initial disappointmentBahcall’s position evolved froman eﬀort to đndmechanisms
so as to make the mismatch less signiđcant, to a later position where the mismatch was
fully embraced as a pointer to the existence of ‘new physics’. Although Bahcalls ‘Ĕexi-
bility’ was attacked by a handful of theoreticians, the community at large did not shun
this strategy.
Although both Davis and Bahcall relied on their good reputation and standing
within their communities, the need to establish the đrmness and stability of the results
was important only in the experimental context, which Davis did very successfully by
the close links he had established with the astrophysical community with which he was
in constant dialogue, butwithout ever challenging their authority in their owndomain.
Davis subjected his experiment to a number of ‘calibration’ tests suggested by the astro-
physics community which although “largely a waste of time in terms of his immediate
experimental goals”, Pinch (1986, p. 174) describes as having served “an important
ritual function in satisfying the nuclear astrophysicists, and thereby boosting the cred-
ibility of his experiment.”
4.9 Trust as the substratum of long distance interactions
between theoretical and empirical physics
I have argued in this chapter that for physics that is epistemically ‘far’ from experi-
ment, the main sociological mechanism for knowledge exchange is the establishment
of trust, the idea having been complemented by Collins & Evan’s classiđcation of the
‘depth’ which this knowledge can achieve. I have also argued that at its most extreme
distance, knowledge exchanges happen in the form of ‘inscriptions’ which Latour de-
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scribes. However, these sociological mechanisms are hidden behind the veil of virtual
empiricism so that in most cases physicists are only partially aware that the empirical
content of their theories are in most cases very indirectly sourced. I have concentrated
on the way that theoreticians take up experimental work in this chapter, but an analysis
of how theory interacts with its other pole of inĔuence, mathematics, will be carried
out in the next chapter where trust-based mechanisms will also be shown to be at play
to bridge the epistemic divide between theory and ‘pure’ mathematics.
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CHAPTER 5
Truﬆ and proofs in mathematics and high-theory
Ŭaiĭ,
Ŭaiĭ ĝ an ĝland in ĭe sċting sun,
Ũut proof, yes,
Ŷroof ĝ ĭe bottom line for everyone.
—Ŷ. Źimon, Ěom ‘Ŷroof ’
Ŷroof—n. ūvidence having a shademore of plaĮibilityĭan of unlikelihood.
Ƈe teﬆimony of two credible witnesses Ć opposed to ĭć of only one.
—ŧ.Ũierce, ‘ƇeŪevil’s ŪiĊionary’
5.1 Trust andmathematical proofs
ăeprevious chapter has shown that when theoreticians that are epistemically far from
experiment use experimental knowledge, they do so as inscriptions and rational recon-
structions that are manufactured by laboratories, which to theoreticians are cultural,
social and linguistic ‘black-boxes’. Nevertheless, it was also argued that pure theoreti-
cians occasionally migrate to physics that is closer to experiment, and this process has
been described as a long and arduous task that requires prolonged exposure and dia-
logue with laboratory scientists. ăe greatest barrier to overcome in understanding a
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foreign culture is the transfer of tacit knowledge. ăis chapter will set out a deđni-
tion and typology of tacit knowledge that will then prove useful in giving clarity to
the problem of knowledge transfer when theoreticians choose to reach out to another
‘micro-culture’ or expertise domain directly — pure mathematics — which is as au-
tonomous from theoretical physics as is experiment, and to analyse how speciđc types
of tacit knowledge impinge on mathematics and physics.
Epistemic autonomy is intimately connected to the deđnition of expertises and ex-
pert languages in esoteric domains, and to the tacit knowledge components that make
up specialist expertise. Tomaster the language of an esoteric expertise means to master
the tacit knowledge of the domain, not just the explicit dimension. ăe importance
of tacit knowledge in mathematical proofs and theorems is particularly interesting, be-
cause it is oĕen claimed that mathematical derivations are one of the few instances of
science where one is likely to đnd a minimal levels of tacit knowledge. I will show that
although certain parts ofmathematical culture do indeed aim tominimise certain types
of tacit knowledge, this cannot be generalised to all practices of professional mathe-
maticians (and even less to that of theoretical physicists), and that tacit knowledge is
inextricable from even the most formalist mathematics.
5.2 Relational tacit knowledge in theoretical physics
Mathematics is said to be ‘the language’ of physics, and it is a primary form of repre-
sentation of theoretical work. ăere are many advantages to presenting theoretical re-
sults in a mathematical form: concreteness, exactness, etc. Being a ‘universal’ language,
mathematical equations allow a result to be presented in a way that is more accessible
to more individuals than resorting to ordinary languages. Or so the story goes. In fact,
reading amathematical or theoretical paper is not straightforward at all, even for an ex-
pert with an excellent mathematical background. In fact, mathematics can sometimes
obscure a paper. ăe reason for this is that even the most highly mathematical papers
make use of tacit knowledge.
Most physicists skim trough themajority of theoretical or mathematically oriented
papers they come across, and only devote their time to understanding and analysing the
steps of only a few select readings of particular importance. Step-by-step analysis of the
deductive steps in a theoretical paper is far from simple and can become a painstaking
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process, evenwhen it is taken for granted that the deduction follows themost primitive
rules of mathematical logic:
Mitchison: I certainly read extremely carefully about one paper amonth, I
would say, to the extent that I actually go through everything in it; tracking
down references, working out the calculations myself and đnding them
not quite right and so on. So I think there is some body of things that
people really read extremely carefullywhen it is close towhat they’re doing
and it’s sort of exciting in some way. […] I presume that’s the absolutely
standard pattern of physicists.
ăeoreticians oĕenpoint out thatwhen theoretical papers arewrittenwithout clearly
stating many of the intermediate steps in the deductive chains of reasoning it is out of
practical considerations. However, practicality can, paradoxically, lead to major obfus-
cations in the original argument:
Mitchison: I think thatpapers inmathematics for instance are constructed
out of lies almost. I think people do a terrible thingwhich is that they hide
the origin of ideas. So it happens again and again… you’re reading a col-
league’s paper and you really can’t get anywhere, and then you go and you
say, “look, I’m having trouble with this. Can you explain it?” and he’ll say
“no, you should really think of it like this: that’s a Fourier coeﬃcient or
something” and then in two seconds you’ve got it! And the way he’s writ-
ten the paper to conform to this idiotic notion of a reasoned argument has
hidden it. And people actually strive to hide the truth through papers.
What we see in these observations is that mathematical physics papers ‘assume’ vast
amounts of relational tacit knowledge. When the author is one’s colleague sitting in an
oﬃce down the corridor, the relational tacit knowledge can quickly be made explicit.
Usually, this is not the case, and one is leĕ to try to work out the missing information,
a task that can eventually consume a very long time. Sometimes, seminars or study
groups may be organised exclusively for a research group to probe particular papers
and work out the missing information. A typical exercise that is oĕen leĕ for aspiring
theoretical researchers in the earliest stages of their careers by their tutors is to take
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home a particularly relevant or paper in the đeld of expertise at hand, and to try to
‘work out’ the argument step by step:
Mondragón: ăe đrst thing [to do with a new student] is to get a general
overall picture and acquire certainbasic knowledge so thatwe can commu-
nicate. I set them to work on more particular things before they actually
get to know everything in the đeld, because if you wait for them to get
the large picture then by the time they do everything has already moved
forward and you will never be independent. You obviously have to read
and solve problems from textbooks, but the best way is to have to face a
problem on your own, even if it is a small one, and to work on it yourself.
Aĕer basic knowledge is acquired, I make them solve something that they
have never done in their life by themselves, like to reproduce a calculation:
a research level calculation in a published article. I tell them to prove to
me whether a certain publication is right or wrong. Or if I have a new but
not extremely diﬃcult problem I ask them to đnd the solution. I think
that there is something like a phase transition, from themoment that they
are passively solving textbook problems as student to the moment when
they have to think and use their own research tools and to look in books
and use the knowledge at hand. Or to try to đgure out what it is they are
missing to solve a problem, say, not knowing group theory; then they have
to learn group theory. Up to now, it has been a good strategy. I don’t give
themđnished problemswhere they only have to do a small calculation and
run a computer program. One student once askedme, “Whydo this prob-
lem if you already know how to handle it?” Well, I told him that I had a
program that could do it, and it could only be a matter of him pushing a
button, but he would learn nothing. I told him aĕer he had solved it we
could checkwithmy program if what he had donewas correct. But he had
to do it from scratch, with whatever tools he had at hand; Mathematica,
FORTRAN, whatever he could do it with. A lot of people panic at that
point, but in general there is a positive change of attitude, at the beginning
because it is their đrst time in a situation like this.
ăe technique ofmaking the student face a real problemhas two functions: to force
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the student to hone skills in relational tacit identiđcation and elucidation, and to in-
troduce the student to the particular relational tacit knowledge of the specialty đeld in
which the student has chosen to do research. ăe student is in fact being taught two
things: to correctlymake the explicit-to-tacit and tacit-to-explicit translations without
supervision, and for this to be recognised as ‘the way the đeld works’. Students who
manage to become prođcient experts and eventually publish in the đeld will ‘naturally’
recognise the relational tacit knowledge that need not be stated for other insiders. It
will be eliminated and black-boxed, just as a master chef hides the basic methodology
in a written recipe. ăe student through immersion picks up which is the knowledge
that can legitimately be kept tacit. ăe more relational tacit knowledge available to a
practitioner, the better performance one should expect. ăis phenomenon of tacit ‘in-
trojection’ is eloquently described by Field medallist mathematician ăurston (1994,
p. 167):
Mathematics in some sense has a common language: a language of sym-
bols, technical deđnitions, computations, and logic. ăis language eﬃ-
ciently conveys some, but not all, modes ofmathematical thinking. Math-
ematicians learn to translate certain things almost unconsciously fromone
mental mode to the other, so that some statements quickly become clear.
Diﬀerent mathematicians study papers in diﬀerent ways, but when I read
a mathematical paper in a đeld in which I’m conversant, I concentrate on
the thoughts that are between the lines. Imight look over several paragraphs
or strings of equations and think to myself ”Oh yeah, they’re putting in
enough rigmarole to carry such-and-such idea.” When the idea is clear,
the formal setup is usually unnecessary and redundant—I oĕen feel that
I could write it out myself more easily than đguring out what the authors
actually wrote. It’s like a new toaster that comes with a 16-page manual.
If you already understand toasters and if the toaster looks like previous
toasters you’ve encountered, you might just plug it in and see if it works,
rather than đrst reading all the details in the manual.
People familiar with ways of doing things in a subđeld recognise various
patterns of statements or formulas as idioms or circumlocution for certain
concepts or mental images. But to people not already familiar with what’s
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going on the same patterns are not very illuminating; they are oĕen even
misleading. ąe language is not alive except to those who use it. (emphasis
added)
ăe diﬃculty inherent to successfully learning a new technique or of solving open
problem has been referred to as ‘hardness’ in studies of veterinary surgical procedures
in previous STS work by Pinch et al. (1996, 1997). Pinch et al propose that the skill
learning process is optimally carried out using the ‘enculturation’model, where the pro-
cess of learning is carried out during the performance of the relevant actions where the
skills are involved. ăis is juxtaposed to an ‘algorithmic’ model, where the skill transfer
is carried out through the acquisition of declarative knowledge. Pinch et al argue that
the enculturation model is preferred over the algorithmic one because skilled practice
comprises mostly the application of tacit and not procedural knowledge. Although the
importance of tacit knowledge is stressed (for example, by introducing a surgical version
of the experimenter’s regress for surgical procedures), there is an incomplete diﬀerenti-
ation between the three types of tacit knowledge involved in hardness; this work being
previous toCollins (2010), somatic tacit knowledge—as an individual skill— and rela-
tional tacit knowledge— as unstated but expressible knowledge— are mentioned, but
not clearly diﬀerentiated as two distinct classes of knowledge.
Pinch et al suggest that in studying skill transfermechanisms, hardness itself is an es-
timable quantity (estimable by a prođcient expert), and could be used as an indicator for
a new skill-learner to identify the success or failure of skill-learning or replication pro-
cesses. In this sense, hardness is a ‘second-level’ explicit indicator about the acquisition
of tacit knowledge. An example is a laboratory attempting to replicate the experiment
of an independent lab working solely from the published literature. A low indicator of
hardness would mean a technique expected to be replicable in a relatively short time,
while high levels of hardness would signify that an experiment can be expected to take
a long time to replicate. A hardness indicator would not make the acquisition easier,
but could be a guide for the replicating lab to know if they are more or less working in
the right direction.
In theoretical physics, a sense of the hardness of a particular problem is a handy
skill in trying to recognise whether a particular pathway or an initial solution will lead
somewhere signiđcant or not. Berry in fact uses hardness to assess how to approach the
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tutoring of new graduate students
Berry: You quickly realisewhether somebody is somebodywhowill have a
broad view and đnd problemswithin the area that I proposed or amwork-
ing on, which is why they come to me in the đrst place, or whether it’s
somebody who is very focused and needs to have their hand held and to
be told ‘Now do this. Now do this.’ ăere are diﬀerent kinds, diﬀerent
sorts. So I give them some little problem, where I know the answer or I
know there will be an answer which I deliberately don’t work out. I want
to see if they can do it.
As Berry explained, this is not an easily deđned skill, but more like a ‘feeling’ that
one gets aĕermuch experience, andwhich he himself uses to gaugewhether his solution
to particular problems are headed in a good direction.
Reyes: When you’re working on a problem… I suppose it’s a hard question
to answer… from when you đrst see the problem to when you’re actually
thinking you’re on the right path, is there a point where you realise ‘Yes! I
think I’m on the right path!’?
Berry: Yes, there is. ăat point comes at diﬀerent times for diﬀerent prob-
lems. Some of them I don’t understand right away, I put them away, come
back years later. Sometimes things come very quickly, and really, they
come in a day sometimes; sometimes years. And here is a concept which
I think is useful. I should write it, I mean to do so, which is the follow-
ing. It concerns exactly this realisation. What is the elementary particle
of sudden understanding, the ‘clariton’? ăis concept is very useful. Ev-
erybody knows immediately what it means. It’s a sudden, ‘Ah! I know!’
Unfortunately, there are also anti-claritons that come the next day and an-
nihilate the one you had yesterday. So one’s intellectual life is a succession
of clariton/anti-clariton events. One hopes there’s an odd number, so in
the end you have at least a clariton. Oh, there are little ones, claritinos,
just little tiny ones that give you pleasure when you write a technical pa-
per. Nobody will ever be as excited as you, but it gives you great pleasure,
just like a carpenter who made a cupboard and he knows that somewhere
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in the cupboard is a drawer with absolutely perfect joints. Nobody ex-
cept him knows, but it smoothly works, the cupboard drawer; the private
pleasure. ăen there’s the bigger pleasures, that everyone understands. So
there are diﬀerentmagnitudes of claritons. ăen there are ambi-claritons;
you’re not quite sure whether something sudden that you realise is good
or bad news. And that happens too.
5.3 ăe role of rigour in puremathematics
If mathematical and theoretical papers are loaded with tacit knowledge, then what is
their advantage? In order to understand this, onemust understand the role of ‘rigour’ in
modern mathematics, or the idea that if a mathematical result is proven by mathemati-
cians, then it is as close to ‘hardcore clear truth’ as anyone can get. Modern mathemat-
ical practice is constituted around the idea that one should be able to logically support
all mathematical statements, theorems and results. In order to achieve this, mathemati-
cians do not only posit mathematical statements, but must accompany them with for-
mal proofs. Proofs— logical proofs, many if not most of them based on set theoretic
constructions developed in the past two centuries— are an important part of modern
mathematics since the early 19th century.Ʋ In fact, proving that a certain mathematical
relation holds true is held by many to be what mathematical practice is mostly about
nowadays. Mathematical proofs have an air of transcendent truth that permeates the
popular view of how truth, proof, universality and mathematics are all interlinked. A
typical example is encapsulated in the following quote from a popular science webpage
Inmathematics you can’t just say that something is true; you have to prove
it. Mathematical proofs have to be rigorous. ăis means that they have to
hold true regardless of what test youmay apply to them. If they don’t, they
aren’t proofs at all.Ƴ
ƲEuler was famous for having discovered many deep theorems in pure mathematics which were pro-
vided with either no proof, or with proofs that would not pass modern mathematical standards. See
Polya (1978) for a discussion of Euler’s theorem on polyhedra, a case that was also analysed in depth by
Lakatos (1976).
Ƴ“Basic methods of mathematical proof ”, BBC’s h2g2 webpage, available at: http://www.bbc.
co.uk/dna/h2g2/A387470.
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However, things are not as quite as simple as that. ăe importance of proofs in
mathematics changes across time and cultures, and even for contemporary mathemati-
cians there is a wide spectrum of opinion as to the importance of proofs in practical
mathematics, the reliability of published proofs, and even of whether proofs are the
most important part of mathematical truth or not.ƴ Because in theoretical physics
mathematics plays such an important role, it is useful to illustrate the role of proofs in
mathematics and to then contrast it to that in physics to understand howmathematics
enters theoretical practice. ăis discussion will also serve to illustrate how mathemat-
ical proofs, the epitome of explicit truth if there ever was one, cannot escape from the
inĔuence of the tacit any more than any other human construction can.
In the early 1990s an interesting discussionwas carried out in themathematics com-
munity concerning the usage of ‘rigorous proofs’ inmathematical papers inwhichmany
of the most important living mathematicians were involved. ăe discussion started af-
ter the appearance of a paper by mathematicians Jaﬀe & õuinn (1993) that proposed
the segregation, in practice and in formal teaching, ofmathematics into two areas: “the-
oretical mathematics” and “formal mathematics”. Jaﬀe and õuinn (J&Q hereaĕer) be-
gan their article by writing
Modernmathematics is nearly characterised by the use of rigorous proofs.
ăis practice, the result of literally thousands of years of ređnement, has
brought to mathematics a clarity and reliability unmatched by any other
science. But it also makes mathematics slow and diﬃcult; it is arguably
the most disciplined of human intellectual activities.
Groups and individuals within the mathematics community have from
time to time tried being less compulsive about details of arguments. ăe
results have been mixed, and they have occasionally been disastrous. Yet
today in certain areas there is again a trend toward basingmathematics on
intuitive reasoning without proof.⁴
J&Qwent on to describe what they see are the two stages of mathematical produc-
tion, the ‘theoretical’ phase in which “intuitive insights are developed, conjectures are
ƴSee Kleiner (1991) for a concise historical review of changing perspectives on proofs within math-
ematics.
⁴Jaﬀe &õuinn (1993, p. 1)
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made, and speculative outlines of justiđcations are suggested”, and the ‘rigorous phase’,
in which “the conjectures and speculations are corrected; they are made reliable by
proving them.” ăe choice of name for the ‘theoretical’ phase was chosen to show an
innovative insight into the practice of both mathematics and physics, for J&Q note
that⁵
ăe initial stages of mathematical discovery— namely, the intuitive and
conjectural work, like theoretical work in the sciences— involves specu-
lations on the nature of reality beyond established knowledge. ăus we
borrow our name “theoretical” from this use in physics.
ăeoretical work requires correction, ređnement, and validation through
experiment or proof. ăus we claim that the role of rigorous proof in
mathematics is functionally analogous to the role of experiment in the nat-
ural sciences. ăis thesis may be unfamiliar but aĕer reĔection should be
clear at least to mathematicians. Proofs serve two main purposes. First,
proofs proĂide a way to ensure the reliability of mathematical claims, just as
laboratory veriĖcation proĂides a check in other sciences. Second, the act of
đnding a proof oĕen yields, as a by-product, new insights and unexpected
new data, just as does work in the laboratory. (emphasis added)
J&Q also noted that
Mathematicians may have even better experimental access to mathemati-
cal reality than the laboratory sciences have to physical reality. ăis is the
point of modelling: a physical phenomenon is approximated by a mathe-
matical model; then the model is studied precisely because it is more ac-
cessible. ăis accessibility also has had consequences for mathematics on
a social level. Mathematics is much more đnely subdivided into subdisci-
plines than physics, because the methods have permitted a deeper pene-
tration into the subject matter.
ăe rest of the paper argues two points. ăe đrst is that mathematics’ relationship
with theoretical physics has generally been synergetic for both disciplines, particularly
⁵Jaﬀe &õuinn (1993, p. 2)
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in the way that theoretical physics has invited progress in ‘theoretical’ mathematics,
mentioning đeld theory and E. Witten’s superstrings as important examples. But sec-
ondly, J&Q note that “these physicists are still working in the speculative and intuitive
mode of theoretical physics. Many have neither training for nor interest in rigor. ăey
are doing theoretical mathematics.” ăis is ironic, for in the physics community string
theorists are oĕen accused of being toomathematical and far too rigorous. J&Q’s paper
goes on to work out the distinction between the speculative and hypothetical practice
of ‘theory’ and the conđrmatory validation process supplied by ‘rigour’. J&Q note that
even amongst mathematicians, there are those who are more theory-oriented, some-
times exasperating to a great degree many of their fellow ’rigourists’.⁶
J&Qđnally warnedmathematicians about how the level of rigour in even themost
mathematically-oriented theoretical physics paper is rarely comparable in its rigour to
that found in any typical mathematics paper. Because of the rise of the ‘rigour’ school
in mathematics during the past two centuries, no ‘theoretical’ proposal, no matter how
brilliant, can be considered đnalised or complete unless it passes rigorous đlters. J&Q
ended their article by severely warning the mathematical community against bringing
up new generations of mathematicians solely in the theoretical school, for “most stu-
dents who try to dive directly into the heady world of theory without such a [disci-
plined and rigorous] background are unsuccessful. Failure to distinguish between the
two types of activity can lead students to try to emulate the more glamorous and less
disciplined aspects and to end up unable to do more than manipulate jargon.”⁷
5.4 Responses to Jaﬀe andõuinn
ăurston (1994, p. 164) replied to J&Q’s paper arguing that the importance of rigour
in mathematics is real but overstated by J&Q, and is only one of many resources in the
development of mathematical though and technique:
Intuition, association, metaphor. People have amazing facilities for sens-
ing somethingwithout knowingwhere it comes from (intuition); for sens-
ing that some phenomenon or situation or object is like something else
⁶Jaﬀe &õuinn (1993, p. 4)
⁷Jaﬀe &õuinn (1993, p. 9)
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(association); and for building and testing connections and comparisons,
holding two things in mind at the same time (metaphor). ăese facili-
ties are quite important for mathematics. Personally, I put a lot of eﬀort
into ”listening” to my intuitions and associations, and building them into
metaphors and connections. ăis involves a kind of simultaneous quiet-
ing and focusing of my mind. Words, logic, and detailed pictures rattling
around can inhibit intuitions and associations. (emphasis added)⁸
ăurston’s account opposes that of J&Q’s by defending an intuitionist perception
of mathematical practice. J&Q were worried about the possibility of allowing ‘theo-
retical’ mathematics too much leeway. ăe opening line of the essay abstract asks, “Is
speculative mathematics dangerous? ăurston claimed that J&Q’s account of mathe-
matical practice had more in common with a deđnition-theorem-proof caricature of
mathematics than with actual mathematical practice, a point also highlighted by Berry
Berry: Youwill đndmathematicianswho say thatunless youwriteăeorem-
Proof-Corollary-Lemmayou arenotdoingmathematics. Well, then to an-
noy them I quote Renéăom, a very great mathematician, Fields medal-
list, ‘Any imbecile can prove theorems.’ I don’t believe it, but you know,
quoting him, one of the most creative mathematicians of the 20th cen-
tury. So he said mathematics is not about proving theorems; it’s about
understanding. Feynman said, ‘A great deal more is known than has been
proved.’ ăat’s deliberately provocative because they have a narrow, par-
ticular view of knowledge. It’s not where I choose to be.
J&Q’s paper created quite a stir in the mathematics community, prompting replies
from many mathematicians. Atiyah presented a response that generally agreed with
J&Q’s account, but criticised it for presenting “a sanitised view of mathematics which
condemns the subject to an arthritic old age.”⁹ Atiyah argues that there are many in-
stances of mathematicians that have empowered great advances in modern mathemat-
ics, mainly the oĕ-quoted cases of Witten, Euler and Ramanujan; he also mentions
that Jaﬀe’s version could be inĔuenced too much by his work theoretical physics back-
ground, “Jaﬀe represents the school of mathematical physicists who view their role as
⁸ăurston (1994, p. 65)
⁹Atiyah et al. (1994, p. 178)
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providing rigorous proofs for the doubtful practices of physicists. ăis is a commend-
able objective with a distinguished history. However, it rarely excites physicists who
are exploring the front line of their subject. Whatmathematicians can rigorously prove
is rarely a hot topic in physics.” Borel also objected to J&Q’s essay, which he saw as
an unnecessary exercise of “pundits who issue prescriptions or guidelines for presum-
ably less enlightened mortals” noting that Weil had readily advocated for the utility of
intuitive mathematics without much criticism; Borel was conđdent that the proofs ob-
viously required by mathematics always come by their own accord, for mathematics is
self-correcting in that respect.Ʋ⁰ On the other hand, Chaitanwholeheartedly embraced
J&Q’s proposal.
Mandelbrot replied that “the main reason why I đnd the JQ prescription appalling
is because it would bring havoc into living branches of science. Philip Anderson de-
scribes mathematical rigor as ‘irrelevant and impossible’. I would soĕen the blow by
calling it ‘besides the point andusually distracting, evenwhere possible.’ ”ƲƲMandelbrot
also discussed the case of Paul Lévy andHenri Poincaré, both of whomwere known in
the stuﬀy and ultra-rigorous Frenchmathematics community of the 19th century as be-
ing ‘incurable’ in terms of their shunning of formal proofs. He mentions howHermite
and Picard “shunned Poincaré, prevented him from teaching mathematics, and made
him teach mathematical physics, then astronomy.” Although theoretical physics was
probably the big winner in Poincaré’s relegation to mathematical physics, Mandelbrot
makes the important point that a too rigorous approach to mathematics can have the
same kind of destructive eﬀect that Jaﬀewarns intuitionism can cause. It also highlights
howdemands of rigour can change across time and space sometimes very quickly;Man-
delbrot complains how the Bourbaki seminar, initially started as a private joke with a
disregard for orthodox mathematical practices, soon turned into a rigid promoter of a
rigorist credo. ăus, the degree of rigour that the mathematical community demands
from its members is far from being a simple and immutable criterion, and is a clear sign
of how sociological factors can actively aﬀect the production of mathematical knowl-
edge. As noted in the response byăom, “Since the collapse of Hilbert’s program and
the advent of Goશdel’s theorem, we know that rigor can be no more than a local and
sociological criterion. It is true that such practical criteria may frequently be ‘ordered’
Ʋ⁰Atiyah et al. (1994, p. 180)
ƲƲAtiyah et al. (1994, p. 194)
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according to abstract logical requirements, but it is by no means certain that these so-
ciological contexts can be completely ordered, even asymptotically.”ƲƳ
Of the many responses to J&Q’s provocative essay, the response is mixed enough
to suppose that, as Mac Lane summarised, “the ways of doing mathematics can vary
sharply, as in this case between the đelds of algebra and geometry, while at the end there
was full agreement on the đnal goal: theorems with proofs. ăus, diﬀerently oriented
mathematicians have sharply diﬀerent ways of thought, but also common standards as
to the result”, agreeing with both ăurston and J&Q in that “throughout mathemat-
ics, inspiration, insight, and the hard work of completing proofs are all necessary.”Ʋƴ It
seems thatwhilemathematicians recognise the important contributionof non-rigorous
and intuition-led mathematics, there is also a unanimous acknowledgement of the im-
portance of rigorous proofs, with variations fromperson topersononwhich is themore
important. However, for the purposes of this work the most interesting conclusion is
that there appears to be a generalised agreement amongst mathematicians that intu-
ition plays a primordial and vital role in the development of all types of mathematics,
and that both in considerations regarding the discipline as awhole and in their personal
work, intuition is a powerful mover of ideas and results.
5.5 Whenmathematicians do not trust
Laughlin (1997, p.22) notes that rejections of intuition such as J&Q’s can be under-
stood if we take into account “the historical association of intuition with metaphysics
and religious knowledge,” both of which “appealed to private, esoteric, and ineﬀable
knowledge that, however productive of personal wisdom, was seen by scientists as in-
accessible to public scrutiny.” ăis was a result, according to Laughlin, mainly of the
positivist movement and its absolute rejection of metaphysics, for “somewhere in the
project of formulating the positivist project the intuitional baby was thrown out with
the metaphysical bath water.” We can still therefore đnd philosophers such as Bunge
(1962, 29) stating that “sensible intuition and geometrical intuition, or the capacity
for spatial representation or visual imagination, have very fewdefenders inmathematics
nowadays, because it has been shown once and for all that they are as deceptive logically
ƲƳAtiyah et al. (1994, p. 203)
ƲƴAtiyah et al. (1994, p. 191)
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as they are fertile heuristically and didactically. ăerefore, what is usually calledmathe-
matical intuitionism does not rely on sensible intuition,” a statement at odds with both
ăurston’s and J&Q’s critics’ replies. Bunge also states that “the products of intuition
are rough to the point of uselessness; they must be elucidated, developed, complicated.
ăe intuitive ‘lightning’, the hunch, may be interesting in the mind of an expert if it
is cleansed and inserted into a theory or at least a body of grounded beliefs. ăis is
how our intuitions gain in clarity and scope. By being formulated into formulated con-
cepts and propositions, they can be worked out, analysed and logically tied to further
conceptual constructions. Fruitful intuitions are those that are incorporated in body
of rational knowledge and thereby cease being intuitions.” But as Fischbein (1987, p.
175) points out, “it is clear that Bunge is projecting features of an elaborated theory
onto the process of elaboration itself.”
Perhaps even more surprising is that the existence of proofs does not necessarily
lead to an increased belief in mathematical theorems. MacKenzie (2001) has analysed
the historical development of computer-aided proofs, paying particular attention to
the mechanised (computer-aided) proof of the Four Colourăeorem, and how many
mathematicians initially rejected this proof despite the fact themechanisation of proof
is nowadays common in mainstream mathematics.Ʋ⁴ MacKenzie (2001, p. 102) cites
mathematician W. Tutte, “the feeling is that the Four Colour ăeorem ought not to
have been provable like that, ‘by brute force’…I have wavered between belief and disbe-
lief in Shimamoto’s proof, but have never liked it”, and also F. Bonsall stating in 1982
that “we cannot possibly achieve what I regard as the essential element of a proof—our
own personal understanding— if part of the argument is hidden inside a black box,”
further down demanding to avoid wasting funds on “pseudo mathematics with com-
puters.” In a semi-popular exposition, Gonthier (2008, p. 1382) writes that the 1976
proof of the theorem “had a hint of defeat: they’d had a computer do the proof for
them!”
Ʋ⁴ăe theorem says that for any map, the countries can be coloured by any of four colours without
any two countries with common borders sharing the same colour. If the theorem is true, map-makers
are guaranteed that there is at least one way to colour a map using four colours without neighbouring
countries sharing colours, although it does not say how to colour any speciđc map to achieve this.
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5.6 Formal proofs and trust: the Four Colourăeorem
ăough its results may be plausible, mathematicians seem wary of computer-assisted
proof. Gonthier (2008), referring to a revised 1995 version of the Four Colour proof,
writes that despite mathematical controversy having died, “there was something still
amiss: both proofs combined a textual argument, which could reasonably be checked
by inspection, with computer code that could not. Worse, the empirical evidence pro-
vided by running code several times with the same input is weak, as it is blind to the
most common form of computer ‘error’: programmer error. Gonthier himself has pub-
lished a ‘computer-checked proof ’ of the theorem diﬀerent in strategy to the original
one, in which “every single logical step” is made explicit. Gonthier’s proof therefore
relies on what he calls ‘general arguments’ and not on examination of a set of particular
cases (Gonthier writes that in this sense, his is a ‘meta-proof ’ and not just amere proof;
meta-proofs allowmathematicians to talk about why an argument is valid, and not just
to show that it is valid for all cases).
Hales (2008, p. 1371) writes that “traditional mathematical proofs are made to
make themeasily understoodbymathematicians. Routine logical steps are omitted. An
enormous amount of context is assumed on the part of the reader. Proofs, especially
in topology and geometry, rely on intuitive arguments in situations where a trained
mathematician would be capable of translating those intuitive arguments into a more
rigorous argument.” Compared to these intuitive arguments, a formal proof is “a proof
in which every logical inference has been checked all the way back to the fundamental
axioms of mathematics. All the intermediate logical steps are supplied, without excep-
tion. No appeal is made to intuition, even if the translation from intuition to logic is
routine. ăus, a formal proof is less intuitive, and yet less susceptible to logical errors.”
Hales (ibid.) highlights that this is a painstaking process; “A. Matthias has calculated
that to expand the deđnition of the number ‘1’ in terms of [Bourbaki’s formal system]
primitives requires over 4 trillion symbols.”
If ultra-formal proofs and meta-proofs are so ridiculously complicated, and if they
don’t aﬀord any sort of ‘understanding’, why go through all the trouble of implementing
them? Wiedijk (2008, p. 1408)) answers that in writing formal proofs one is “ensuring
a reliability that is orders of amagnitude larger than if one had just used humanminds.”
ăe ‘formalist’ computer proofmakers likeGonthier propose that computersmake bet-
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ter proof-checkers because one must necessarily take the formalisation seriously when
the actual programming is carried out.
MacKenzie (2001, ch. 4) argues that the Four Colour proof became acceptable
not because the proof was correct (nobody could have ‘checked’ it, except a computer-
brained human!) but because people considered that the arguments were ‘suﬃciently’
good. ăe J&Q and the Four Colour theorem episodes highlight one of sociology of
science’s most important reĔections on science: truth is never ‘self-evident’, it is socially
consolidated and always has elements of conventional agreement. Even in mathemati-
cal logic, with its particular notion of truth through proofs, truth does not escape con-
struction and convention. MacKenzie (2001, p. 147) writes that “for some […] to put
one’s trust in the results of computer analysis was to violate the essence of mathematics
as an activity in which human, personal understanding is central. To others […] using a
computer was no diﬀerent than to use pencil and paper, which is universally accepted
in mathematics.” In the end, one again faces questions of trust, and where trust is im-
plicitly and explicitly placed.
5.7 ăe tortoise and Achilles
One can take the tacit agreements necessary for the application of logic literally to an-
other ‘level’, asCarroll (1895) showed inhis dialoguebetween theTortoise andAchilles.
In the dialogue, theTortoise shows that the proper application of logic to themost triv-
ial syllogisms necessitates the tacit acceptance of rules that must remain unchallenged,
and usually remain unstated. For example, consider the statements A=“all apples are
red”, and B=”this object is an apple.” It follows— trivially one could say— that state-
ment Z=”this object is red” is true. Carroll (or the Tortoise) asks us to consider the
statement “D=if A is true and B is true then Z is true,” and ask if it is possible to deduce
the truth of D from A, B, and Z, otherwise this in itself implying the tacit acceptance
of the ‘meta-rule’ that trivial syllogisms are themselves proper rules. Carroll shows that
in order to practice logic then, the basic rules of logic must remain accepted as conven-
tions, or otherwise an inđnite regress occurs which cannot be broken by appealing to
higher order theories (meta-theories). ăe point is explored even further inHofstadter
(1979) in connectionwithGödel’s incompleteness theorems andArtiđcial Intelligence.
It is thus plausible that betweenmathematics and formal logic there is a sociological
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connection analogous to that between experimental physics and theoretical physics,
and the one between theoretical physics and mathematics. Alas, it is a connection that
will not be pursued here, but that this is so can be glimpsed by analysing the attitude
that mathematicians have towards hardcore set-logical proofs as described byHarrison
(2008, p. 1399), which itself seems to echo the attitude of physicist towards ‘rigorous’
mathematical proofs:
Since mathematics is supposed to be an exact science and, at least in its
modern incarnation, one with a formal foundation, this situation seems
thoroughly lamentable. It is hard to resist the conclusion that we should
be taking the idea of formal foundations at face value and actually formal-
ising our proofs. Yet is also easy to see why mathematicians have been re-
luctant to do so. Formal proof is regarded as far too tedious and painstak-
ing. Arguably formalised mathematics may be more error-prone than the
usual informal kind, as formal manipulations become more complicated
and the underlying intuition begins to get lost.
ăurston (1994, p. 165) also meditated upon the role of logical deductive argu-
ments (rigorous proofs, or what he calls the “popular caricature” of deđnition- theorem
-proof mathematics), making a similar point as to how logic becomes a ‘black-boxed’
set of rules for pure mathematicians in the proof-construction work (delegating this
work to logicians):
Mathematicians apparently don’t generally rely on the formal rules of de-
duction as they are thinking. Rather, they hold a fair bit of logical struc-
ture of a proof in their heads, breaking proofs into intermediate results so
that they don’t have to hold too much logic at once. In fact, it is common
for excellent mathematicians not even to know the standard formal usage
of quantiđers (for all and there exists), yet all mathematicians certainly
perform the reasoning that they encode.
When it comes to the practice of mathematics, it appears that it is simply too de-
structive to go into a logic-minded-Tortoise way of thinking, just as like in physics it is
unproductive as a physicist to think like a mathematician.Ʋ⁵
Ʋ⁵Sociological analyses of practice in pure logic and in the elaboration of mathematical proofs from a
logician’s perspective can be found inMacKenzie (1999), Rosental (2003)).
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5.8 Rigour in physics
ăeoretical physicists have a diﬀerent relationship with mathematical ‘objects’ than do
mathematicians. In contrast to mathematicians, theoretical physicist usually have no
problem using ‘rules of thumb’ or intuitive and proof-less results. ăeoreticians, un-
like mathematicians, are less concerned with being able to provide or understand the
rigorous elements of mathematical statements, but rather take them up if they can be
used in productive ways. When mathematical rigour concerning mathematical objects
is needed, theoreticians will oĕen consult a mathematical colleague directly. ăeoreti-
cians see mathematics as a tool; a tool in which one can trust thanks to the work of
professional mathematicians. ăus rigour is of little direct importance to physicists
when carrying out their craĕ,
Berry: I remember in the early days when I was involved with singularity
theory I got to knowChris Bezzina, whowas a really greatmathematician.
Hewas the personwho brought catastrophe theory to awider public. […].
We talked a lot about what I did, making concrete use and understanding
problems in optics using this new bag of tools; that was a new thing that
came in, singularity theory. ăen he said, ‘I’ve got this very good student,
and maybe you’d like to take him on as a graduate student.’ And then I
discovered that this guy learned mathematics and theorems, but he didn’t
know what a Bessel function was! Ʋ⁶ I had to explain that this is useless to
me. So there are diﬀerent kinds of expertise. We talked about theorems
yesterday. I myself inmywork don’t have the ability to prove a theorem to
the rigorous degree that the mathematician uses. I quoted ăom, ‘imbe-
ciles can prove theorems.’ Not really true [laughs]. It’s not what I do. It’s
not useful for me to have somebody around me who does. I don’t need
that. It’s not the level at which I’m working. If there was a genuine un-
certainty about something which really required a mathematician— and
there are occasions as these— then I would đnd it prođtable, worthwhile
to consult someone who knows that culture, butmostly not, certainly not
Ʋ⁶Bessel functions are mathematical functions that are solutions to a general type of mathematical
equation and that arise in many areas of physics, particularly when problems are posed in terms of cylin-
drical coordinates.
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with a student who doesn’t know a simple hands-on calculating tool that
I use.
or as Mitchison (who is originally an applied mathematician, and a theoretician
only in the later stages of his career) explained,
Mitchison: I tend to stay with theoreticians. I don’t talk to mathemati-
cians unless I’m really stuck and I know there’s something, and then I have
friends who are mathematicians, and one very, very brilliant mathemati-
cian who very kindly phrases things in a language I can understand. But
mostly I just talk to my colleagues.
ăe ability to use mathematical tools without having to rigorously work out their
usage— the task of ‘rigorous’ mathematics— is another illustration of the trust which
physicists rely on, oncemathematics has been ’black-boxed’ and the derivationof results
beenmade tacit. A theoretician canbe conđdent that the tools he is usinghave inherited
the epistemic strength of provedmathematics because others have done the work, or at
least because the theoreticianbelieves that someonehas done it. AsBerrynoted, there is
not even the need to personally know someonewho has carried out the proof, except in
extraordinary cases. Just as experimental knowledge Ĕows from experiment via virtual
empiricism, mathematics is supported in physics by ‘virtual rigour’, if one may abuse
the phrasing from the previous chapter. Again, this does not mean that the world of
pure mathematics is impregnable to theoretical physicists, but only that mechanism of
institutional trust is established as a way to make the division of labour possible. Many
theoreticians enjoy going through the proofs of the tools they use, even if they do not
carry out work in pure mathematics. Ʋ⁷
5.9 Levels of understanding
One must make a distinction between rigour in supporting a mathematical tool to be
used, and the actual argument that uses the tool to derive a ‘physical’ result, although
Ʋ⁷For the role of mathematical proofs as mechanisms for the suspension of doubt in physics and the
black-boxing of mathematical results through proofs, see Pinch (1977) and his discussion of the von
Neumann-Bohm debate concerning quantum physics hidden-variables proofs.
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it is not simple to demarcate one ‘level’ from the other in practice. Trust works at both
levels, but with diﬀerent objectives: a theoretician may trust his mathematical tools
just like a car driver can trust the car manufacturer to have constructed a vehicle that
is safe to use; a theoretician may also trust the results of a paper that manipulates and
transforms equations that rely on these tools themselves. In the latter case, trust is es-
tablished on both the tools and those who use them, like one trusts other drivers on
the road to stop and let one safely cross at a crossroads when they are stopped by a red
light.Ʋ⁸ In the đrst case, one trusts mathematicians/car manufacturers whose world is
practically inaccessible, while in the second one trusts an author’s/ car-drivers actions
who are accessible, though the full access may require too much eﬀort. Collins (2007)
has identiđed a hierarchy of mathematical understanding in theoretical physics that
classiđes the way in which theoreticians enter through diﬀerent ‘levels’ of understand-
ing:
1. Authority based understanding: “judgement on the basis of whether a mathe-
matical argument has been published in a peer-reviewed journal or similar source
without any understanding other than the reputation of the author.”
2. Familiarity based understanding: “acceptance, or otherwise, on the basis of the
fact that the claim makes sense or otherwise within the familiar and consensual
conceptual structure of the scientiđc domain. ăemathematical exposition does
not have to be read.”
3. Impressionistic understanding: “the mathematics is read to gain an impression-
istic sense of the argument but it is not followed step-by-step.”
4. Checking the proof: “any level of reading that does involve following the proof
step-by-step.”
5. Innovatory understanding: “doing brand new proofs of the same sort where you
do not already know the outcome.”
Ʋ⁸In Mexico City, for example, this is not the case, and one must be very careful when crossing many
intersections even if one has a green light. ăis situation is equivalent to reading a paper by another
theoretician that has a bad reputation of makingmistakes in derivations or calculations: this gives rise to
an ‘abnormal’ attitude of suspicion.
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6. Domain-speciđcownership: “«ownership»of themathematical area in theman-
ner of, say, a physicist, or whichever domain scientist is using the mathematics.”
7. Mathematical ownership: “«ownership» of the mathematical area in the man-
ner of a mathematician.”
According to Collins’ query among a small sample of theoreticians, an average of
60% of the papers they read are at most to level 3, while 85% of their reading is done up
to level 4. Collins supposes that levels 1 to 4 are the domain of most physicists, while
the upper levels are more akin to mathematical practice.
ăe adjective ‘rigorous’ is also applied diﬀerently depending on whether one is in-
side the physics or the mathematical community, and in each of these communities
the purpose of rigour is quite diﬀerent. Physics-rigour is related to oﬀering theoreti-
cians the possibility of playing aroundwithmathematicalmodels withoutworrying too
much about whether thesemodels are directly linked to physical reality or not, because
they are supported by ‘good’mathematics and therefore theymay in the end provide de-
scriptions of possible physical scenarios. ăe fact that these models have been ‘proven’
to constitute legitimate mathematical objects makes them immediately interesting.
Mathematicians seemwilling to overlook physicist’s ‘sloppiness’ when the ‘theoret-
ical’ developments may turn out to inspire future mathematically rigorous results. On
the other hand, inside the mathematical community, the process of legitimisation in
itself, the application of rigour, is an important objective in itself. ăere are also in-
termediary categories: theoreticians who care little for the actual physical applicability
of their results in a physically realisable system (‘mathematical physicists’) or mathe-
maticians who work out techniques for applying mathematical results to any system,
without payingmuch attention to the proof of novelmathematical statements (‘applied
mathematicians’).
Physicists can get away with keeping a lot of ‘rigorous’ background knowledge tacit
in their publications, while mathematical papers are diﬀerent in this respect. Harri-
son (2008, p. 1395) explains that “formal proof is a proof written in a precise artiđcial
language that admits only a đxed repertoire of stylised steps. ăis formal language is
usually designed so that there is a purely mechanical process by which the correctness
of a proof in the language can be veriđed.” Harrison also states that the use of proofs is
“to improve the actual precision, explicitness, and reliability of mathematics.” But this
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diﬀerence between the level of rigour should not be taken to mean that there is noth-
ing tacit in a mathematical paper, but only that the collectively tacit is eliminated in
mathematics as much as possible, at least relative to the allowances that seem common
to theoretical physics, but this does not eliminate the relational-tacit fully.Ʋ⁹ Harrison
(2008, p. 1398) admits that despite the struggle for clarity, “mathematicians seldom
make set-theoretic axioms explicit in their work, except for those whose results depend
onmore ‘exotic’ hypotheses. And there is little use of formal proof, or even formal log-
ical notation, in everyday mathematics; Dijkstra has remarked that ‘as far as the math-
ematical community is concerned George Boole has lived in vain’. Inasmuch as the
logical symbols are used […] they usually play the role of ad hoc abbreviations without
an associated battery of manipulative techniques.”
If we take the responses to J&Q as representative of mathematical practice, then
surprisingly it seems that creating innovative mathematics is not so strongly associated
with working out proofs. Although it is very likely that proofs would play a much big-
ger role in mathematics than in physics, the dominance of hard-core logic in mathe-
matical practice is not as high as is commonly supposed, particularly when it comes
to pioneering work. Collins concludes his mathematical-level article noting that even
though there exist atypical cases (like refereeing) where themathematics in physics can
become central, “the necessity of mathematics under circumstances like these does not
show that every physicist has to be amathematician, only that somephysicists have to be
mathematicians.”We could rephrase for mathematics saying that even though there are
cases inmathematics that demand logic and rigour, this does not show that everymath-
ematician has to be a logician, only that somemathematicians have to be logicians. ăe
thing to note is that intuition in its many guises is the vanguard of mathematical cre-
ation, and logical proof comes only a posteriori. ăis should to force us to consider that,
because of (and not despite of ) the importance of mathematics in theoretical physics,
tacit knowledge should play a leading role in the account of both mathematical and
theoretical physics practice.
Ʋ⁹ăe degree of work that writing a mathematical paper involves can have deep eﬀects on the conđg-
uration of mathematical work; for example, it can be seen to deeply inĔuence the rate of publication for
mathematicians. Grossman (2002) has shown that around 60% of mathematicians have only published
between one and two papers in their lifetime; although he admits that this includes mathematicians at
any stage of their career, the numbers is suﬃciently low to clash with physics practice, where one article
per year is still a rather low number. Physicists also tend to publishmore in collaborative work, andmore
as one shiĕs from the purely theoretical, to the phenomenological and then to the empirical.
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Part II
Tacit knowledge in theoretical physics
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CHAPTER 6
Relational and somatic tacit knowledge in physics and
mathematics
6.1 Intuition in theoretical physics
ăe discussion surrounding J&Q’s paper highlights the importance that intuitive and
informal processes play in pure mathematics for working mathematicians. J&Q’s posi-
tion regarding the ‘dangers’ of intuitively oriented mathematics is not unusual, but as
many of the responses to the paper highlight, it seems a position that simply does not
do credit to the way mathematics is produced, but rather to the way that it is rationally
reconstructed once the mathematical idea is developed.
As far as theoretical physics goes, intuition seems to play exactly the same funda-
mental heuristic role as it does in mathematics, the diﬀerence in physics being that log-
ical proofs are both much less stringent and much less common in the general practice
of the đeld. Although formality may be slacker, theoretical physics still relies on math-
ematical and logical arguments to present theoretical ideas. In most of my interviews I
confronted physicist with the question of whether there are additional major heuristic
guides in theoretical physics besides experimental knowledge andmathematical reason-
ing. ăe answer in all cases was the same: a third major heuristic is ‘physical’ intuition.
A typical example is the following exchange:
Reyes: Mathematics, for theoretical physicists, is a tool, right?
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Mondragón: Yes.
Reyes: On the other hand you have experiments, which is a guideline,
which is restrictive. Is there something to theoretical physics beyond these
two dimensions?
Mondragón: Yes of course. ăere is intuition, and a certain formof…good
taste. […] Yes, of course. You have your tools. You need a good toolbox or
you’ll đnd you can’t solve your problems. And what you want to describe
are physical phenomena; things you can observe. For example, “Why are
there three generations [of quarks] andwhy are their masses so diﬀerent?”
ăere, you deđnitely need a strong intuitive and creative component. If
you have it and you don’t have the tools, it’s like having musical taste but
not having the ability to play the piano. It’s not good for much. But if you
only have the tools and you don’t have that feeling, that intuition, you’ll be
reduced to doing very technical things. ăere is a creative component, not
unlike writing poetry [laughs]. When you see the great physicists you ask
yourself, “HowonEarth did they comeupwith that? Howdid he imagine
that the solution was to plug in a scalar?” or something like that; Ĕashes
of imagination. ăere is also a certain aesthetic sensibility. Sometimes
you see a theory and you say, ‘ăey might describe many things, but the
physics is horrible.’ You just look at them and it seems ugly! ăey plugged
in this scalar there, and it just looks baroque, with lots of…things. And
then others you look at and you just say, ‘ăis has to be right. If the exper-
iment is not exactly coincident it has to be very close.’ It’s beauty…in the
equations, or in the formulation. It may have to do with the symmetries
that are somehow built into our brains and that one recognises.
ăe response followed the same pattern every time. Intuition along with experi-
ment and mathematics is one of the key practical elements of theoretical physics. For
some, it is in fact a theoretician’s level of intuitive understands which marks him as a
true physicist:
Romero: A good physicist— I’m not talking about a genius, just a regular
good guy— is the one that builds his own intuition. One learns it partly
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through his supervisors, during his postdoc, with your colleagues when
you are still young, but with the years you develop your own, in your own
style.
A key question is then to ask what it is that ‘physical intuition’ is composed of.
Being such a crucial component of a theoretician’s toolbox, at the same level as ‘experi-
ment’ and ‘mathematics’, it is remarkable, though perhaps not surprising, that ‘physical
intuition and ‘physical insight’ prove extraordinarily hard, or actually impossible, to
deđne:
Reyes: I đnd some trouble understanding this [intuition]. It’s relatively
easy to understand what a mathematical ‘argument’ is…
De la Peña: Yes, that’s right.
Reyes: It’s relatively easy; it’s centred on a deductive procedure…
De la Peña: Yes, and the other one is a physical intuition. Yes, it’s a physical
intuition. People will want to slap me; I know any philosopher would
want to slap me, ‘what do you mean with an intuition?’ It’s an educated
intuition. It’s an intuition that one acquires with time. It doesn’t emerge
spontaneously. It emerges from having gone deeper into the problem, in
the physics of the problem. ăe hard part is to create such an intuition.
ăat’s why problems in physics are complicated.
De la Peña, who specialises on a highly unorthodox type of quantum theory known
as Stochastic õuantumElectrodynamics, may be argued to not be representative of the
theoretical status quo. In fact, he is fully aware that his views lie outside the orthodoxy,
but that it is his engagement in debates regarding a universally acknowledged impor-
tance of intuition in physics that has allowed him to still dialogue with his theoretical
colleagues despite these diﬀerences:
De la Peña: Look here, why are the problems of quantum mechanics so
complicated? Well, precisely because there is no such thing as a suﬃciently
deep quantum intuition. It’s lacking, completely. One does not know
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how to dive in. Any argument that is mathematical, if it works, it’s consid-
ered good. ăehistorical construction of quantummechanics was accom-
plishedbyđndingmathematical descriptions that allowed thedepictionof
the physical situation. But there was little knowledge of what the physical
situation was which was being described. ăere was no intuition of that
physical situation. ăat was the problem. ăat is the problem that I de-
vote myself to try to understand, to try to đnd that missing construction,
and consequently that profound intuition of the quantum world that is
what would allow us to advance along other lines.
Maybe the word intuition is inappropriate, because rather it is a cultivated
thing. In theory, intuition is not something one cultivates! Einstein han-
dled this concept; he spoke of intuition. He said, “ăere’s something in
me that does not allow me to think that the world is not deterministic.
God does not play dice”. It’s a physical perception. It’s what I would de-
fend. God either plays dice or does not. ăe conviction that it does not
is what moves us; what moved him and what moves me. ăat of physicist
nowadays is, “Who knows if he does. What do I care?”
Mathematics accounts the phenomena. Mathematics is the apparatus that
gives account. ăat is only a description; it is not comprehension. Science
is needed to understand the world. Understanding is something much
deeper than that. It’s not enough to know how to describe things. It’s not
enough to be able to calculate some little number. One has to understand
the ‘why’ behind the number. It’s false — in my opinion— that science’s
aim is to calculate the number. ăe objective of science is to understand
the little number
Mitchison similarly failed to verbalise intuition:
Mitchison: Sometimes you canplay [physics andmathematics] oﬀ against
each other, the kind of physical intuition and feeling for how things work
so aligned tomathematics that, you know, a particle is a representation, or
you simply move between diﬀerent chunks of mathematics in every new
world. …Intuition is…something that I still haven’t got [laughs]. Intuition
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is, somethingwhich youget…so,which somepeople seemtohave…intuition
is…I guess…it’s yeah…[very long silence] it’s very, very diﬃcult to describe!
[…] It’s a certain kind of picture of how things; whether it’s curved space-
time or molecules vibrating in a lattice. It’s just having a picture, as Feyn-
man said, whichwould lead him towhere themistake in the equationwas.
I think that that kind of picture is what counts as physical intuition.
Reyes: In a way this idea of physical intuition is at odds with the idea of
rationality, you know, theoretical physics as…
Mitchison: Well, only with a very narrow idea of rationality! I mean, ra-
tionality is not what doing mathematics or logic is. It’s something you do ret-
rospectively to check it out. And so how you get the things, how you get the
material that you then apply rationality to, is through physical intuition,
and I don’t see that as being contrary to it. (emphasis added)
Curiously, for some theoreticians, it seems that the inexpressibility of ‘physical in-
tuition’ is not only unremarkable, but is also a quintessential part of its nature:
Reyes: One thing that [people I’ve interviewed] have mentioned many
times is physical intuition. ăat is the part that nobody has given me an
answer to: what is physical intuition?
Berry: Well, why do you expect an answer?ąeveryword intuition implies
that you’re not going to get a very clear…there isn’t going to be an algorithm
for it. You know, there isn’t. ąat is what intuition means. Of course, you
get it— if you’re lucky enough to get it— by having studied a lot of prob-
lems and seeing connections between them. ăat’s where the intuition is.
You see that something is like something else you did, except for some cru-
cial aspect. ăis locates it in theworld of doable, understandable phenom-
ena. But intuition is…intuition means that you’re so familiar with similar
situations that the connections come almost unconsciously. ăat’s what
intuition is. I think I hadn’t thought about it, or hadn’t thought how to
describe it. But I think it’s that.
Reyes: So it’s based on experience?
Berry: Yes, of course. (emphasis added)
śChapter 6 166
ăere are thus several important points associated with ‘physical intuition’, which
should be clearly set out:
1. It’s one of the threemajor heuristics of theoretical practice, alongside experiment
and mathematics.
2. It’s inexpressible in an algorithmic form.
3. It is acquired with time, both by exposure to relevant problems, and by attempt-
ing solutions to these problems.
4. It is learnt through direct practical immersion; it is passed on to young physicists
through close supervision of attempting solutions to real research problems, in
the style of an artisan apprenticeship.
5. ăere is a creative component, and it iswhat in real-world research circumstances
leads physical practice, as opposed to the mathematically rigorous reconstruc-
tions, which are retrospective exercises.
6. ăere is an aesthetic component, which may be closely linked to intuition being
based on the possibility to visualise physical phenomena, but which in others
may hinder the ‘spontaneity’ of intuition.
7. Physics that is not led by intuition is usually reduced to very technical work, al-
though physics with only intuition and nomathematics is “like having goodmu-
sical taste but not having the ability to play the piano”.
Intuition as unstated knowledge, is some sort of tacit knowledge, the crucial ques-
tion being what kind. It cannot be relational tacit knowledge, because it does not hinge
on things being leĕ out, but rather on things being inexpressible. It is not located in
the collective, but is rather in the individual, as it is ‘taught’ and acquired through at-
tempts at successful performance; althoughphysics canbeperformedwithout intuition
leading the way, theoreticians typically see this as physics that is too ‘mechanistic’. ăe
only type of tacit knowledge leĕ from Collins’ typology is somatic tacit knowledge,
which in fact exhibits exactly the same characteristics as physical intuition as outlined
above, except that the ‘soma’ (from the Greek word for ‘body’) is to be replaced by
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the ‘mind’. ‘Physical intuition’ is the somatic tacit knowledge dimension of theoretical
physics. One problem that could be conceived when linking these two concepts con-
cerns the connection of somatic tacit knowledge with the body. Collins does mention
chess-playing as a form of somatic tacit knowledge, and chess-playing can be conceived
in a purely abstract form (think of the reduction that is made of chess games to a set of
written steps when it is described in a newspaper sports column; the list of moves is ac-
tually the chess game), and so this does not seem like a particularly relevant objection.
Aĕer all, the brain is part of the body.
Polanyi (1958, p. 59) supported this extension of the somatic to the mental realm,
as he argued that the somatic-tacit mastery of tools and instruments should not be re-
duced to the physical plane, for “whilewe rely on a tool or a probe, these are not handled
as external objects. […] We pour ourselves out into them and assimilate them as parts
of our own existence. We accept them existentially by dwelling in them. […]Hammers
and probes can be replaced by intellectual tools; think of any interpretative framework
and particularly of the formalism of the exact sciences.” Polanyi calls this alertness or
awareness of the tools or probes that sit in one’s hand ‘subsidiary awareness’ for “they
are not watched in themselves; we watch something else while keeping intensely aware
of them” in opposition with ‘focal awareness’ which is a full, conscious attention to-
wards an object. ăus, in hammering a nail, we have only subsidiary awareness of the
hammer as a hammer, and a good hammerer will literally feel the hammer as an ex-
tension of his hand, while there will be focal awareness of the nail as an external ob-
ject. Likewise, one would expect that when wielding their mental ‘tools’ theoreticians
would have only subsidiary awareness of this object. ăey would be able to use them
prođciently, but without being able to put the process into an algorithmic form. ăis is
physical intuition. ăe continuous reference of mathematics as a tool throughout the
interviews is relevant here.
Polanyi stressed how true and full mastery of an art or a technique necessitates that
the ‘logic’ behind the mastery remain indescribable, and gives numerous examples of
activities where focal attention on the action itself renders it literally impracticable (e.g.
piano playing, or bicycle riding). ăat ‘the physics’ of bike riding or the technique be-
hind a pianist’s ‘touch’ can still be explained post facto is only possible because these are
physical objects which can be probed independently of the process. However, when we
deal with intellectual ‘tools’ such as mathematical reasoning no such manipulation is
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possible, and the best we can do is either logically reconstruct the argument ormake no
attempt at an explanation. If we trust the ample mathematical and theoretical physics
testimony presented here, then it is a fact that in many cases the solution to problems
in these domains does not involve what is retroactively logically reconstructed. One
must accept that a fully somatic tacit mechanism is involved in physics practice, one
that may never be fully grasped through anything other than immersion into real the-
oretical practice. As Berry explained concerning the process of thinking about doing
science related to how one actually does the science:
We tend to be doers. It depends on how reĔective a human being you are.
[…] In fact, you’ve got to be a bit careful because if you spend too much
time in the ‘why’, you stop doing it. ăat’s true of all human activity. If
you’re walking and you think consciously about putting one foot in front
of the other you’d stumble over, and if you’re amusician and you’re playing
something on the piano if you try to think ‘where’s this đnger going to
go’ then you can’t do it anymore. To some extent, reĔection can inhibit
activity. You’ve got to be a bit careful.
As Polanyi (1958, p. 53) notes, “an art which cannot be speciđed in detail is an
art which cannot be transmitted by prescription, for no prescription for it exists. It
can be passed on only by example frommaster to apprentice. ăis restricts the range of
diﬀusion to that of personal contacts, andwe đnd accordingly that craĕsmanship tends
to survive in closely circumscribed local traditions.” ăere is no reason to expect that
mathematics or physics and the mastery of their tools are any diﬀerent, and thus one
would expect that the acquisition of successful physical intuition can only be gained
through contact with a master craĕsman in these trades, through full immersion into
the world of real research with close supervision; as in fact it actually happens. One is
reminded of Wittengenstein famous closing aphorism from the Tractatus: “What we
cannot speak about, we must pass over in silence.”Ʋ
Polanyi’s work is clearly set out in the phenomenological tradition within philoso-
phy. ăeanalysis of the hammer is actually one ofHeidegger’s best-knownphenomeno-
logical analyses, that of tools and tool-usage. Polanyi echoes Heidegger (1927, p. 98)
ƲWittgenstein (1922, §7).
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when the latter writes that when using tools such as hammering with a hammer, an
entity like the hammer
“is not grasped thematically as an occurringăing, nor is the equipment-
structure known as such even in the using. ăe hammering does not sim-
ply have knowledge about the hammer’s character as equipment, but it
has appropriated this equipment in a way which could not possibly be
more suitable. […]ăe more we stare a the hammer-ăing, and the more
we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship
to it become, and the more unveiledly it is encountered as that which it
is— as equipment. ăe hammering itself uncovers the speciđc ‘manipu-
lability’ [Handlichkeit] of the hammer. ăe kind of Being which equip-
ment possesses— in which it manifests itself in its own right— we call
‘readiness-to-hand’ [Zuhandenheit]. […] ‘Practical’ behaviour is not ‘athe-
oretical’ in the sense of ‘sightlessness’. ăe way which it diﬀers from the-
oretical behaviour does not lie simply in the fact that in theoretical be-
haviouroneobserves, while inpractical behaviourone acts [gehandeltwird],
and that action must employ theoretical cognition if it is not to remain
blind; for the fact that observation is a kind of concern is just as primor-
dial as the fact that action has its own kind of sight.”
Polanyi’s ‘subsidiary awareness’ is thus akin to the hammerer’s perception as Zuhan-
denheit, whichHeidegger contrastwith the attitude of ‘presence-at-hand’ (Vorhanden-
heit) that is ‘theoretical’ in that it is concerned with observable facts about the object.
ăe tension between these two attitudes in bothPolanyi’s andHeidegger’s accounts can
be seen tomirror the tension between the processes that bring about the explicit and so-
matic tacit knowledge about the usage of a tool. Polanyi however goes beyondmaterial
tools, and extends this to intellectual tools, which are of course hallmarks of theoret-
ical practice, pointing out that the mastery of a tool involves deep readiness-to-hand
knowledge, and little presence-at-hand knowledge.
Dreyfus (1991, section 4.I.B) has discussed this passage and related it to the anal-
ysis of the blind man’s cane by Wittgenstein, Polanyi and Merleau-Ponty, where the
comparison is between the blindman describingwhat the cane’s ‘properties’ are (“light,
smooth, about three feet long”), and themoment when the blindman actually uses the
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cane, and loses awareness of the cane itself and feels it become an extension of his own
body throughwhich he can actually feel the external world.Ƴ Because inMerleau-Ponty
(1945, p. 143) Gestalt psychology tints the dialectical elements of analysis, the classic
tension between subject and object is transformed to that between the foreground con-
sciousness of the body, and of the background that constitutes the world within which
the body moves.ƴ In the blind man’s case, “ăe blind man’s stick has ceased to be an
object for him, and is no longer perceived for itself […] In the exploration of things, the
length of the stick does not enter expressly as a middle term: the blind man is rather
aware of it through the position of objects than of the position of objects through it.
[…]To get used to a hat, a car or a stick is to be transplanted into them, or conversely,
to incorporate them into the bulk of our own body.” Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1980) have
proposed that somatic tacit knowledge of this kind, being completely unstatable, does
not share the features of ‘true’ knowledge, and choose the term ‘intuition’ for it. How-
ever, as Collins (2010, p. 106-113) argues, that somatic knowledge is unstatable is only
an accidental feature of the way we as humans have integrated it into our being; if a
machine can reproduce the behaviour, even if it is through a diﬀerent process, then a
relationship can be traced between the unstated human version and the statedmachine
version that undermines the separation of the somatic from ‘real’ knowledge.
6.2 Somatic tacit knowledge and collective knowledge
Atension arises here between intuition as somatic tacit knowledge, and the sociological
deđnition of knowledge discussed in Chapter 1, where it was claimed that, sociologi-
cally, personal knowledge is of no consequence to sociology. Certainly, one would be
forced to admit that somatic tacit knowledge as such has no apparent sociological di-
mensions, it being of an individual nature, but there are several reasons for supposing
that even at this deep personal level the inĔuence of sociological factors is deep. In the
training of young theoreticians, although the acquisition of intuitive skills is a personal
aﬀair of practical immersion, this immersion is ideally guided by a recognised expert
who directs the novice in the right direction of performance. A notable result of this
training method is that the novice does not just learn to solve problems, but acquires
ƳSee Polanyi (1966, p. 12-16), Wittgenstein (1953, § 626) andMerleau-Ponty (1945, p. 143).
ƴSee the Editor’s Introduction in Merleau-Ponty, Maurice & Baldwin T. (ed.) (2003).
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his own style of doing so which echoes the teacher’s predilections:
Romero: ăe way [teaching at research level] is done is like this. You talk
to your student about a particular problem. Typically when you are start-
ing out you have a tutor who talks to you about a problem you don’t un-
derstand, and sometimes even he does not understand it! Maybe he half
understands it. And he leads you towards a point where you can try to
solve it. But typically, he will show you things that he himself knows how
to do. He knows how to do it because he’s tried it out for other things, and
he advises you to also try out the same thing. Now that I’mon the teaching
side, I know that one does it with the hope that the student will turn out
to be a real jewel and that he’ll be able to do something that you yourself
weren’t able to do treading the same roads that you yourself once took. It
really is like being an artisan’s apprenticeship. Although maybe even arti-
sans are more professional than us since they’re more systematic. It’s an
artisan learning process. (emphasis added)
ăus a theoretician will generally try to tackle a theoretical problemwith the ‘tools’
he is most adept at, and these are naturally those that were learnt in his early research
career. As Romero alsomentioned, it is not altogether rare that despite knowing plenty
of methods, theoreticians will đght to frame the problem so that it can be tackled with
the tools they are most prođcient in:
Romero: If you learnt for example a lot about Laplace transforms in your
PhD…we had a postdoc mate whom we made a lot of fun about. We’d
joke and say, “hey, ask this guy how to solve a problem and he’ll tell you to
đrst do the Laplace transform.” You’d ask him and really, he’d say, “what if
you take the Laplace transform đrst?”He was such a good problem solver.
He’d arrange theproblemso that he’dbe able to take theLaplace transform
andhe’d then have the equation. Others, they choose theGreen’s function
approach…everything is Green’s functions! For other everything is some
other [mathematical] method.
Everyone learns particular tools, at a very early age I think, typically when
your mind is still fresh. You base yourself on those tools, and you reduce
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all problems to a usage of those tools. [Some theoreticians] reduce every
problem to the same thing. [A] reduces every problem to a transfermatrix
problem, or a dispersion matrix. [B] reduces everything to a transfer ma-
trix. ăey reduce every problem to obtain the same equation so that they
can then do what they know how to do.
One tackles problems that can be handled through the things that you
learnt know how to do; not necessarily problems that one thinks are im-
portant. ăis is typically how one carries on. Technique is learnt at an
early age, during your PhD or your postdoc, or the đrst years of your pro-
fessional career when you are open to learn new things, new techniques.
ăe content of a theoretician’s mathematical tool bag is thus shaped by his early ca-
reer, though Romero did not mention whether this is a conscious phenomenon or not.
Itmaywell be that this combination of a ‘natural’ way for a theoretician to grasp a prob-
lem tinged— a theoretical ‘style’— marked by the tradition that the theoretician grew
up in has mixed elements of both the somatic and the collective tacit. Berry likewise
reĔected on how the content of his mathematical ‘bag of tricks’ was deeply inĔuenced
by work with his PhD supervisor:
Berry: I like asymptotics and divergent series; I’ve worked a lot on them.
So the tools, I like the tools; using the tools. ăere’s that, and it’s an area
where I can do something; there’s a fair amount of space […] It’s hard to
be speciđcwhy you like something; why you do something. Maybe histor-
ically I was in it too. My PhD supervisor who just died— Bob Dingle in
St. Andrews— he made utterly seminal contributions to understanding
divergent series. […].
Underlying a lot of whatwe do are tools. And a lot of tools have to dowith
divergent series. One of my favourite tricks is the Poisson summation for-
mula. ăat’s a formula for evaluating sums. And it relates a sum to another
sum where the quantities in the second sum are the Fourier transforms of
the ones in the đrst sum. I encountered it in a paper decades ago and then
I very quickly realised— but don’t ask me how because I don’t know—
that this is a very general notion and it replaces a sum over quantum num-
bers (one sum) by a sum over topologically diﬀerent classical paths (that’s
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the other sum) and this is a very valuable duality and I’ve applied it to a
half a dozen diﬀerent problems over many years, and it keeps being useful
and it gives a huge amount of insight. So that’s another trick. So I don’t
knowwhere they come from. Asymptotics I learnt frommy PhD supervi-
sor Dingle, I mentioned that. He sensitised me to asymptotics.
ăus, although the development of the tools is a personal process, the guidance of
a novice’s tool selection is determined by his senior mentor, the research group he is
immersed in, and the traditional tools which are mastered within this tradition. ăere
are a few important historical studies that have concentrated on the development and
dispersion of such theoretical ‘tools’ and the traditions and institutions which these
spark, themost detailed beingKaiser’s on Feynman diagrams, with smaller work on the
dispersion of General Relativity.⁴ As Kaiser (2005b) sums up the corpus of his studies
on Feynman diagrams,
As physicists recognised at the time, much more than published research
articles or pedagogical texts was required to spread [Feynman] diagrams
around. Personal mentoring and the postdocs’ peripatetic appointments
were the key. Very similar transfer mechanisms spread the diagrams to
young theorists in Great Britain and Japan, while the hardening of the
ColdWar chokedoﬀ thediagrams’ spread tophysicists in theSovietUnion.
Only with the return of face-to-face workshops between American and
Soviet physicists in the mid-1950s, under the “Atoms for Peace” initia-
tives, did Soviet physicists begin to use Feynman diagrams at anything re-
sembling the pace in other countries. […]ăus it remains impossible to
separate the research practices from the means by which various scientiđc
practitioners were trained.
⁴See Kaiser (2005a) and Kaiser (2006), respectively.
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6.3 Revisiting Planck’s solution to the black body prob-
lem: the importance of physical intuition
Physicists, like mathematicians, insist that it is intuition that most oĕen leads the way
for theoretical practice. But is ‘intuitive’ theoretical physics then the only option? It
seems that while intuitive physics is the preferred method, it is not the only successful
method. Revisiting the episode of Planck’s solution to the black-body problem, it is
interesting to reexamine to search why Planck did not approve of a mere data-đtting
approach (see Section 2.7, p.56). Planck (1920) admitted that his initial answer to the
blackbody problem was little more than an ad hoc move:
Even if the radiation formula should prove itself to be absolutely accurate,
it would still only have, within the signiđcance of a happily chosen inter-
polation formula, a strictly limited value. For this reason, I busied myself,
from then on, that is, from the day of its establishment, with the task of
elucidating a true physical character for the formula, and this problem led
me automatically to a consideration of the connection between entropy
and probability, that is, Boltzmann’s trend of ideas; until aĕer someweeks
of the most strenuous work of my life, light came into the darkness, and a
new undreamed-of perspective opened up before me. (emphasis added)
ăe formulation of the Planck distribution initially presented at a seminar was thus
empty of ‘physical’ content. It was led by no other argument than the need for data-
đtting, and a limited set of criteria concerning the form the function had to take. Al-
though intuition for the development of the theoretical functional criteria Planck had
to adhere to did arise through ‘physical arguments’, the actual solution to the prob-
lem did not. Although Planck did not discuss this any further, it seems Planck played
around with equations of very simple kind and saw how these đtted the data best while
still keepingwithin the physical constraints imposed by thermodynamics and theWien
law. What Planck accomplished seems not to be too diﬀerent towhatCollins describes
a chess-computer does: apply a bit of heuristic rules and a lot of combinatorial brute
force to đnd the optimal answer, as opposed to a chess grand master who uses a heuris-
tic which is not amenable to full explication. In fact, this strategy of data đtting is not
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uncommon in a lot of modern physics, and computers in fact do it better than any hu-
man being. Even when Planck later derived a truly physical explanation for the seminal
1901paper, what is clear is that physics of thehighest impactmaybe at times ledbynon-
intuitive means. ăe situation is similar in some computer-aided mathematical proofs
such as the four colour theorem that was already mentioned, where a ‘brute force’ ap-
proach led to the examination of numerous cases that are not practically soluble, yet do
constitute a logical but non-intuitive proof of the theorem.
Collins (2010) explains that if an activity in which tacit knowledge is evidently
present can be successfully replicated by a machine, then even if the machine follows
a diﬀerent pathway, this knowledge is at the somatic, and not at the collective level.
What I have argued with the Planck example is that this may indeed be possible in
some theoretical cases, when what is wanted is an equation to describe a set of data,
and that this can also be a useful heuristic tool for theoretical research, even if initially
the equation is ‘empty’ of intuitive or ‘deep’ content. ăus as far as the end results go
(producing an equation that đts the data) it can be possible in principle to substitute
intuitive argumentswith purely ‘mechanical’ ones. ăis is a second reason to view phys-
ical intuition as somatic tacit knowledge in theoretical physics, if Collins argument is
taken at face value.
ăe Planck brute-force argument can be observed in pure mathematics, in the dis-
cussion surrounding computer-assisted proofs discussed in previous sections. What if
Planck had been able to use, say, the program Mathematica to đt his data and đnd his
function? ăe result would have possibly been the same! Yet while the establishment
of ‘physical’ arguments for Planck’s formula only took a matter of years, the ‘axioma-
tization’ of quantum mechanics did not come about until several decades later; yet in
the course of a few years Planck’s brute force formula had already revolutionised the
physics landscape. In contrast, while mathematicians nowadays are wary of comput-
erised ‘brute force’ proofs, even if they are useful in actually proving a hypothesis, it
seems tomatter signiđcantly whether the intuition is there or not. While rigour and in-
tuition both have a place inmathematics and in theoretical physics, comparing episodes
such as Planck’s and the Four Colourăeorem illustrates J&Q’ point that rigour plays
very diﬀerent roles in these discipline. ăis is an important sociological diﬀerence that
sets theoretical physics apart frommathematics independently of the ‘objects’ that they
may study.
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Trying to pin down the nature of theoretical physics practice, or of mathematics by
reducing them to only intuitive components or only formalist components is a tasked
doomed to failure. Neither physics nor mathematics is restricted in any sort of way by
the idiosyncrasies of individuals’ methods. Nor can one say that ‘good’ mathematics or
physics are restricted by particular methods, formalist or intuitive. On this, Mitchison
commented:
Mitchison: ăe truth is, all these things are fair game. One of thewonder-
ful things about physics is that there’s such variation of personal style that
some people just want to prove things with algebraic accuracy, and peo-
ple who hate writing equations and would just want to get the idea home.
ăere’s so many ways of doing things that it’s hard to think of something
that would be a complete giveaway. Hearing David Deutsch talking, you
might think, ‘this is wild stuﬀ ’ but of course, he’s a sort of genius. So you
really can’t diagnose.
I had another experience which was quite revealing to me. For a time I
worked in computer vision; one way of looking at neurobiology, trying to
understand what the problems are to solve the problems of vision in the
brain. It’s diﬃcult computationally. ăere was a mathematician in the
audience who had stopped being a mathematician and had decided to be-
come a computer scientist, DavidMumford. He happens to be one of the
most extraordinary mathematicians in algebraic geometry. He just sort
of created a whole đeld, really. Here was this man who had been working
at the very highest level ofmathematics attending lectures where probably
the lecturer’s level ofmathematics had stopped at three years or something,
you know, it wasn’t very đne. I missed the talk and asked him, ‘did you go
to it?’ and he said ‘yes, do you want to borrow my lecture notes?’ I saw
his notes and he’d worked out every little detail. You might think this is
sort of an undergraduate who goes to a lecture and kind of has to convince
himself that everything is right. I was just amazed, because it made think,
‘here’s someone who really has to see how every diﬀerent piece works.’ It’s
completely the opposite of the powerful abstract mathematician who sees
it in a twinkling without thinking more about it. I don’t believe I can see
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any pattern in that sphere.
6.4 ăe bodily experience of doing theoretical physics
I present two đnal examples of how we may link theoretical intuition to the somatic
dimension. ăeđrst will deal with the prevalence of geometric thought inmathematics
and theoretical physics. It seems that visualisation techniques play a very important
role for these disciplines. Amongst the “facilities” that ăurston (1994, p. 164)) lists
as important for mathematical thinking he counts:
Vision, spatial sense, kinaesthetic (motion) sense. People have very pow-
erful facilities for taking in information visually or kinesthetically, and
thinking with their spatial sense. On the other hand, they do not have
a very good built-in facility for inverse vision, that is, turning an internal
spatial understanding back into a two-dimensional image. Consequently,
mathematicians usually have fewer and poorer đgures in their papers and
books than in their heads. An interesting phenomenon in spatial think-
ing is that scalemakes a big diﬀerence. We can think about little objects in
our hands, or we can think of bigger human-sized structures that we scan,
or we can think of spatial structures that encompass us and that we move
around in. We tend to think more eﬀectively with spatial imagery on a
larger scale: it’s as if our brains take larger things more seriously and can
devote more resources to them.
ăis somatic dimension is also reported by Monsay (1997, p. 104), “I recall one
particular clear example of intuition at work, later inmy career in industry. I was work-
ing on a design for an underwater sound sensor […]While discussing this situationwith
two engineers one aĕernoon, one of whom was the senior engineer I was assigned to
workwith, I suddenly knew I had the resolution to our problem. First came this ‘know-
ing’, then an essentially kinaesthetic feeling forwhatwas involved, and đnally, thewords
to describe the invention […] ăe senior engineer immediately understood.” R. Feyn-
man was famous for the central role that visualisation played in his work, enunciating
in his typically picturesque way, “what I am really trying to do is bring birth to clarity,
which is really a half-assedly thought-out-pictorial semi-vision thing. I would see the
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jiggle-jiggle-jiggle or the wiggle of the path. Even now when I talk about the inĔuence
functional, I see the coupling and I take this turn - like as if there was a big bag of stuﬀ
- and try to collect it in a way and to push it. It’s all visual. It’s hard to explain. […]ăe
character of the answer, absolutely. An inspiredmethod of picturing, I guess. Ordinar-
ily I try to get the pictures clearer, but in the end the mathematics can take over and
be more eﬃcient in communicating the idea of the picture. In certain particular prob-
lems, that I have done, it was necessary to continue the development of the picture as
the method before the mathematics could be really done.”⁵
But perhaps the best illustration that links ‘the body’ with intuition is given by the-
oretician Ron Horgan, describing the process of identifying correct solutions to open
theoretical problems being similar to car driving— one of the most characteristic ex-
amples of somatic tacit knowledge used continuously in the philosophical literature:
Horgan: I think you might call it intuition, serendipity, and there’s a gut
feeling as well. ăere was a professor up here who was teaching solar dy-
namics to some undergraduates, and he went [mumbles] and then he said
“…and so you write down this.” And a student said, “I don’t understand
why you write that down.” And he answered, “It’s obvious. It can’t be any-
thing else” ăen trying to uncode it, to explain to the student is almost
impossible. You say, “but how can it be anything else? It has to be like
this. And no, no, no, you can’t do that.” But that’s an intuition. It’s a bit
like driving your car. Aĕer a while it becomes natural that you don’t sud-
denly shoot oﬀ to the leĕ. “Stay on the road, its obvious.” ăat I can’t
tell you about. Some people have that in pure mathematics. Some people
have that in engineering much better. ‘Green đngers’…some people have
that in gardening! Some people are very, very, very accurate calculators,
so if they want to calculate something they won’t make a mistake and ab-
solutely push it to the end. Other people are not such good calculators
but are very good at deciding what it is that should be calculated and sort
of how.
Reyes: Now that youmention car driving. One doesn’t learn to drive a car
just grabbing a manual. And you don’t take oﬀ immediately. It’s a process
⁵õuoted in Gleick (1992, p. 244).
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of being trained…
Horgan: No, no, you have to work up to it. In the end, if you’re a good
car diver or a good air pilot the vehicle becomes an extension. It becomes
like your hands and arms. It becomes an extension of your brain. It’s ob-
vious…your hands are an extension of your brain, and the car is, and it’s the
same with all this theory. Very gradually these things become amental exten-
sion. ąe mental landscape is increased in size. (emphasis added)
6.5 Puremathematics andappliedmathematics, andtheir
relationship to physical theory
Having discussed mathematical rigour as one factor that separates the general mathe-
matical culture from that of physics, I đnally wish to provide a more precise classiđca-
tion of the upper levels of the horseshoe diagram, so as to identify how the diﬀerent
‘micro-cultures’ of mathematics and high theory can be identiđed. As one goes further
away from the experimental and the phenomenological, there is a feeling that physics
becomes more and more ‘like’ mathematics, to the point that it may sometimes be im-
possible to distinguish one from the other, just as it sometimes might be hard to pin
down if ‘the phenomenal’ should be interpreted as theoretical or experimental argu-
mentation, or as both, or perhaps as a new category. However, theoretician themselves
are sometimes very careful to distinguish physics frommathematics:
De la Peña: When I talk to mathematicians, I even grow envious, because
the way they think is beautiful, but is completely diﬀerent to mine. I can’t
think like they do. I clearly see the enormous diﬀerence that there is. ăeir
purity of thought is very beautiful: the abstract way in which they con-
struct things is very beautiful. But it does not correspond to the way of a
physicist, who has to tie himself down to Nature.
ăere is amarked distinction betweenwhat types of ‘objects’ a physicist and amath-
ematician’s work are supposed to deal with. Physics is ‘empirically based’, while math-
ematics’ aim is not to explain real phenomena, but to deal with and construct abstract
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objects. But sometimes the division is not so clear. Superstring theory has been heav-
ily criticised by many as lying outside of physics, and there is an underlying feeling in
the general physics community that string theorists are in reality more mathematicians
than actual theoreticians. ăis is because at the present moment, all of the predictions
that string theory has made require experimental processes that lie outside of present
experimental capabilities, or any that are likely to be available in the foreseeable future.
Still, string theory has in its origin the idea of unifying diﬀerent pieces of theoretical
physics into a broader, universal mathematical framework. In this sense it is not pure
mathematics; it is ‘tainted’ by a necessity to answer to ‘the world’, even if a relevant ex-
periment is still impossible to carry out. Mondragón, who once worked in the đeld
commented:
Mondragón: Obviously people who do strings need a lot of mathematics;
they’re practically mathematicians but maybe other people from diﬀerent
specialties do not need, say, to know all of topology and diﬀerential ge-
ometry.
ăey may be “practically mathematicians” but this only means that they are not
really mathematicians. Mondragón echoed De la Peña’s appeal to the role of Nature in
theoretical physics as opposed to mathematics:
Mondragón: For me, physics can only be physics if it describes Nature.
And Nature is those processes that we observe and measure. ăe other
parts, mathematics or mathematical physics…Well, there was a very fa-
mous physicist W[…], who used to call them “impure mathematics” be-
cause they arenot completelymathematics. Forme, I do theoretical physics
because although my models may be abstract, they do have to describe a
physical reality that you have to measure and compare with experiment.
For me that is what makes it physics, the theoretical part of these mathe-
matical models.
People do things where they don’t compare. People in strings have certain
physical parameters but they are much more abstract. I like more direct
stuﬀ. ăat is what makes it more physics, rather than mathematical mod-
els. […]You look athow theStandardModel [of particle physics]was built
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and it was built phenomenologically: this symmetry works here, this one
doesn’t, etc. ăat is how physics is done. ăat is how physics is built.
Some theoreticians are highly suspicious view of the kind of physics that is ‘too
much’ likemathematics, to the point of reinforcing the idea that one ought to be careful
of becoming a mathematician:
De laPeña: ăosemathematical schools produced thiswayof seeing things,
to the point of seeing mathematics as the only method of physics. I insist,
mathematics are a very valuable auxiliary, an indispensable tool, even a re-
search tool, a researchmethod; but it is simply onemethod among others,
and it has to be submerged in physics. If it is not submerged in physics,
things usually go wrong.
Between pure mathematics and phenomenologically minded theoretical physics
there is a hybrid land of neither pure-physics nor pure-mathematics, of which super-
strings seem to be the most visible case nowadays. Perhaps superstrings really has in a
way become mathematics and is no longer physics, but even its staunchest opponents
have admitted that the developments made by strings have had enormous relevance in
other areas of physics and even in other sciences:
Mondragón: During the đrst stages of string theory, they thought that
they understood everything […] and it didn’t happen. Other possibly in-
teresting things happened that their calculating obsession blinded them
to, and the realisation came later. ăey saw phenomenological calcula-
tion stuﬀ as a lesser thing; I got to experience it as a student. […]My own
opinion is that it is very interesting, but it is still far frombeing theultimate
description of Nature and the physics of space-time. Nevertheless, there
are connections between Hawking radiation and strings, and things like
that, which make the theory intriguing from a mathematical standpoint.
It is probable that the new astrophysical and cosmological measurements
will đnd this contact with physical phenomena that they are lacking. In
my opinion, even if it were not the description of the physical nature of
space-time, it has given mathematical results applicable to other đelds of
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knowledge that have proven extremely interesting. For example, these are
tools in đeld theory that I mentioned, which were developed from super-
string theory. ăere is also a lot from conformal superstring theory that
has been applied to biophysics, inmembranes, precisely because it involves
similar extended objects. A new application is being developed with the
Maldacenaduality, to apply his development in string theory to a very con-
crete problem: the chromodynamic vacuum; a very hard problem because
it is non-perturbative.
ăese two sides of string theory were commented on in an interview with Tong,
who has actually made phenomenological string theory predictions:⁶
Tong: ăere’s two diﬀerent ways you can approach string theory. One is
the kind of thing you always hear about in the news, that this is the Grand
ăeoryofEverything, it’s solved all of physics. Hawking says it’sM-ăeory
which is basically the same thing as string theory. I was a little bit on that
andmywork on cosmologywas trying to use string theory in that context.
Can we get experimental predictions down to something? But there’s an-
other side of string theorywhich doesn’t get pushed verymuch because it’s
probably not as sexy which is that you can use the theory and the math-
ematical tools that come out of string theory to solve other problems in
physics, and sort of not use it as a Grand ăeory of Everything but just
as a very useful tool [in] some other things like high-temperature super-
conductivity, various aspects condensedmatter physics. So lately I’ve been
playingwith that side. […]ăere’s been lots of similar work that’s really led
to revolutions inmathematics by thinking about string theory. ăere have
⁶“You could actually, in principle, see strings stretched across the sky. So there’s been a long specula-
tion in cosmology of cosmic strings, which aren’t necessarily the same types of strings as in string theory,
but one type of cosmic string is the string of string theory. If these things were ever detected you could
do further observations to know what kind of string you’re dealing with and so maybe you’d see it. With
Eva Silverstein and Mohsen Alishahiha I came up with a theory of inĔation that has to do with extra
dimensions and objects moving in extra dimensions and it gave rise to observable predictions for the
Planck satellite. ăe Planck satellite launched over a year ago. It’s three million kilometres away at the
moment taking data and in đve years we’ll know if my model of the universe is right or wrong. I think
all of these are long shots. So then what do you do? You’ve got a theory; you can’t falsify it. It looks very
good. It looks very compelling but if you don’t know it’s the right theory, you know, you’ve got to be
wary about that.” [From interview with Tong]
183 śRelational and somatic tacit knowledge in physics and mathematics
been ideas in cosmology; I came up with a few; particle physics; and now
in the last ten years it’s spat out this other tool— very surprising, nobody
expected it— but it’s a tool to understand strongly interacting systems;
this means when the interaction is between things like electrons and are
so strong you can’t possibly hope to solve the equations.
6.6 A typology of physics epistemically distant from ex-
periment
ăis chapter has examined both mathematician’s and theoretician’s accounts of their
ownpractice, and shownhow ‘rigour’ has ahigher status inmathematical than inphysics
practice. Yet both intuition and rigour form part ofmathematical and theoretical prac-
tice, so it is not there that a demarcation between mathematics and physics can be
found. It is the hallmark of pure mathematics that mathematics is a discipline that is
separated from thenuances of the ‘real’ world; the stuﬀof puremathematics are abstract
structures, which may or may not have connections to the material world through sci-
entiđc application. One can talk of ‘impure’ mathematics, or applied mathematics that
although it doesn’t have as primary concern the application of their techniques to a spe-
ciđc problem, it does create mathematical frameworks that are clearly geared towards
applications in some domain. ăere are mathematical physicists who although they
may be producing work that is arguably similar to applied mathematics still has the so-
lution of a physical problem ‘in the back of its mind’. It is because string-theory has this
property that despite the strong criticism that it has subjected to, it must still be seen
as a subset of physics. However unsuccessful or fruitless it may be in its phenomeno-
logical aspects, string theorist do aĕer all dream of creating a great physical theory. It
is also physics in the sense that its mathematical apparatus has branched out to explore
other phenomena, and so the ties with the material world are still present, if not in the
original manner. Furthermore, it remains closer to the physicists’ idea of mathematics,
where rigour plays a much lesser part.
In a review of Smolin (2006) and Woit (2006) and their critique of superstrings,
Johnson (2006) refers the reader to the internet page PostmodernismGenerator, which
upon loading generates an academic-looking essay which the page authors describe as
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“completely meaningless and was randomly generated.”⁷ăe ‘essay’ is an electronic ver-
sion of the famous Sokal hoax that started the ScienceWars. ăe interesting bit comes
when Johnson continues:
With a tweak to the algorithms and a diﬀerent database, the Web site
could probably be made to spit out what appear to be abstracts about su-
perstring theory: ”Frobenius transformation, mirror map and instanton
numbers” or ”Fractional two-branes, toric orbifolds and thequantumMcKay
correspondence.”ăose are actually titles of papers recently posted to the
arXiv.org repository of preprints in theoretical physics, and they may well
be of scientiđc worth — if, that is, superstring theory really is a science.
Two new books suggest otherwise: that the frenzy of research into strings
and branes and curled-up dimensions is a case of surface without depth, a
solipsistic shuﬄing of symbols as relevant to understanding the universe
as randomly generated dadaist prose.”
All physicists are familiar with these sort of ‘ultra-theorertical’ but not-quite-math-
ematical physics papers. Duringmy physics research years, a favourite game formy clos-
est collaborator and I was to invent ridiculous sounding articles on the Casimir eﬀect
and then go through arXiv orWeb of Science and đnd the closest đtting example; most
of the time we were never too far oﬀ from at least one existing article.
Take for example an article by found aĕer searching a physics database for the key-
words ‘Casimir’ and ‘torus’ byHuang (2001), “Casimir eﬀect on the radius stabilization
of thenoncommutative torus”. ăe abstract reads as follows: “We evaluate the one-loop
correction to the spectrum of Kaluza-Klein system for the3model onR; d×(T2)L,
where 1 + d dimensions are the ordinary Ĕat Minkowski spacetimes and the extra di-
mensions are the L two-dimensional noncommutative tori with noncommutativity .
ăe correction to theKaluza-Kleinmass spectrum is then used to compute theCasimir
energy. ăe results show that when L > 2 the Casimir energy due to the noncommu-
tativity could give repulsive force to stabilize the extra noncommutative tori in the cases
of d = 4n−2, with n a positive integral.”
Dauntingly titled, these articles are commonplace in the ‘mathematical’ Casimir ef-
fect literature. Although I can understand to some extent whatmost of the termsmean
⁷http://www.elsewhere.org/pomo/
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(e.g. ‘a one-loop correction’ is associated with a particularly simple Feynman diagram;
the ‘noncommutative’ is describing the kind of algebraic structure of the system that is
being analysed; a ‘torus’ is a geometric đgure that in three dimensions can be visualised
as a doughnut but then can be generalised to a higher dimensional space). ăeCasimir
force can be seen to arise in any spacewhere there is any kind of backgroundđeld, which
in this case must be the Kaluza-Klein system. If an object is put inside the đeld, it ‘dis-
turbs’ the đeld and the energy of the đeld changes (this change of energy is the origin
of the Casimir force). ăus, the author is putting a mathematically well-deđned object
in a weird but mathematically well-deđned kind of space, and calculating the energy of
the đeld associated with this geometry. ăe author then analyses cases for particular
numbers of dimensions, and đnds that some of them may give rise to repulsive forces
(which is curious, because Casimir forces are generally attractive).
What is the point of such a paper? Experimentally, there are currently only two
conđgurations where the Casimir force is measurable: the force between two plates,
and the force between a plate and a sphere. Any other conđguration proves too unsta-
ble, or experimenters have yet to set up an experiment that can probe them. Of course,
we have no access to generalised experiments in 1+ddimensions, nor to aKaluza-Klein
system! And yet, the author is calculating something that in a very abstract form takes
‘inspiration’ from real phenomena, and could, maybe, possibly, perhaps, if we dream, if
we dream a lot, one day đnd applicability in the real world.
Althoughmany physicists may contend that these mathematical exercises might be
mostly irrelevant to the profession, they nevertheless keep being produced and pub-
lished. Mathematical physics may not đnd a lot of direct application in the material
world of physics when it is of the more pedestrian variety, but when it touches upon
more edgy or exciting-sounding topics, it seems to be quite popular. Superstring the-
ory is such a đeld, where the contact from the phenomenal world seems very far away,
but not entirely severed. ăat is has also fed technique to both physics andmathematics
while not being the one or the other puts it in a favourable, if strange, position.
ăough it may resemble mathematics, mathematicians like Jaﬀe andõuinn do not
see physical theory as a branch ofmathematics, but as a đeld of expertise thatmay inĔu-
encemathematics, but is not quite at the same level. Diﬀerent areas of theory therefore
have a diﬀerent relationshipwith the empirical content of thework. ăediﬀerent levels
in whichmathematics enters into physics and forms specialist domains is encompassed
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Table 6.1: Relationship with experiment, mathematics and physics
Micro-culture Relationship with experiment
Pure Mathematics Irrelevant
Applied Mathematics Relevant, but fortuitous
All Physics Essential, but in diﬀerent degrees depending
on the micro-culture
in Table 6.1.
ăeory can be fractioned depending on how the phenomenological ‘enters’ prac-
tice. For many theoreticians, the appearance of ‘the world’ in their work seems almost
as fortuitous as for mathematicians, as happens inmost of string theory, but is still kept
as a far away, or separate goal. On the other hand, some physicists seem inclined to-
wards the belief that one should not only play around with mathematical objects that
may represent physical objects, but one also needs to explain and understand real phe-
nomena, and gain a conceptual understanding of it. But perhaps the best argument for
tracing a division between mathematical physics and more ‘phenomenologically ori-
ented physics’, and for considering them distinct micro-cultural entities, is the disbelief
in each other’s work that sometimes arises, and particularly of a mild resentment some-
times shown by theoreticians concerning mathematical physicist’s work being taken as
the highest form of ‘true’ theoretical physics:
Mondragón: It’s like those theoretical physicists that live in their own nir-
vana, in their ivory tower; they’re really convinced about what they do.
ăese so-called mathematical physics… In my studying history I’ve come
to the conclusion that the term ‘theoretical physics’ is an abnormality, per
se. I think it originates in the twentieth century as a consequence of the
overwhelming success of quantum mechanics, and of linear algebra. […]
And within theoretical physics, there’s that second abnormality, ‘mathe-
matical physics’. […] Anyway, I think there are two kinds of us. I do feel
more of the pragmatic kind, although if you look at the everyday stuﬀ I do
it’s just as abstract as the people who do mathematical physics [laughs].
CHAPTER 7
ColleĆive tacit knowledge in theoretical physics
ųyĖrﬆ article“ſun-ŷi űingdom—ŬundamenĬl ŵne” obvioĮly hĆ very
weğ put today’sŶŮſŹůũŹ intoĭeŪūŧŪūŴŪ.Źtudents, teachers and
professors who have a solid background of mćhemćics and/or physics can
eĆily examine whć ů say by yourselĂes.
ůf youĭinkmyĖrﬆarticle does not suﬃciently shake down today’sųŧźŮ-
ūųŧźůũŹ, my second incoming article ”ſun-ŷi űingdom— Ŭunda-
menĬl źwo” wiğ clearly show you ĭć ĭe ųŧźŮūųŧźůũŹ we
have Įed for centuries ĝ also considerably and lawlesslyŽŸŵŴŭ.
ŶleĆe do not Įe today’s knowledge Ć your prejudices to cut immedićely
whć ů have said down. źry to inĂeﬆigće it Ėrﬆ. ů hope one can bećſun-ŷi
űingdom down by Įing today’s science and knowledge, but ů’ğ be aĚaid to
say ĭćŴŵŨŵŪſ ũŧŴ.
-ũhang ſuŽang, Ěomĭe ‘ſun-ŷi űingdom’ webpage (2011)
7.1 ăe ‘collective’ in ‘collective tacit’ knowledge
Collins’ third type of tacit knowledge is collective tacit knowledge, and contrary to the
other two types it lies not in the individual but in collectivities. Collective tacit knowl-
edge is of particular importance to sociology because it is, by deđnition, a phenomenon
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that has roots not in persons but in societies. ăis does not mean that collective tacit
knowledge does not enter the individual mind, but that to ‘tap into’ the pool of col-
lective knowledge (tacit or not) it is necessary to đrst be socialised into a collectivity. I
will introduce the role of collective tacit knowledge by looking at examples of people
who practice physics outside of professionally sanctioned settings, so-called ‘cranks’.
Cranks are interesting because they are individuals who can be prođcient in the techni-
cal aspects of mathematics or theory, but who have not been immersed in the physical
or linguistic world of professional physics. Because of this they have not been able to
‘tap’ into the discipline’ reservoir of the collective tacit knowledge, and are isolated by
‘legitimate’ physicists.
7.2 Crank science: an illustration of (missing) collective
tacit knowledge
Berry is the current editor of the Proceedings of the Royal Society A, one of the world’s
most prestigious and oldest scientiđc journals. Being a high-prođle scientiđc journal,
the number of articles submitted for publication is much larger than the number that
can actually be published (approximately seventy to eighty percent of papers are re-
jected). Along with the papers rejected for technical reasons, Berry mentioned that is a
large number of submissions that can be placed in the ‘crank’ category, papers that are
so outlandish or poorly written that they can instantly be seen to have been made by a
non-physicist:
Berry: ăe other problem is that with a journal of such prestige we get
a lot of junk; people who aren’t scientists with this new theory. Oĕen
retired engineers seem to be prone to this grandiosity. You instantly know
if a paper is junk, but on the other hand you have to take into account
that the author is serious, and has thought a great deal about what they’ve
done— they’re always men, never women— and so I encourage my board
members to write not just ‘ăis is rubbish’, but helpful comments just why
the paper is being rejected.
Reyes: How do you know when a paper is rubbish?
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Berry: Many people have written about this. You instantly know. You
knowbecause their references areEinstein, Schrödinger,Heisenberg. ăere
are lots of diﬀerent ways. I shouldn’t say this, but oĕen they use bizarre
typefaces, or there’s a lack of contact with large current literature on all
these problems; oĕen, very oĕen — almost always — a lack of concrete
quantitative predictions; a failure to test whether this new theory of theirs
will reproduce what is already known. When I get papers that claim to
reproduce quantum mechanics I oĕen write, ‘Well, how would you ex-
plain with your theory… how would you explain the Casimir eﬀect, or
theăomas precession?’ And they don’t knowwhat that is. ăey’ve never
heard of it, and that silences them. In areas that I know about that’s what
I do. You have to explain things that are already understood before you go
oﬀ… It’s complicated. ăere is a little literature on people who describe
ways to recognize crazy papers. One just recognizes.
Reyes: I suppose that there must also be a smaller amount of papers from
members of the community that are not worth publishing.
Berry: Of course there are. ăis is thenormal rejectionof papers; not deep
enough or just publishing a small incremental advance. You see, there’s
this famous devastating criticism by Pauli of a paper, ‘It’s not even wrong.’
ăat category is diﬀerent. ăese are not cranks; they aremediocre. Some-
times, people think that if something is a correct result and has never been
published before, this is a good enough reason to publish. And I have
never been so unkind as to say what I’m going to say now to an author, but
I’m waiting for a suﬃciently unpleasant author to say this to him. ‘ăree
hundred and thirty sevenmultiplied by seven thousand four hundred and
sixty two equals…whatever it does.’ ăis is undoubtedly a correct result
and I’m convinced it has never been published result, but it’s not worth
publishing. I’ve never said this, but it makes the point. It can be correct,
it can be original, but that doesn’t mean it’s worth publishing.
A number of high-prođle theoreticians and mathematical physicists have written
‘crank indices’, shedding a comical light on the pathos that cranks evoke in mainstream
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physicists.Ʋ All of the these references are more or less part of theoretical physics ‘pop
culture’ rather than formal documents—with the exception of Langmuir they are only
available as internet resources—andgive us an insight into aphysicists ‘everyday’world-
view. ăough they may be informal, they are not meaningless. ‘Crank’ is a category
recognisable by physics researchers far and wide. It may even be a professional pitfall
that can have severe consequences should a physicist come to be branded as one.Ƴ
A lot of the crank-characteristics in thesepopular satirical pieces dealwith the crank’s
eccentricity: comparing oneself to great scientists, having persecutory delusions, ego-
mania, etc. Siegel (2011) for example mentions that a telltale sign of being a ‘quack’
is inclusion of personal attacks claiming that “the establishment always rejects new
ideas,” or declaring “I knew you wouldn’t listen, you scientists are too arrogant and
closed-minded.” In a similar piece, Baez (1998) awards ‘crackpot points’ for each use of
the phrase “self-appointed defender of the orthodoxy” and particularly high scores for
“claiming that the ‘scientiđc establishment’ is engaged in a ‘conspiracy’ to prevent your
work from gaining its well-deserved fame, or suchlike.”
But as Berry mentions, cranks in science are not necessarily lunatics or hopeless ec-
centrics; they can be “retired engineers” who are out of touch with the đeld and exhibit
“lack of contact with large current literature”. Most importantly, cranks are not iden-
tiđed by whether they are right or wrong. Scientists disregard crank theories without
even noticing what the theory may say. ăis is not because cranks are wrong, but be-
cause in many cases even the questions they pose are ‘illegitimate’; despite being what
one might call conceptually eccentric, many of the most esteemed theories of contem-
porary physics are not regarded as crank science. As an interviewee mentioned, “if you
hear people talk aboutmany-worlds [theory], you’d think they are asmad as anything!”
Ideas such as darkmatter, dark energy, black holes, superstrings, inĔating universes and
ƲSee for example Baez (1998), Siegel (2011) and ’t Hooĕ (2003); see Mulkay & Gilbert (1982) for
an analysis of scientiđc humour as a resource for sociological investigation.
Langmuir (1953) discussed multiple examples of what he termed ‘pathological’ experimental physics
in a well-known conference, but not all the examples that Langmuir chose constitute ‘crank’ science as
deđnedhere; someof these experimental projects aremore akin to ‘fringe’ science, where an experimental
group that started out as legitimate physics spun oﬀ into a closed research program. Langmuir’s examples
also include ‘pseudoscience’ as oĕen denounced in the popular press by scientists (e.g. UFOs).
Ƴ‘Crank’ is deđned by theOED as “a person with a mental twist; one who is apt to take up eccentric
notions or impracticable projects; esp. one who is enthusiastically possessed by a particular crotchet or
hobby; an eccentric, a monomaniac.” ăe crank scientist, and particularly the crank physicist, đts this
deđnition.
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particles that ‘exist’ yet are literally undetectable are all part of respectable science.
In his popular account of crank science and pseudo-science, Gardner (1957, p. 8)
supported the view that cranks are separated from experts not by the truth of their
theories but by the degree of their “scientiđc competence”. Gardner points out that
cranks come in many varieties, from the “stupid, ignorant, almost illiterate men who
conđne their activities to sending ‘crank letters’ to prominent scientists” to others who
are “brilliant and well-educated, oĕen with an excellent understanding of the branch
of science in which they are speculating.” Gardner asserts that the most salient charac-
teristic of cranks, whether idiotic or genial is that “cranks work in almost total isolation
from their colleagues. Not isolation in the geographical sense, but in the sense of hav-
ing no fruitful contacts with fellow researchers.” Gardner explains that although pre-
Renaissance science may have allowed for the working of individual scientists, because
of the emergence ofmodern science’s vast and complex network of cooperative dynam-
ics nowadays “it is impossible for a working scientist to be isolated.”ƴ He also points out
that it is not the outlandishness of a crank’s hypotheses that a community refuses but
that rather, because of his isolation, “the crank is not well enough informed to write a
paper with even a surface resemblance to a signiđcant study.”
Cranks tend to believe that through individual eﬀorts they have found a fracture
in a scientiđc worldview to which they have no legitimate access; but at the same time,
that their views should be placed on par to those of a legitimate expert. Crank papers
oĕen pose problems that are not ‘legitimate’ problems for the community which is ex-
pected to read the paper, for example casting doubt on a particular experimental result
that is seen as unproblematic, or a foundational theoretical result that has been uncon-
troversial for decades. ăey fail to recognise the sociological dimensions of scientiđc
knowledge, championing a highly individualistic viewpoint of scientiđc practice. ăe
infamous crank journal Progress in Physics for example states in its ‘Declaration of Aca-
demic Freedom’:
A scientist is any person who does science. Any person who collaborates
with a scientist in developing and propounding ideas and data in research
ƴ‘Crank’ is deđned by the OED deđnes as “a person with a mental twist; one who is apt to take
up eccentric notions or impracticable projects; esp. one who is enthusiastically possessed by a particular
crotchet or hobby; an eccentric, amonomaniac.”ăe crank scientist, and particularly the crank physicist,
đts this deđnition.
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or application is also a scientist. ăe holding of a formal qualiđcation is
not a prerequisite for a person to be a scientist.
Naturally, this sort of declaration marks the crank not only as an outsider, but as a
hostile outsider, and it renders their likelihood of success even smaller.
7.3 Knowing the literature, knowing the đeld
Someof the characteristics listed as telltale signs of cranknessmay initially seemodd, for
example, whenBerrymentions that “their references are Einstein, Schrödinger,Heisen-
berg.” An outsider to physics would suppose that to cite the great masters, rather than
secondary work, would be an obviously good thing. In many disciplines, sociology for
example, this is oĕen the case. Physics is diﬀerent in this respect. Although founda-
tional papers are sometimes cited (for example,Casimir force papers invariably beginby
citingCasimir’s foundational 1948 article), meaningful debates are not centred around
these papers but on the present literature. Citing the foundational literature in extenso
by itself, without reference to modern developments, is a sign that the author is not fa-
miliarwithwhat is ‘commonknowledge’ in theđeld, or in terms of the previous chapter,
what ought to be treated as conventional (relational) tacit knowledge.
More surprising is that even recognised experts may sometimes, if they’re not care-
ful, behave like cranks. Scientists may have been away from the đeld long enough to
no longer recognise what’s important even when they have achieved high prođciency
in other areas:
Reyes: We have a saying in Spanish…it’s a bad translation; it sounds better
in Spanish…, ‘ăe Devil is clever not because he’s the Devil, but because
he’s very old’.
Berry: Yes, I like that, but if you’re in the world of proverbs, there’s an-
other one in English which is, ‘ăere’s no fool like an old fool.’ So you just
choose. ăese old fools…are such people who have had good scientiđc ca-
reers andwho in their retirement think that they can look at someproblem
they’ve not studied before and they canmake some contribution to it, and
they can’t. I’m now dealing with an author who I don’t know how to deal
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with because he was a very senior person, made some useful contributions
inmathematical physics. And nowhe thinks that he has an understanding
of Cosmology, which is fundamentally new, and he doesn’t, and it’s rather
awkward todealwithbecause these arenotpeoplewho…in their lives, they
have not been cranks. ăey think that because they were clever— and are
clever— they can understand problems without getting into the details.
ăat’s the old fool, so to speak.
ăe prime characteristic of cranks is therefore not that they lack technical prođ-
ciency, for they can be brilliant ex-scientists, but that they lack the skills to realise what
is and what is not relevant in the professional physicist’s social landscape. For example,
they are unable to ‘keep up with the current literature’, even when they may have been
contributors to that very same đeld years before:
Berry: You have to be very careful. In my own life I’ve been very wary
of this because choosing not to work in fashionable subjects, but having
been fortunate enough to do work that has made some subjects fashion-
able, I then have a dilemma. õuantum chaos is an example. I hardly work
on it now, but if I did, I would be having to keep up with the literature
when I already…long ago we worked out the fundamental principles. I’m
delighted when they’re applied, and I’ve made some applications myself,
but I don’t want to continue along that line, and there are other people
just as clever as me now doing this work. So I change, every few years I
change what I do. But I’m very careful when I do that. ăe areas I go into
are organically related to the ones before, because I’m really aware of the
danger of trampling into a subject and making pronouncements about it
simply because I’ve done good work in the past.
7.4 ăechangingworldof theoreticalpublications: arXiv
ăeproblem of becoming a crank through lack of continuous of contact with ‘the đeld’
has been exacerbated by the way the mechanisms of diﬀusion of papers has changed
in physics in the last few decades. In today’s physics even the last published article in
a specialty’s preferred journal can be old news, and today it is the electronic pre-print
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service arXiv and not the paper journals which are the primary sources of published
material. Although printed publications are still a measure of academic prestige, the
de facto standard for keeping up to date with published work is no longer the peer-
reviewed journal, but the arXiv website.⁴ As Tong described:
Tong: Oh, I don’t look at them [journals]. I don’t think anybody does. I
suspect it’s diﬀerent for experimenters. ăe only place I’ve looked at jour-
nal papers lately are experimental condensed-matter papers. String the-
ory, high-energy physics, it’s all on the arXiv. ăe đrst hour of every day I
spend reading what’s interesting in the arXiv.
Reyes: I was talking to Graeme [Mitchison] yesterday, and he said that a
lot of theoreticians would be very happy if journals just stopped existing
and everything was on the arXiv. I don’t know if that’s possible but…
Tong: I think it’s true. A few years ago a lot of the top theorists just
stopped publishing in journals. ăe only real reason not to, and I think
it’s an important reason, is sort of testing people’s…how you test the qual-
ity of somebody’s work. A lot of that still depends on how many papers
you’ve published in journals. I think the peer-review process is sometimes
worthwhile, but not oĕen. And oĕen you write a paper and the person
says, “this is a really nice paper,” and sometime you get an excellent ref-
eree’s report back where he says, “you’ve got to think about this or that.”
ăat’s somehow a bit more satisfactory. [In arXiv] the way your bad re-
ports happen is by ignoring a paper, a complete lack of interest in it. But
certainly if a paper is interesting it gets informally refereed. And it’s very
odd. […] ăere was a big breakthrough a couple of years ago on under-
standing membrane theory, Bagger-Lambert theory. ăis paper came out
by Bagger and Lambert about three months before a group of people, dif-
ferent people around the world suddenly sort of had been playing with
these and had ideas, and then it just became exponential. So it got to the
point where a paper would be published on the arXiv, two weeks later I’d
get to referee it, but it was already out of date by then because there had
⁴For a general description of arXiv and its relationship to printed journal publications in contempo-
rary physics, see Gunnarsdóttir (2005).
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been thirty other papers in the intervening two weeks pointing out mis-
takes in that paper even though it had inđnitesimal progress, so you were
not quite sure whether you should accept that paper or reject it. It had
been useful but it was already superseded by that time. I think that’s an
example of how the arXiv works really well, with this informal refereeing
process and the whole movement just pushing things forward.
‘Bad’ or ‘irrelevant’ papers that make it to arXiv are thus đltered in the same way
that cranks are đltered out of mainstream physics: they are simply ignored. ăe more
so since unlike traditional journals, arXiv is only slightly moderated; ‘endorsement’ has
recently been introduced into arXiv, whereby an article can be posted on the website
only if it is ‘endorsed’ by an already recognised poster, thus limiting the probability
that cranks, pranksters or other community-wise unwanted posters could upload their
papers. ăis is far frompeer-review in the traditional way. As Tongmentions, an article
becomes ‘interesting’ in arXivwhen it is talked about, when it causes open controversy,
and when recognised scientists generally engage with it, either positively or critically.
õuoting Andy Warhol, arXiv success follows the dictum “don’t pay any attention to
what they write about you. Just measure it in inches.”
Tong: In the old days you could oĕen read rebuttals to rebuttals to rebut-
tals in the journals. Somehow with the arXiv that seems to have stopped
a little bit. It happens occasionally… a comment on this paper, and then
a rebuttal to the comment. But if an idea is boring, if a paper is boring,
it won’t get much attention. If a paper is interesting everybody wants to
read it, everybodywants to work on it and very quickly anymistakes come
to the fore. One good thing about the arXiv is that this can turn over very,
very quickly. If you write an interesting paper within a couple of weeks
there can be sponsors to that paper. People try to build on your theory or
generalize the idea, and people also say, “the guy did this wrong.”
An arxiv publication’s reputation is upheld by ‘word of mouth’; by the amount of
attention that the community invests in it. Cranks, being at the fringes or completely
outside of scientiđc circles where the talk is being carried out, have little or no access to
this knowledge. ăeway that theoreticians inpractice acquire this collective knowledge
śChapter 7 196
is tomeet and talk to other theoreticians, that is, to immerse themselves in the language
of their practice.
7.5 How to gain collective tacit knowledge: identifying
legitimate problems
Cranks negatively illustrate the importance that interacting with recognised members
of a community plays in modern theoretical physics. But how does one in fact gain
entry into a community of physics experts? ăe đrst thing most senior scientist makes
a novice pupil do is to get acquainted with the relevant modern literature and under-
stand it as far as the young student’s skills allow. ăis allows, as described in the pre-
vious chapter, for the student to become acquainted with the technical relational tacit
knowledge that is intrinsic to the đeld, but it also permits the student to identify which
are the ‘good’ articles simply by having the supervisor point them out as a worthwhile
read. It also allows the student to develop a feeling for what the important discussions
in the đeld are. So important is the ability to identify what the relevant problem is
that displaying this skill is in fact oĕen cited as one of the indicators that an aspiring
theoretician has actually become a competent expert, for example:
Mondragón: ăere is of course a training period. Which skills do you
need? Curiosity is necessary, I think. You need a true desire to under-
stand Nature, or a part of it. It can be through solid state, materials sci-
ence, elementary particles, or astronomy. ăat is a pre-requisite. I think
you need to exhibit logical thought, and a certain mathematical ability
that can vary in scope, depending on your specialty. Obviously people
who do strings need a lot; they’re practically mathematicians but maybe
other people from diﬀerent specialties do not need, say, to know all of
topology and diﬀerential geometry. You need some specialty-dependent
training that is partly themathematics of your subđeld, andpartly the phe-
nomenology that youwant to describe with thesemathematics. Aĕer that
youhave todo things on your own. Youhave tođnd aproblemand to solve
it. Not necessarily alone; maybe it’ll be in a group. But you need a prob-
lem. Once you’re at that stage where you’re looking at a problem that no
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one has solved with your own eyes and your own ideas from a theoretical
perspective…that is when you can consider yourself a true theoretician.
Before arriving with a senior scientist, the apprentice may have digested tomes and
tomes of textbooks, but these will not tell him what the ‘allowed’ topics are. If starting
from the textbook (as one may suppose many of Berry’s retired engineers do) there is
high probability of descent into crank territory. But even very experienced scientists,
recognised experts in their đeld, need to exercise the utmost caution whenmoving into
other đelds of specialised expertise, like Berry mentions. Mitchison described how his
relatively recent transition into the world of quantum information was enabled by the
close guidance of mature experts.
Mitchison: What happened was that I went to some lectures that were
being given in Bristol and on the train I met one of the lecturers and we
started talking and he became a friend, Sandu Popescu, and then I met
Richard Jozsa, and he had posed in New Scientist a problem which he
had thought interesting about counterfactuality in quantum mechanics.
I started working on that and corresponding with him, and he very kindly
helpedme through incredible gaps andmisunderstandings and eventually
wrote a paper together. I sort of had the beneđt of private tuition from two
very brilliant people, which I think is just incredibly good luck. I’m sure
if I just sat down and tried from a beginner’s position to get into research
in the subject it would have been quite diﬃcult.
Reyes: Why do you think it would have been diﬃcult?
Mitchison: I think that you only understandwhat are the important ideas
if you’re a beginner by talking to somebody who’s been in the đeld a long
time. It’s not that there are things that you can’t know on your own. It’s
that there’s a kind of perspective and a weight that has to be given to it,
to the important ideas. Half an hour of talking to somebody who knows
the subject completely changes the landscape, and I have the beneđt of
Richard’s email correspondence and we worked out ideas by me making
mistakes and he correcting them.
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Reyes: Whichwere the important parts of the landscapewhich he showed
you, which would have been harder to đnd on your own.
Mitchison: One thing is to understand how classical information theory
looks in a quantum context, and to realize what the questions were that
he thought important to try to understand. I would never have seen the
correct way, for example, to think of quantum computation, which you do
using a number of models, and the way that he moved between them was
very educative. ăere are a lot of tricks and techniques and viewpoints.
ăe same is true of Sandu; he’s an incredibly good teacher. One reads a
paper and says— as I did, because the paper was incredibly badly written
— ‘how can people produce such a trashy paper?’ and he said, ‘actually,
that’s one of the best ideas!’ and I realised I was being put oﬀ by the wrong
thing. ăose sort of things are vital!
Using the Collins & Evans’ criteria of expertise, Weinel (2007, 2008) has come up
with the concept of ‘domain speciđc discrimination’ as a collection of skills that allow
experts in an esoteric đeld to recognize ‘legitimate’ scientiđc controversies. ăe four
criteria thatWeinel proposesmake up domain speciđc discrimination are all applied by
theoreticians to recognise crank papers:
1. Conceptual continuity in science —Weinel asserts that “if a body of work or a
claim is too far removed from science so that there appears to be no intent to
make it part of science, it cannot be said to be part of a scientiđc controversy.”
Many crank papers do not try to ‘add’ to existing scientiđc theory, but rather at-
tempt to overturn the entire ediđce of physics (see quote at beginning of chapter)
or of a stable piece of theory.
2. Expertise of the originator—Weinel writes that “ [expertise] criteria can be op-
erationalised by examining the social networks in which the person making the
claims is embedded. To the extent that these include networks of relevant ex-
perts, then there are grounds for believing the person making the claim knows
what she or he is talking about.” Although some cranks may be practicing scien-
tists, they are characteristically not part of the scientiđc networkwhich they area
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attempting to enter. ăus they are seen as treading on an expert area to which
they do not legitimately belong.
3. Constitutive work — this category is connected to understanding the scientiđc
‘form of life’, in Fleck’s sense, which forWeinel is made up of activities that ‘look
like’ science to scientists. For example, the lack of constitutivework in cranks can
be seen in their inability to understand that empirical, mathematical or theoreti-
cal results are collectively and not individually supported in science. Cranks fail
to understand that to practice science it is not enough to have a bright idea, but
to play the sociological game of convincing expert communities that the idea is
clever, and that this does not go against the ‘spirit’ of science. Cranks for exam-
ple would fail to understand the importance of virtual empiricism for theoretical
practice, and the chains of trust that have to be kept unless a full migration to-
wards phenomenological work is carried out.
4. Explicit argument — although it is probably only the minority of crank papers
which eventually get read by scientists, this does not mean that scientists are un-
able or unwilling to engage in argument with unusual ideas; change in science
would be impossible otherwise. It is likely that a theoretical proposal that cov-
ered the previous three categories would at least pass the preliminary refereeing
stage of a journal, although eventually it could be rejected for technical reasons.
7.6 Socialising into a new đeld
Lacking the possibility of keeping prolonged contact with a recognised expert close at
hand, an alternativeway to initiallymapoutwhat a ‘new’ đeld looks like and thus obtain
partial social immersion is to attend introductory workshops or ‘schools.’ For example,
the “2010 Casimir, van der Waals, and nanoscale interactions school” at the École de
Physique des Houches, one of many centres around the world devoted to these kind of
events, was described as follows:
ăeCasimir, van derWaals and nanoscale interactions school is organised
to provide its participants a complete overview of the state-of-the-art in
theđeldof theCasimir eﬀect andof someof the related research areas. ăe
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school will oﬀer a pedagogical introduction to the theory of the Casimir
eﬀect, from the origin to the questions which nowadays focus interest of
physicists, chemists and engineers. A series of lectures will describe the
major issues and how they are related to innovative methods of Casimir
forcemeasurements, thus illustrating the trends for future activities in this
vibrant research đeld. Several distinguished lecturers coming from other
areas of researchwill report on the basic concepts onwhich their scientiđc
community is growing.
ăeconferencewas attendedbybotholdmembers of theCasimir community (most
of them standing in as “distinguished lecturers”) and by physicists from other đelds
as diverse as gravitational wave detection and AFM microscopy that were interested
in understanding the relevance of the Casimir eﬀect within the context of their work.
Schools such as these are not just easy substitutes for reading the literature, but rather
ways to interact directly with establishedmembers of a đeld. Scientiđc conferences and
seminars always include references to and explanations of the ‘relevant’ recent articles
and results, which act as social ‘pointers’. ăey also allow direct contact with the ex-
perts, and serve to identify who else is considered an expert straight from the horse’s
mouth. If a recognised expert cites a particular theoretical result or an experiment in a
conference, the novice can assume that this is proper reading and reference material. If
a paper is discussed in a school, just the fact that it’s mentioned is a pointer that this is
accepted work up for discussion.
ăe same thing happens with the topics of research covered in schools and semi-
nars. In order to establish dialogue with and within a community, a physicist must đrst
recognise that all problems are not created equal. ăere are problems that interest com-
munities, and other that do not. Attending a conference with ‘experts’ gives one a fair
sampling of ‘what is being talked about’ in the đeld and what constitutes a problem of
concern for the community of relevant experts. Many of the scientists that attended the
LesHouches school were senior theoreticians from ‘related’ areas whowere looking for
opportunities to network directly with Casimir physicists, or to check out if the topics
being researched into could be relevant to their work.
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7.7 What is a ‘good’ theoretical citation?
Although in principle theoretical results are said to be open to reconstruction by any-
one who possesses suﬃcient knowledge of the mathematics involved, as was argued in
the previous chapter, most theoretical results that the individual physicist comes across
in the literature remain unchecked unless one has a very particular interest in them.
When one is forced to cite a paper outside of one’s đeld of expertise, it is oĕen done
without exhaustively checking the entire paper’s argument, and oĕen times one is led
by other heuristic indicators. For example, one can choose to cite a paper that has a
high citation rate. But this does not aﬀord a general method of identifying the ‘proper’
sources to cite.
Onapersonal note, Iwas able to experience the importanceof collective tacit knowl-
edge during the writing of the đrst published paper I was involved in, which dealt with
an acoustic classical analogy to the Casimir eﬀect. ăe group I worked in had ređned
previous work on the topic by extending the applicability of the original theoretical
setup for this eﬀect.⁵ Previous authors had shown that given two parallel plates inside
a gas đlled cavity, if one introduces a background white-noise đeld a force between the
plates arises that pushes or pulls them apart depending on the parameters of the back-
ground đeld and the distance between the plates. However, in acoustics one normally
deals not with forces, but with pressures (forces per unit area). ăe pressure itself is
usually derived from a fundamentally ‘higher’ theoretical quantity, the so-called wave
stress-tensor. In our original submission, we referenced a paper from a Ĕagship journal
in acoustics (the same one we were submitting to) that contained— so we thought— a
nice historical discussion of the concept of acoustic pressure and cleared up some con-
ceptual issues that arise from how one deđnes what the pressure is starting from the
stress tensor. ăe refereeing process was rather fast and the article was almost immedi-
ately accepted for publication, pending the resolution of some recommendationsmade
by the referees. One in particular stood out in reference to the this paper, which I re-
produce directly the referee report:
…reference[15] may not be the best reference for the acoustic radiation
pressure, Eq (11). ăis article dealt with a silly polemic that surfaced in
⁵See Barcenas et al. (2004).
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the 70’s over an idiotic misunderstanding of radiation pressure in one-
dimension (see Lord Rayleigh, Philos. Mag. 3, 338-346 (1902); Lord
Rayleigh, Philos. Mag. 10, 364-374 (1905)). Using reference [15] may
just be an invitation to renew this silliness. Alternative references may
be L. D. Landau and E. M. Lifshitz, Fluid Mechanics, (Pergamon Press,
London 1959), Sec. 64; C. P. Lee and T. G. Wang ”’Acoustic radiation
pressure,” J. Acoust. Soc. Am. 94, 1099-1109 (1993)
ăe author we had cited had several dozen articles just in the very journal we sub-
mitted to, with this very article having been cited more than 60 times, and yet the ref-
eree’s words made it clear that we had committed a small blunder by citing an article
that had at some point stirred up deep disagreement in the đeld. Although the main
author of our paper had beenworking in acoustics for some time andhad other publica-
tions in this journal, it was not hismain topic, andwe decided to drop the reference and
stick to the suggested references. So why did we not identify that this was the ‘wrong’
article to cite? ăe cited work’s credentials seemed impeccable; the article itself was
highly engaging, and there were no outstanding evident Ĕaws in his argument. It was
something that only a deep ‘insider’ to theworld of this brand of acousticswould know;
a piece of information leĕ unstated in the formal literature, but critical when it came
to the reception if the article by the specialised peer-reviewers.
ăus a good theoretical argument in this case depended not only on giving a tech-
nically correct argument, but also on supporting this argument on acceptable sources.
Our source might have been acceptable by citation standards, but the controversy it
had caused in the past was not visible to us outsiders. We lacked the ‘inside’ collective
tacit knowledge to identify this. Only an expert could point this out to us, as all outside
standards pointed to this as being a ‘good’ paper. In this case, the collective tacit knowl-
edge was made explicit by the referee, but only because the issue came up, as otherwise
it would have remained something only an expert in acoustics would have known to
avoid.
ăe core characteristic of collective tacit knowledge is thus that it allows individu-
als to walk about, perform and talk eﬀectively within a social sphere, and has much in
common with Bourdieu’s concept of habitus as “a sense of the game”, and as “the social
game incarnate”, which is imbued by tacit knowledge in the forms of “strategies” and
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“dispositions”. ăus, says Bourdieu, ‘ăe constraints and requirements of the game, al-
though they are not locked within a code of rules, are imperative for those, and only
those, who, because they have a sense of the game’s immanent necessity, are equipped
to perceive them and carry them out”.⁶ Cranks in this context are the uncomfortable
strangers at the edge of the physics playground who are eager to join in the game, but
demand that the rules be changed for their own beneđt, or a private understanding of
how the game ought to be played that does not match the habitus of physics.
7.8 Historical cranks
Historical studies of reactions to Einstein’s theory of general relativity show that both
the existence of cranks and the modern physics status quo’s reaction to them have not
changed much since at least the early 20th century. Reviewing a recent monograph on
opposition to relativity since the 1920s by Wazeck (2009), van Dongen (2010) notes
that “the actions ofmany of Einstein’s opponents resemble those of the thinkers nowof-
ten referred to as, in perhaps an all too derisive manner, ‘crackpots’. It thus appears that
this phenomenon is at least as old as the existence of institutionalised science, which
arbitrates authoritatively what is, and what is not, sound scientiđc practice and estab-
lished truth; crackpots, with their own unshakable beliefs, in the end rather deny that
authority than give up their ideas.”
Regarding the closure of scientiđc circles to ‘illegitimate’ critics of relativity such as
the engineer Arthur Patschke who wrote numerous pamphlets condemning relativity,
Wazeck (2011) writes that “non-academic researchers like Patschke announced public
lectures, submitted essays, and tried to establish contact with Einstein and other lead-
ing scholars in order to warn them— as well-intentioned colleagues— of the falsehood
of the theory of relativity and to convince them of the veracity of their own scientiđc
worldviews. Patschke and others like himwere oĕen simply ignored; in other instances,
it was patiently explained how their criticisms of the theory of relativity had completely
missed themark”, in the sameway thatmodern cranks are ignored by academic physics.
⁶P. Bourdieu, in Lamaison (1986).
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7.9 Making up worlds
I have argued that the salient feature that distinguishes cranks fromprofessionally sanc-
tioned physicists is that cranks, because of their lack of enculturation, lack the crucial
pieces of collective tacit knowledge that would make them part of the community. I
đnally wish to discuss the case of a person that although not a professional physicist,
has managed to convincingly portray the language of physics and of science in general
to a wide audience with much success. I was led to interview the author Ian McEwan
by a comment made by Berry,
I’ve just read— this is required reading for you— the new novel by Ian
McEwan called Solar. I’ve just read it this weekend and I’m waiting for
all my colleagues to come back to tell them to read it, because that’s about
a particular individual doing theoretical physics and…it’s not very com-
plimentary about the guy. It’s a novel, so the human weakness is all there
and it’s full of tremendous insights. I mean, he really…he’s not a sociolo-
gist, but noĂelists understand people and they get into other people’s worlds
and I found it very uncomfortable because you know…I was wondering
all this while why I was đnding it uncomfortable and I realised that there
aren’tmany novels about theoretical physicists, and I suppose anyonewho
is reading a novel about the world in which they live— a lawyer for exam-
ple reading a novel about bad behaviour among lawyers—would probably
feel uncomfortable if the novel is a hit. I found myself feeling guilty for
the bad deeds of this guy in the novel, guilty on behalf of theoretical physi-
cists. It’s very interesting to read. It’s also funny. He exaggerates a little bit
here and there; it goes over the top but I forgive him that because it’s such
a good read. (emphasis added)
McEwan is well-known for his extremely realistic portrayals of scientiđc characters,
and these feature oĕen in his novels. Importantly, McEwan does not shy away from
using technical language in his work, but themanner in which he acquires the ability to
use this language conĂincingly is particularly interesting. I interviewed McEwan, who
received help from Mitchison for Solar in which the main character is a theoretical
physicist,
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McEwan: I needed help not necessarily on the ideas, but on how physicists
would say them. ăere were a number of times when Graeme Mitchison
said to me, “oh well that’s correct, but we don’t say that. We don’t say…
we don’t keep saying ‘General ăeory’.” ăere was phraseology like that
that mattered to me. And you do have to separate those out. ăey are
simply matters of đctional realism, to get those things right. I did a lot of
research for a novel called Saturday, I don’t know if you’ve read that. I had
to describe surgical procedures of a neurosurgeon and I followed closelyone
particular surgeon [for two years]. When I showed him what I’d written
most of his commentswere of thekind, “yes that’s right, but that’s notwhat
we say.” I think that is broadly one of the important areas where one does
need the input of the profession, because you can get all the facts correct but
it’s the way in which people represent these facts to themselves within the
profession that you can never inĂent. [...] Yes, the turns of phrase that a
surgeon might use to an anaesthetist; the shorthand that develops when
people work in a team, you could never invent. And likewise in a commu-
nity like the community of theoretical physics, if they refer to an equation,
they might do so in a shorthand or in the way that a layman could never
guess at, and those little things are very important. I hadmany letters from
surgeons. (emphasis added)
McEwan perfectly illustrates the point made by Collins (2010, p. 124) that one
must make a distinction between exhibitingmechanical technical skills or ‘plain’ prođ-
ciency in the usage of language, and exhibiting these in a “socially sensitive way”. Some
cranks are extreme examples of individuals with high technical skills and perhaps high
prođciency in the language, butminimal orno ‘social sensitivity’ toprofessional physics.
McEwan, through immersion in the for-of-life of scientiđc language, is the other ex-
treme: amaster in social sensitivity, withno technical skill at all. ăewide acceptance of
McEwan’s work (he proudly stated how he had only received one complaint about the
language in the novel from a theoretician, and the complaint was brushed oﬀ by other
physicists who scrutinised it) and the wide rejection of crank’s highlights the relevance
of ‘social sensitivity’ to the social world of physics and the acquisition of collective tacit
knowledge as an intrinsic part of theoretical physics practice.
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Conclusions
ůsn’t it clear to you, a mćhemćician, ĭć only diﬀerences — diﬀerences in
temperćure, only ĭermal contrĆt— only in ĭem ĝĭere life.
— ſevgeny ƀamaytin, Ěom ‘Žū’
ăeproblem of communication and the heterogeneity of
physics practice
Although I have tried to draw up as comprehensive a picture of theoretical physics as
possible, the present work does not exhaust all the dimensions of the đeld that could
be sociologically probed, nor have I reached themaximumpossible depth in themicro-
cultures that were examined. One of the most fascinating features of modern physics
is that it has become such a wide đeld of knowledge, and with so many connections to
other sciences, that for one person to be intimately acquainted with all its topics seems
impossible, such is the heterogeneity of practices and expertises that make up the đeld.
It is this heterogeneity that gives rise to themain research question of the thesis, that is,
to đnd a solution to the problem of communication between dissimilar micro-cultures
in physic; within a homogenous social group, the problem of communication is not a
problem, by reductio ad absurdum. As such, the problem of communication can be
put into a wider context beyond the sociology of science not as a feature of theoreti-
cal physics, but as a question regarding the integration of heterogeneous social groups
207
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in general. ăe đnal answer given here, reproduced from Chapter 4, is the following
đgure:
I reiterate themain characteristics of the horseshoe diagram as the principal way to
address the problem of communication in physics:
1. Physics is a đeld of knowledge within which one can observe the division of
labour into a number of ‘micro expertises’ (the lozenges that make up the horse-
shoe diagram).
2. ăese expertises comprise esoteric đelds of knowledge that display epistemic au-
tonomy from each other.
3. ăe expertises are deđned as esoteric domains and are delimited by localised sets
of tacit knowledge.
4. Although the expertises are autonomous, there is a Ĕowof knowledge across their
boundaries. ăe Ĕow can be modelled using the SEE approach.
5. ăe Ĕow of knowledge follows the pattern in the diagram: expertises which are
epistemically/ culturally/ sociologically close to each other interact through the
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elaboration of interactional expertise bonds. Expertises that are distant from
each other establish interaction through lower-level knowledge.
6. Physics is thus a ‘disuniđed’ science, but the disjoint micro-cultures remain con-
nected by SEE-type interactions.
Physicists inparticular tend todevelop interactional expertisewith colleagueswithin
their own ‘families’ of practices (i.e. within high-theory, phenomenology, and experi-
ment). Although sometimes they choose to migrate to diﬀerent families or expertises,
this is not common, as it requires the apprehension of a new form-of-life. Even consid-
ering that a ‘culture of physics’ underlies all of these traditions, the picture of physics
that I wish to project is one of multiplicity in the whole; a multiplicity that is ‘bridged’
in practice by personal knowledge transfer, and by sociological trust. ăese esoteric
domains can therefore be practiced ‘for their own sake’ while at the same time being
socially connected by SEE type interactions to the wider web of physics.
Heterogeneity as a feature of modern physics
As sociologists have recognised since the 19th century the transition from ‘traditional’
to modern societies was parallel to the transition from social and cultural homogene-
ity to a state of heterogeneity. ăe fragmentation of physics into its distinct micro-
cultures is the reĔection of this ‘modern condition’, and could perhaps be historically
traced along the classical sociological lines of the division of labour, specialisation, etc.
It would be a worthwhile investigation to ask, for example, if physics has always been
as fragmented as it is today. My guess is that one would đnd it has not, but however in-
teresting, a more complete answer is beyond the scope of this work. ăe heterogeneity
that has been posited since the đrst pages of this work is not a trivial one. ăe sociolog-
ical partition talked about here implies large amounts of cultural incommensurability,
distinct forms-of-life, autonomous styles of knowledge creation, large amounts of un-
shared tacit knowledge, and localisation of social networks. True, one must not forget
that beneath all these micro-cultures there is an underlying ‘culture of physics’, but as
I have tried to show the incommensurability and autonomy arise despite these ubiq-
uitous cultural elements being there. Collins & Evans’ model of expertise provides a
precise way to talk about how social tendrils are stretched across these divides.
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ăe beauty of Collins & Evans’ model answer to the problem of communication is
that it openly allows incommensurability to Ĕourish as part of a stable social system.
By positing that interactional expertise necessitates that one group become ‘parasitic’
on the tacit knowledge repository of the other, it permits these two groups to function
independently. ăe đgures of ‘interactional ambassadors’ , ‘interactional translators’
and ‘special interactional expert’ allow the communication across boundaries to occur.
Crucially, they do not blur the boundaries, but operate ‘with one foot in each side’.
8.1 Tacit knowledge in theoretical physics
I have also illustrated how tacit knowledge in all its forms enters theoretical practice at
the interface between the lozenges, but also how tacit skills shape the everyday practice
of theoretical physics. Tacit knowledge is seen to play a Janus faced role in relation to
communication in physics: collective tacit knowledge allows communication inside an
esoteric group to bemore eﬃcient, but limits access to the group for outsiders; somatic
tacit knowledge allows for skilful, virtuous elaboration of theory, but is impossible to
transmit to other individuals; collective tacit knowledge makes physics a living, grow-
ing discipline, but severely bars outsiders from joining its ranks. Although mathemat-
ical logic and proof construction at times serve as mechanisms to diminish the tacit
dimension, it is impossible to do away with it completely.
Nothingofwhat has been said in thiswork about physics shouldbeparticularly new
to physicists. In their daily lives, physicists—most of them— are quite aware of the so-
ciological dimensions of their practice, for they must take professional decisions based
on these existing social circumstances. However, most of these social circumstances
are invisible to outsiders, and being part of the form-of-life of science may even remain
hidden behind the veil of the collective tacit for the practitioners themselves save for ex-
ceptional circumstances. ăe task of sociology can then be visualised as being strongly
oriented towards bringing the collective tacit to the fore.
Regarding the somatic tacit and intuition, the situation for sociologists is compli-
cated by the fact that it is not linguistic immersion but practice that permits its acqui-
sition, and thus the sociologist is leĕ only with second-order accounts for illustrative
purposes. Nevertheless, here philosophy comes to the sociologist’s aid, allowing one to
transpose what prođciency means in particular domain and translate it into another.
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An important point of SEE is that all human beings, simply because they are social an-
imals, have prođciency in at least their native culture and their native language. ăus
by examining our own manner of using language, we can understand what it is like to
be prođcient in carrying out general skilled activities, in having gained somatic skills in
other domains. In this, theoretical physics is also no diﬀerent to other domains of hu-
man activity, with the exception that the set of skills for theoreticians lies almost exclu-
sively in the realm of the purely mental. Nevertheless, as Polanyi argued, the diﬀerence
between the purely mental realm and the physically-embodied one is insigniđcant in
terms of how knowledge is structured, acquired and oĕen times also experienced; as
Lakatos (1980, p. 14) pointed out, it is aĕer all only an assumption “that there is a nat-
ural, psychological borderline between theoretical or speculative propositions on the
one hand and factual or observational (or basic) propositions on the other”.
8.2 Heterogeneity in modern societies
ăe comprehension of forms-of-life through the acquisition of localised tacit knowl-
edge is the heart of Collins & Evans’ expertise model. ăe analysis oﬀered in this work
is an example of this structure, albeit in a precisely bounded cultural setting, the world
of theoretical physics. But one can refract the answer given to the problem of commu-
nication in theoretical physics back onto a wider sociological context, and ponder on
the kind of answers that sociology has given to similar problems in our intrinsically and
increasingly heterogeneous modern societies.
I began this thesis by placing my analysis of theoretical physics and its cultures and
forms-of-life within the larger problem of the fragmentation of cultures which social
studies of science has named the problem of disunity. To recapitulate, this problem fo-
cuses on how it is possible for sciences such as physics, made up of diverse epistemic ele-
ments and forms-of-life, to form a coherent community where cooperation and knowl-
edge exchange is produceddespite the existenceof cross-cultural boundaries. Myanswer
is that the existence of trust and of interactional experts is the two-fold solution to the
problem of disunity. ăere are many practical problems intrinsic to complex modern
societies where the expertise model could đnd application— not as a natural solution
to these problems, but as a means to reĚame current debates within an approach that
can deal from the start, with the multiplicity of forms-of-life coexisting side by side.
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ăe problem of cultural autonomy of ethnic minorities, for example, is a challenge
to many if not most nations; whether it is due to the cultural diversity that is a historic
legacy of modern nation-states such as is faced by societies up and down the American
continent, or the challenges posed by the increased immigration inĔux nowadays faced
by Western Europe. ăe sociology of ethnic minorities poses a challenging situation,
one where problems of cross-cultural fragmentation, communication and political in-
tegration seems to lead to terrainswhereCollins&Evans’model and the extrapolations
made by this workmight seem applicable. In the remaining section I will focus on con-
sidering two such problems where cultural and form-of-life fragmentation have arisen
in two very diﬀerent socio-political settings.
8.3 Heterogeneity: two challenges
Cultural heterogeneity is a problem that is faced by all modern societies. Since the Za-
patista Army of National Liberation’s 1994 declaration of war on theMexican govern-
ment, theproblemofmulticulturalismbecamehighly visible in thenationwidepolitical
agenda to Mexican society at large. ăe anti-neoliberalism and anti-globalisation Za-
patista movement was based in the state of Chiapas, one of Mexico’s poorest and most
ethnically diverse regions. One of its hardest fought demands was the political recogni-
tion of this diversity, along with the legal protection of ‘indigenous rights’ of the Chia-
pas native peoples.Ʋ In 1996 the conĔict received partial resolution with the presiden-
tial signature of the San Andrés Accords, which granted autonomy, the right to self-rule
and recognition of the indigenous rights of to these ethnic minorities. Aĕer months
of negotiations, the Mexican Constitution was subject to modiđcations based on the
San Andrés agreement (modiđcations to which the Zapatistas, international NGO’s
and human-rights agencies were extremely critical, as they saw them as a watered down
version of the agreements, and an insult to a legitimate political movement and a grave
national problem).
Despite the Zapatista’s discontent, the Mexican Constitution now explicitly ac-
knowledges the ‘pluricultural’ nature of the Mexican nation, and grants indigenous
communities the right to ‘autonomy’ regarding their traditional formsof self-organisation,
ƲSee Stahler-Sholk (2007) for a historical summary of the Zapatista movement’s development.
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as well as the right to self-regulation of their social, economic, political and cultural
activities. ăis, however, was a quick political đx to a complex problem that has not
received a solution. Chiapas and its indigenous people still lag behind the rest of Mex-
ico in terms of development and wealth, probably as much as before the constitutional
amendments.
ăe Zapatista movement is now widely recognised as a social movement that not
only attempted to bring recognition to the cultural and đnancial plight of the indige-
nous peoples of Chiapas, but as a Latin America-wide struggle that has faced oﬀ ethnic
minorities and underprivileged social groups against a neoliberal national projects that
have, in these groups’ views, only deepened ampliđed their already dire situation. But
as the Zapatista movement developed, it found necessary not only to struggle against
theMexican government’s neoliberal agenda, but also to đnd new deđnitions of auton-
omy that would allow the movement to circumvent neoliberal versions of autonomy
such as were seen to be reĔected in the Constitutional changes. One of the most in-
teresting facets of Zapatismo has been the redeđnition of autonomy as a concept that
recognises the special situations of localised ethnic groups but that does not confuse
the boundaries between autonomy and secession from theMexican nation at large.
Nash (1997) has pointed out that this balance between autonomy and political co-
hesion has been a recurring topic in Latin American history, as nations attempt to bal-
ance the heterogeneity of their societies with the development of ‘national projects:
‘Nation building has oĕen been assumed to require the assimilation or even annihila-
tion of marginalized cultures. ăe pluricultural base of Mexican society (like that of
many other Latin American states with large indigenous populations) was seen as an
obstacle to modernity”. ăus Zapatismo not only đghts for autonomy, but struggles
internally to đnd new boundaries for autonomy, new deđnitions of what it is to have
a plural society where no micro-culture is leĕ behind, but where traditional cultures
retain this newly-developed autonomy while still being ‘fully Mexican’.Ƴ As a Zapatista
quoted byNash puts it, “we are allMexicans, but each lives and feels his or herMexican-
ness diﬀerently”. In fact, the Zapatista movement demands a re-examination of what
‘Mexicanness’ implies, how the Mexican form-of-life can be compatible with a tradi-
tional indigenous form-of-life — in fact, a large number of them, since the indigenous
cultures of Mexico are themselves deeply diﬀerentiated.
ƳSee Mora (2007).
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Zapatismo thusoﬀers a cultural locuswhere cultural complexity is in constant strug-
gle with a vision of cultural homogeneity embedded in a national project. A similar
situation, albeit under diﬀerent circumstances, is faced by many First World nations
where immigration has confronted cultural minorities suddenly immersed within a
larger homogeneous culture. ăe scholarly literature points to two generalised political
strategies to face this situation, the so-called assimilation perspective versus themulticul-
turalism perspective.ƴ ăe former is a homogeneity-centred view inwhich the end result
of immigration processes is ideally the full subjugation of ethnic identities to a central
national project, while the second places diversity and the maintenance of ethnic mi-
norities’ identities above any national identity. Lambert et al. (1990) have identiđed
these diﬀerences in the attitudes of both immigrants and natives in the United States
of America and its ‘melting-pot’, integration-centred politics, and the Candian multi-
cultural politics which are in fact seen as a deđning quality of ‘Canadianness’.
Currently, with an increasingly interlinked world — politically, economically, and
in physicalmobilisation terms—ModernWestern democracies in general, particularly
in Europe, have recently been forced to rethink their policies regarding the heteroge-
neous composition of their contemporary societies in the face of a political claim of
multiculturalism’s ‘failure’. In general, there has been a widespread backlash against the
idea of a pluralistic society by the right-wing political status quo. Nearly a year ago,Ger-
man chancellor Angela Merkel stated the following regarding the failure of the ‘multi-
kulti’ public policy of immigrant integration in Germany,⁴
We are a country which at the beginning of the 1960s actually brought
guest workers toGermany. Now they live with us, andwe lied to ourselves
for a while saying that they wouldn’t stay, and that they would disappear
one day. ăat’s not the reality. ăismulticultural approach, saying that we
simply live side-by-side and are happy about each other, this approach is
failed. Utterly failed.
Merkel also added
ƴSee Lambert et al. (1990). ăedichotomy is also sometimes posed as the debate between integration
versus assimilation; see Harles (1997).
⁴“Merkel saysGermanmulticultural society has failed”, BBCnews, 17October 2010,http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451.
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We should not be a country either which gives an impression to the out-
sideworld that thosewhodonot speakGerman immediately orwhoweren’t
raised speaking German are not welcome here. ăat would do great dam-
age to our country. Companies will go elsewhere because they can’t đnd
the people to work here anymore. ăat means that the demand for inte-
gration is one of our key tasks for the time to come.
ăis problem, particularly regardingMuslim cultural integration, has received sim-
ilar answers from other European heads of state. David Cameron for example declared
that⁵
In the UK, some young men đnd it hard to identify with the traditional
Islam practiced at home by their parents, whose customs can seem staid
when transplanted to modern Western countries. But these young men
also đnd it hard to identify with Britain too, because we’ve allowed the
weakening of our collective identity. Under the doctrine of state multi-
culturalism we’ve encouraged diﬀerent cultures to lead separate lives, apart
from each other, and apart Ěom the mainstream. […] We’ve even toler-
ated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely
counter to our values. So when a white person holds objectionable views,
racist views for instance, we rightly condemn them, but when equally un-
acceptable views or practices come from someone who isn’t white, we’ve
been too cautious, frankly… frankly even fearful, to stand up to them. […]
ăis hands-oﬀ tolerance has only served to reinforce the sense that not
enough is shared. (emphasis added)
French president Nicolas Sarkozy also declaredmulticulturalism “a failure”, adding
that, ‘the truth is that, in all our democracies, we’ve been too concerned about the
identity of the new arrivals and not enough about the identity of the country receiv-
ing them”. ⁶ Spanish ex-prime minister José María Aznar declared during a speech at
Georgetown University that he believed that “multiculturalism is a big failure”, fur-
thermore adding, “I’m against the idea of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism divides
⁵“State multiculturalism has failed, says David Cameron”, BBC News, 5 February 2011, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994.
⁶“Sarkozy joins allies burying multiculturalism”, Reuters U. S. on-line edition.
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our societies, debilitates our societies,multiculturalismdoes not produce tolerance, nor
integration. And this is one of the reasons of the great failures in several European so-
cieties at this moment”. ⁷
Is homogeneity intrinsic to social integration?
Can the expertisemodel say anything at all about problems like the ones posed by these
heads of state? Is cultural heterogeneity really “one of the reasons of the great failures
in several European societies at this moment”, as Aznar believes? Does positing a soci-
ety where autonomous cultures coexist side by side necessarily lead to a failed society?
Should we accept that the only path to ‘integration’ is homogenisation of the cultural
landscape? Are ethnic minorities in the UK as segregated from British modern culture
as Cameron claims? Is it really impossible to live side-by-side and be happy about each
other unless we all ‘speak’ German? Are the indigenous ethnic groups of Mexico as au-
tonomous and free from cultural homogenisation as the Mexican Constitution claims
them to be, or have they been forcibly integrated into a modern society that has erased
a major part of their indigenous cultural inheritance despite putative protection from
the law? What is it, in the end, to ‘integrate’ a minority group into the wider society
into which it is embedded by forced physical contiguity? According to the changing
tides of European politics, integration seems to imply the adoption of a ‘parent’ culture
in deterrence of the immigrant’s native one. In practice, the Mexican state has leĕ in-
digenous cultures to their own devices to fend for itself within a society that repudiates
their ‘backward’ traditions.
Rethinking these problems in terms of Collins & Evans’ expertise model, I believe,
oﬀers another option, which is the possibility of cultural understanding within diver-
sity, and not one of cultural dominance, nor of cultural fragmentation. ăis opens
up the possibility to think in terms of heterogeneity and homogeneity simultaneously:
heterogeneity in practices, but within one linguistic universe-set that is bound by very
general cultural practices. ăis does not mean that a maximal-heterogeneity choice
⁷“Aznar asegura en Georgetown que el multiculturalismo ’divide y debilita a las sociedades”
(”Aznars assures audience in Georgetown that multiculturalism ’divides and weakens’ socities”, El
Mundo España, 27 October 2066, http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2006/10/27/espana/
1161909568.html.
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is intrinsic to this model, only that it allows a reformulation of the problem itself. It
also allows one to pose the question — the empirical question — of whether or not
interactional expertise-type integration has occurred or not in particular societies rel-
ative to their most ‘isolated’ groups, and whether multicultural projects are per se the
sources of modern European social project ‘failures’. As Ribeiro (2007a, p. 562) notes,
issues regarding interactional expertise are directly relevant “to the much larger prob-
lem of how cooperative projects between two social worlds, forms-of-life, paradigms or
cultures that involve linguistic, cultural or conceptual discontinuities can be made to
work”.
Have the ‘youngMuslimmen’ of Britain really no understanding of British culture?
Collins and Evans’ imitation game methodology could, in principle, give an answer to
such a question by exhibiting whether or not youngMuslimmen have any interactional
expertise in relation to the wider British culture. If, as is my gut feeling, one were to
đnd that young Muslim men in the UK are good interactional experts relative to the
wider British culture (for are they not fully immersed in, at the very least, the linguistic
aspects of British culture which is the crucial element in developing interactional ex-
pertise?) then the ‘multiculturalism is a failure’ thesis could be, perhaps, re-examined
by asking whether the problem is not in young Muslim men’s lack of understanding of
white British culture, but in the white British political establishment failing to under-
stand any other cultural possibility that is not a domineering version of its own white
British version. In the Mexican context one might đnd that despite the political class’
rhetorical stress on the importance of incorporating ethnic autochthonous minorities
into its ‘national project’, imitation games could show these groups to be completely
segregated from the general socio-cultural milieu. Again, I do not propose that the ex-
pertise model can or will provide an immediate answer to these extremely complicated
problems, but only that it gives a strong analytical tool to frame the problem of cultural
heterogeneity diﬀerently, just as in this work it allowed the problem of communication
in a fragmented science to be reframed from a diﬀerent perspective.
Let us turn back to the case of physics and the problem of communication. I have
argued that the micro-cultures of physics are fragmented — culturally fragmented —
despite the fact that they are ‘embedded’ into the universe-set of physics as a whole. Yet
how is this diﬀerent from the fragmentation of modern Western societies that nowa-
days face the problems of multiculturalism? ăere may or may not be signiđcant dif-
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ferences, but whatever the case physics and its micro-cultures oﬀer at least one example
of a collection of fragmented cultural groups that nevertheless remains ‘integrated’ de-
spite a large degree of heterogeneity and autonomy between its constituent cultures. I
have tried to show how there is ample participation from all the micro-cultures in the
grand scheme of physics, which is creating knowledge about the physical world even
when physics micro-cultures in the horseshoe diagram only have low-level knowledge
regarding those cultures that are far away. By any standards, physics is not only pretty
good at what it claims to do in creating knowledge, but is also one of the most success-
ful intellectual enterprises in modern human history in terms of material accomplish-
ments.
Itwould be all too easy to fall into the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ of suggesting that because
physics is well integrated by interactional expertise and trust-based mechanisms, these
same mechanisms of integration could be applied to any social context and that this
would render good results. For example, there is the most particular situation that in
the grand scheme of physics the micro-cultures have mostly equal epistemic grounding
amongst themselves: experiment, phenomenology and high-theory share, so to speak,
equal amounts of epistemic power and though one may be more popular at particular
times or spaces, the distribution of power seems to bewell spread out. ModernWestern
democracies, despite their titles, do not generally exhibit widespread balances of power.
Young Muslim men in the UK can hardly be said to have equal access to places of po-
litical power, which aremostly populated by upper-class white Britishmen. InMexico,
a country that only became anything like a proper democracy a decade ago, having the
skin colour and appearance of an indigenous people still carries with it deep and cruel
social stigmas in a society obsessed with the white European phenotype. It would be
terribly naïf to propose that lack of mutual cultural understanding is the crucial prob-
lem in every case, but it is worth asking whether the solution of bulldozing cultural
diﬀerences is the only possible answer to integration.
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